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LINCOLN IN POWER

THE myth-making energies of the American people are busy with Lincoln.[1] When they stop trying to make a God out of a human American, we may be able once again to study his extraordinary life for the real lessons there are in it. Perhaps even the myth-making will contribute to our understanding. It provides a motive for endless study and discussion. Too much dross and fulsome nonsense have been accumulated, of course, but the excitement over Lincoln's life, and the attempt to understand his greatness, have led serious scholars to pile up a heap of dependable facts. We may eventually understand them.

It would not be safe, however, for any one now to say that the Lincoln he was talking about was the "real" Lincoln. What I am talking about here is the person that has been revealed to us in the studies thus far made, and I am using our present picture of this person to illustrate certain principles and conclusions about a philosophical problem. Lincoln's saintliness of character was combined with extraordinary elements of strength. These qualities make his behavior in the last four years of his life, when he was lifted up without preparation into the presidency, of great value in illuminating the problem of power.

The problem of power has always been important to thoughtful students of politics; it has never been more acute than now.

[1] The substance of this essay was delivered at Cooper Union in New York, February 10, 1946, as the Sixth Annual Lincoln Lecture, in honor of Lincoln's Cooper Union address in the same Great Hall, February 27, 1860.

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I mean by power, the control or influence that a man may have over the lives and destinies of others. The problem is acute now because we have, in modern times, enlarged the influence of men in office while we have, at the same time, increased the expectation of all men for freedom and self-government. Herein lies a paradox that is little understood and in no way taken care of. The problem of power is also a dominating concern in our time because we are building concentrations of power parallel to concentrations of relevant knowledge without building adequate bridges of communication or understanding between the men who can master the knowledge and those who make policy in government and business.

It may be that a search into the facts of Lincoln's life for exemplification of the principles of power may give us some hints as to how we should proceed toward solution of this problem. Power corrupts, we are told; and we ought, if we can, to find out if Lincoln was corrupted and if not what it was in him that resisted the effect of his four years in office. That he had only four years may be one of the things that protected him against deterioration. He hardly had time to change. There is also the fact that he was plunged into crisis at the same time that he was given his post. It is in times of the gravest danger that men are likely to rise above themselves. If power inevitably corrupts, it seems to have its worst effects in times when men can sink to their ordinary levels of personality and to be least damaging to the soul when great urgency and great danger must be faced. The poets may say that Lincoln did not give in to corruption because he was Lincoln, but that does not help much in understanding what the possession of authority does to personality nor how we can select the men who are to control the state.

The process of selection itself in a self-governing country suggests a principle worth examination. The principle is that the qualities that get a man into power are not those that lead him, once established, to use power wisely. There is a simple democratic theory that the best man gets the office. In American thinking this is badly mixed up with the idea that some men "deserve" office, as if the right to control other men, to blast or benefit the future, were something that should be paid over

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as a reward for achievement in other fields or for virtue. The only rational explanation of this common American substitution of moral judgments for judgments that should be mostly intellectual is that the common man, casting his vote, feels far more secure in moral judgments than he does in judgments on intelligence or on technical equipment. He thinks he knows a good man when he sees one. He thinks he knows by his own native shrewdness whom he can afford to trust. He is not nearly so sure as to who has brains and who has appropriate training, because he is unfamiliar with the exercise of intelligence on high levels, and he is aware of his own lack of technical understanding of problems involved. But whatever kind of judgment the voters try to make, it is still a dangerous doctrine that the best man will generally get the office by the ordinary operations of politics in a republic like ours. The qualities that get a man into office are not identical, and some of them are inharmonious, with high intelligence, disinterestedness, moral integrity and objective imagination.

What about Lincoln? How did an obscure Illinois lawyer get to be president of the United States? It is difficult, of course, at this distance and with the handicap of our own habits of mass communication to estimate exactly how well known Lincoln may have been. He received 110 votes for the vice presidential nomination in the first convention of the Republican Party, four years before his successful campaign, but it is quite likely that he was sincere in saying, when he heard the news, that it must have been another man named Lincoln.

He had some assets and some very evident handicaps. He had a homely origin and a quite sincere way of exploiting his feeling of closeness to ordinary people. He knew how people of his own region thought and felt. He had also a sense of strategy. His experiences on the lecture platform, at Cooper Union and elsewhere, and even to some extent in his debates with Douglas, made him aware that he did not make a very good impression at first meeting. He shrewdly decided on no campaign trips after he was nominated. He let the crisis work for him.

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In spite, however, of the handicap that Lincoln suffered in an uncouth appearance, he had learned by this time how to make full use of his native gift of eloquence. The myth-making process has worked in Lincoln's case as in so many others. It has, by what may well be an overestimation of its victim's wisdom and saintliness, tended to obscure a real claim to greatness. Lincoln was a master of words. He had learned his eloquence in the school of practical effect but he had the extra quality of a sense for beautiful phrases. Sometimes these were carefully polished and rehearsed, as in the Gettysburg address; sometimes they came in letters as in the letter to James C. Conkling, of August 26, 1863, which he intended to have read in public. "The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea."

On the other hand, he was unpredictable and often disagreed with what a more conventional person would have thought the appropriate mood for an occasion. This may have been a handicap at times and a great asset at others. The most famous example is the reading of several pages of a farcical essay by Artemus Ward to his assembled and uneasy cabinet on the morning of September 22, 1862. They knew he had called them together for the promulgation of the Emancipation Proclamation. By the somewhat dubious victory at Antietam the North now felt strong enough to use the emancipation of the slaves in the southern states as a war measure. It is reported that they squirmed, some of them, when Lincoln insisted on their hearing such labored absurdities before they got down to the business at hand. Unpredictable he was and possibly, on that occasion, tactless, but at other times he showed an astonishing sense of simple appropriateness and direct good manners.

It is in this area of his unpredictability, or originality, of character that one finds the transition from his assets to his liabilities as a politician. His moody personality, his fits of melancholy and absent-mindedness were an old story to his neighbors in Springfield. He was gentle and was always believed to be a little queer; and there were undoubtedly some who did not want to trust him with power because they were not sure what went on when the black curtains of his melancholy shut him off from

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all neighborly acquaintance. The Brady photographs that have done so much to fix the Lincoln picture in our minds have given us a good many suggestions of a solemn and unhappy man. But this may be part of the myth. He may have been more generally companionable than we realize.

A greater handicap to a politician was his honesty. Much of the feeling of frustration and defeat that seems to have dodged him for years came from the collapse of his ambitions when he was a member of Congress, serving his only term. In 1847, almost at the beginning of his term, he offended the war spirit of his constituents by his severe criticism of Polk's administration on account of the Mexican War. Still more, his honesty showed itself in the fact that he persisted, long after it was expedient or even intelligible to his friends, in distinguishing between a moral condemnation of slavery and political abolitionism. In his youth, on the flat-boat journey to New Orleans, he saw Negro girls sold as slaves and after that he hated slavery. He never left doubt in anyone's mind, no matter what the occasion or the issue, that he considered slavery all wrong. But because of his innate and stubborn conservatism, which was interpreted then as it would be now by many men of good will as mere legalistic timidity, he insisted also that the Constitution had given the southern states a right to maintain slavery within original bounds. He fought its extension into new lands because he was sure the Constitution did not give the slave-holding territories any right to expand it. He cherished the hope that time would destroy it because it could not pay profits on old land.

But he was not an abolitionist at any time—even in September 1862. An honest man, a conservative man, a man who will protect the legal rights of his neighbor to do what he thinks is a moral wrong, is not a man who is easily understood by voters, nor a very likely candidate for high political office.

What we are bound to do, I think, is to give credit very largely to luck, to the good fortune of the American people, for the fact that a combination of accidents made Lincoln's real qualities evident to a few and made it possible to make of him a symbol not well understood but emotionally stirring to the

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northern and western voters who elected him in 1860. Here no principle of power can be exemplified except the principle, if it is one, that in democratic elections accidents may be beneficent.

No matter how a man may come into office, corrupting forces begin to work on him as soon as he takes control over the destinies of other men. They are real, these disintegrating forces, and they bore down on Lincoln. By studying his day-by-day experience, we can get a glimpse of what happens. I am offering hypothetical formulations of the factors. Following the principle just discussed, that men appear to be corrupted by power because the qualities that lead to power are not those that provide a man with wisdom, the second principle is that the actual exercise of power is largely the process of choosing among the ideas that are proposed by lieutenants. It is very difficult to say how ironic Plato may have been when he said cities should never have rest from their evils until philosophers are kings or political greatness and wisdom meet in one. Looking at men in power does not lead us confidently to the belief that any combination of kingly qualities and philosophic wisdom is likely to be exercised by one man at any time in his life. He may be philosopher when out of office, like Balfour, Haldane or Morley. He may be philosopher during a campaign to settle the issues, as Madison and Hamilton were while writing the *Federalist*. But to be a philosopher and king at the same time is something far more difficult than to exercise alternately the two sets of qualities that are sometimes found together in one personality. Marcus Aurelius may be an exception but that would leave us with a further problem. How much is a stoic essayist really a philosopher and how much is he an overwrought soul finding escape from the philosophic problem of government in moralizing on human destiny? Plato may have intended to state an impossible combination. At any rate, we can see that the exercise of power is a process of such a nature that a man can seldom be philosopher while he is busy being king.

Lincoln, like every other man who ever had power, spent most of his time in saying yes or no. This is not the usual picture of power but the truth. Many men of good will and high imagination are haunted by a naïve dream of being great. They want

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to be great in order to do by fiat what they see no other way of doing. But the man who has the actual experience, day by day and hour by hour, of controlling other men soon discovers that he spends his time in passing judgment on the initiatives of others. He has no time, or very little, to think out ideas of his own. This is to say that power, exercised for any length of time and in any degree of thoroughness, is in practice negative. Of course, he is often credited with the idea that others have conceived and have offered to him for approval; this is part of the sycophancy of advice. But a man who actually must decide what is done in any context chooses among the ideas that compete for his attention. In doing this he must also choose among the men who compete for a chance to exercise a share of his authority. He dispenses instead of commanding.

Lincoln found this out before he got away from Springfield. The office seekers descended on his home like flies, persistent, trivial, selfish, unashamed. For weeks he stumbled over them wherever he tried to go. When they failed to get a little of his wearied attention, they tried to enlist Mrs. Lincoln to help them. It is no part of our subject here to discuss the part Mary Todd played in Lincoln's life. She has probably been abused far beyond her deserts, and more recent writers, like J. G. Randall for example, are making a gallant attempt to restore her reputation. But the story persists that when Lincoln started for Washington to take the presidency he had to leave Mary, his wife, lying on the floor in a tantrum of screaming rage, because he would not appoint one of her friends to a desired post. The office seeker invaded his most intimate relationships, and this probably annoyed him even more than the fact that some of his campaign managers, probably against his direct command, made substantial promises of office and emoluments as a purchase price for support of the Republican candidate.

Above this difficulty, which is a normal part of the getting of power and inescapable, Lincoln rose and showed his love of humanity even when it was being most exasperatingly human. He showed humility also, when he appointed to his cabinet the best men he could get in spite of the arrogance of some of them and the personal insults he had taken from others.

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As soon as he actually took charge of the American government, the new president found that his simple idealism in appointing men like Seward and Chase to be his lieutenants was not matched on their part by any noble courtesy. Instead he got condescension and sometimes arrogance and sometimes even sabotage. There appears to have been no one in the cabinet who was any less anxious than Lincoln to preserve the Union by winning the war, but some of them took curious ways of showing it. However that may have been, even with a cabinet completely loyal, Lincoln would still have been subjected to the pressure of other men's ideas, which is the corrupting influence we are now discussing. There can be no doubt, I think, that part of the corrosion of integrity that takes place when a man commands others is caused by his relation to the ideas that make up policy. He chooses the ideas of others and then judges of their success and failure. Men in subordinate posts often have to put into effect their own ideas and have judgment passed upon them and have then to accept the judgment of others, approving or otherwise. The man who works alone, the man who works by the permission of another, in fact most men, have a constant check upon our common tendency to think we are always right by the fact that their own ideas, when put to test, may fail. This is a paradox that would be astonishing if it were not hidden from our notice by its very commonplaceness. The man who is subordinate must often pay for his mistakes. The man who is in power can nearly always blame someone else for what goes wrong and can easily persuade even himself that a disaster was someone else's fault. This, of course, has nothing to do with the symbolic or charismatic function of a leader in time of crisis.

In a better ordered world it would, no doubt, be arranged in the contrary fashion. Men in power would then be held responsible for errors; not in the slow accounting of history or in time of crisis, but day by day. Corruption lies in the fact that exercising power is the process of accepting or rejecting other men's ideas, and this corrupts because it protects from direct responsibility.

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Lincoln had other difficulties of the same kind. He was pestered by office seekers who were trying to share his authority and get incomes for themselves, he had advisers on the highest levels who were arrogant and obstructive, and he had outside pressures like, for example, the abolitionists who were constantly urging upon him courses of action that he had either to accept or turn down. Whenever he turned down advice, no matter how rash, he ran the risk of making enemies and made still more difficult the other aspect of exercising power, which is to keep it.

It is another part of the dream of men of good will, wishing they had power in order to benefit man, to think they could be secure in exercising power if once they could get it. As can be easily observed, the influence over others that is exercised in public is never secure, and most kinds of publicly exercised power are insecure in proportion to their extent. I say public power because there are probably kinds of psychic interference that can be practiced secretly; and I am not attempting to say that they are also subject to quick loss if the wielder forgets his vigilance. They are not so easily observed. But a man who is in a political office of importance (even the Supreme Court, one might say), and certainly a man who has a position in the business or professional world, cannot exercise power without spending a good deal of his time in protecting himself against dangerous critics, ambitious subordinates and rivals on his own level.

The most dangerous threat to power is not mere criticism. Lincoln could swallow or ignore the kind of attacks made upon him by angry abolitionists like Garrison, for example, who called him "evidently a man of very small calibre," and suggested that he had better "be at his old business of splitting rails"; or a lesser abolitionist, one S. York, who wrote to Lyman Trumbull of the president's message of December 3, 1861, that it contained "not one single, manly, boldly, dignified position." It was "a timid, time-serving commonplace sort of an abortion of a message." Randall cites these as examples of criticism.[2] Lincoln could take abuse with a sad smile or a

[2] J. G. Randall, *Lincoln, the President* (New York, 1945), I, 27.

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funny story. The uneasiness of the head that wears the crown is something more serious.

He discovered that his cabinet of great men contained some who were quite willing to be great by making him a dummy president. The most direct attack was in Seward's letter that came to the new president April 1, 1861. Seward has often been estimated as a man of considerable stature and of far more experienced statesmanship than Lincoln could be expected to show; and yet, Seward struck a blow at Lincoln's power before he was fairly used to the passageways of the White House, and it is surprising that Lincoln ever trusted him again.

It was while Lincoln was still doing his best to contend against the advice of extremists, on the one hand, and compromisers on the other, in the uncertainty of the crisis over Fort Sumter, that Seward tried to take over. As Randall says, Seward's note of advice to his chief would have been an excellent reason for dismissing him.

What the Secretary of State had to say to the president, all in a tone of confident superiority, was ordinary enough in the beginning. He said in his note that he advised making some show of force in the South but would refuse to fight South Carolina for possession of Sumter. But being a specialist in diplomacy and international affairs and similar matters of high statesmanship, he showed himself not unaware of the qualities called "machiavellian". He proposed to unite the North and the South by having his government make such imperious demands on Spain and on France that war would be inevitable. It seemed simple enough to this master diplomat that the slaveowners of the South would defend the Union against European nations even though they might be willing to start a war to destroy it at home. All this, of course, was offered to a president because the president was "without a policy". A more surprising suggestion is to follow. Someone had to do all this, of course; someone had to govern the United States, and if Lincoln did not want to do it himself he would find his Secretary of State ready and willing. Mr. Seward said that he would "neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility."

This note from Seward to his chief is accepted as authentic in spite of its absurdity. There is no doubt that Seward, how-

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ever sensible he may have seemed to be in most of his doings, did persistently have the idea that he could save the Union by tricking the southerners into fighting against Europeans instead of northerners. Lincoln took care of Seward's aberration and this impertinent threat to his own power with such tact and quiet resolution that Nicolay and Hay, who are our sole witnesses to the affair, say that no one else ever heard of Seward's proposals until long afterward. But he asserted his power in protecting it, and our only reason for recalling the story is to say that this incident is actually one of the kinds of normal experience that is lived through by any man who has any authority worth taking away.

He had other trouble with Seward, but nothing else so threatening. The abolitionists, always impatient, often abusive, accused him of having no real objection to slavery on any grounds. Garrison's words were that he "had not a drop of anti-slavery blood in his veins." Fremont, commanding in the West, went beyond orders and jeopardized the whole administration. McClellan may have been neither so hopelessly Fabian as most historians have wanted to make him out, nor so excusable as Randall seems to think, but he was, nevertheless, a constant trouble to Lincoln. Like several other commanders, McClellan managed to thwart the president's intentions. Congressional committees interfered and made games of politics with army appointments and necessary legislation.

All the time Lincoln was trying to maintain, in spite of these rear-guard engagements, his fight against the main threat to his power which was the war itself. Things went badly for the North for a long time. It is hard for us to believe now that the South could have won, being so inferior in resources, but the southern armies were aggressive, well commanded, equally convinced of patriotism and the honor of their cause. Lincoln might well have spent all his time, in the exercise of power, in those four years, at this main enterprise which was just an exemplification of the principle I have been discussing, that is, to keep the power he had.

I have stated and tried to discuss very briefly in terms of Lincoln's experience three tentative declarations about the nature of power. The first is that the qualities that get men into

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office by the suffrage of citizens are not identical with those that make for wisdom in office. Lincoln's experience throws little light on this principle except to indicate that there must have been a large element of chance in his election and thus to show that his achievement does not discredit the generalization. The second principle is that the exercise of wisdom by one in power, being the philosopher-king, is made extraordinarily difficult by the fact that a man in power spends a large part of his time in judging and disposing of the ideas of others instead of conceiving and executing plans of his own. Lincoln's difficulties with officeholders and associates show the truth of this generalization and indicate something of its importance as a comment on the causes of corruption. The third principle is that a man in power must spend most of his time in keeping it; and this might be almost a summary description of Lincoln's experience.

One of the things we want to know, however, in the case of so interesting a man, is how much capacity he may actually have had for deep and fruitful thought about the kinds of problems in which he suffered this desperate immersion. Was Lincoln of any importance as a philosopher before he took on his more than kingly authority?

Unfortunately for our judgment, he was a great writer who wrote very little. He was not the kind of writer who observes life and events and time about him and puts down for other men what he sees and feels. His letters show his quality and the growth of his style, but there is little else to go by. He was never a writer in the professional sense. His rhetorical mastery showed itself in polemic occasions, such as were evoked by Douglas, and in the high business of state papers. It is important in judging his capacity as a thinker to note that we have very little serious writing by his hand, or what one might better call writing on serious subjects of general import, when he was a circuit lawyer. He wrote little of importance in those days and those days were a large part of his mature life; so it is practically impossible for us to say what the qualities of his thought may have been. If he had never been elected to the presidency and had never had a war to fight, he might have been a philos-

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opher of considerable power but only a mute inglorious one. Most of the wisdom that is now attributed to his early days seems to be only poetic exaltation of his commonplace good sense that would never have seemed more than common sense to anybody if he had not gone on to glory. It would be safer, even if not quite so generous, to judge his power as a thinker by what he actually said in his late years.

What kind of mind was it that carried the burden of power and how much of possible fruitful thought was lost to the world by the fact that his energy was consumed in action? This is a very difficult question not only because the facts are inaccessible but also because our judgments in these matters are likely to be heavily prejudiced. Some observers will always be sure that any man who, in time of stress, says memorable things would not have been stirred to say anything at all except by the demands of the dangerous occasion. Others are convinced that any man who gives glimpses of philosophic greatness in a life of action would have been a philosopher if he had stayed at home. Neither of these positions can be supported with much proof.

We can say certain things about Lincoln that have a bearing on his philosophic quality. They are related to his moral integrity, and I see no profit in trying to separate his simple goodness from his simple directness of vision. They were closely related qualities of his soul. He was humble; humility is one of the moral attributes that make the exercise of fine intellectual powers more likely to be fruitful. He had, as we can see in his dealings with men, a real detachment from his personal concerns. These are all of them moral rather than intellectual qualities; and all I am saying is that Lincoln had the qualities that make up the ideal temperament for scientist or professional thinker and the surprising thing about it is that he showed these qualities not in the protected seclusion of professional thinking but in the noise and dust of battle itself.

Certainly, we can go this far. We can say that on some of the most difficult and then beclouded issues of the philosophy of government Lincoln thought freely and clearly and originally. Perhaps the best example is what is offered from John Hay's

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notes of 1861.[3] He knew what made government possible, and society possible, and the peaceable association of men a practical matter in a real world. According to Hay's notes, he said:

> the central idea pervading this struggle is the necessity that is upon us, of proving that popular government is not an absurdity. We must settle this question now, whether in a free government the minority have the right to break up the government whenever they choose. If we fail it will go far to prove the incapability of the people to govern themselves.

This seems to me to be the most important statement made by any statesman or philosopher on the principle of the war over the union of the states. It has a bearing on the debates now about to begin on the principles of world government and the proposals for world federal organization. Lincoln understood the basic problem of authority and the nature of the never-resolved tension that lies in the nature of freedom.

He thought simply and profoundly on a few problems; he had scarcely any time to be tested in the smaller and more wearing cares of governing. He was only a war president; and we have no way of knowing what would have happened if he had been allowed, or compelled, to face a peace. We can see that he was not corrupted, but we cannot be sure that time did not save him. Against the corrosion of the exercise of power, against the temptations and traps for the soul, he seems to have had enough strength.

The nature of the exercise of power, its negative character, since it is involved constantly in judging the suggestions of others, its dangerous flattering safety, since mistakes can nearly always be blamed on subordinates, its restlessness because it is never secure—these are all exemplified in Lincoln's brief tortured greatness. He was a good king and like all kings he seems to have been too busy to be a philosopher. For the sake of his country that was no doubt the best choice.

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[3] Hay's diary, cited in Philip Van Doren Stern's *Life and Writings of Abraham Lincoln* (New York, Modern Library, 1942), p. 122.

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HINDSIGHT ON VICHY

EVENTS in France during the past year have written a provocative footnote to the period in American diplomatic history that goes under the heading of our Vichy policy. In June 1940, when France fell with abrupt and startling swiftness, we could only regard the French scene with deep uncertainty. Technically we were not to be at war for another seventeen months. Actually since September 1939 we had supported the British by a variety of measures short of war, and, when in the summer of 1940 we were confronted by a defeated but still existent France, our problem was to work out a course of action that would be of maximum benefit to the anti-Hitler forces.

In 1940 we had, of necessity, to make certain judgments. We accepted Marshal Pétain as the legal and spiritual head of the French people and maintained diplomatic relations with the Vichy régime, uninterrupted by our entrance into the war, until the invasion of North Africa in November 1942. Then it was Laval who broke off relations with us. "With stupor and sadness", Marshal Pétain wrote to President Roosevelt: "We are attacked; we shall defend ourselves; this is the order I am giving." As to General de Gaulle, in 1940 there were doubts as to both his politics and his representative character. We regarded him as an unknown quantity.

Today, six years later, the French people have made their own judgments. Pétain and Laval were branded traitors; General de Gaulle was enthusiastically given the right to speak for France —and, of his own accord, stepped down from the provisional presidency.

It would be neither fair nor true to view these popular verdicts as demonstrating the error of our wartime policies. We may have miscalculated de Gaulle's potential importance, but we

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and our allies succeeded in liberating France and that is a far more important thing to be weighed in the balance. The question is, rather, was our policy toward Pétain a necessary preliminary to the liberation of France? To what extent was there a causal connection between our political maneuvers and our military success?

Underlying the specific details of our relations with Vichy was a valuation of democracy, not in sentimental terms, but as a weapon in American foreign affairs. As a case study in the techniques of international politics, our Vichy policy has definite relevance for the present and future of American foreign policy.

I

In June 1940 the Germans seemed to show remarkable forbearance. Though the French defense had crumbled before them, they refrained from occupying the entire country and permitted the French to sign the only armistice agreement in all of occupied Europe. The Germans left the empire in French hands and freely pledged themselves not " to use the French war fleet which is in harbors under German control for its purposes in war, with the exception of units necessary for the purposes of guarding the coast and sweeping mines."

" The French Government directs a cessation of fighting against the German Reich in France as well as in French possessions, colonies, protectorate territories, mandates as well as on the seas." This was article one of the armistice that plenipotentiaries of the French government signed at Compiégne June 22, 1940. Under its terms the Germans occupied more than half of France. The unoccupied zone and the major part of the empire—all that had not gone over to de Gaulle—were controlled by the French government under Pétain. To what extent it, in turn, was controlled by the Germans was not yet known.

" Whatever happens," de Gaulle had proclaimed from London June 18, " the flame of French resistance must not and shall not be extinguished." Six days after the signing of the armistice the British government recognized General de Gaulle " as leader of all free Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause."

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For the British, as for the United States, the disposition of the French fleet and empire was of vital importance. During the pre-armistice period both countries had sought and received assurances that these would not be delivered to the Germans; and in the succeeding two years the United States was many times to reiterate its inquiries on these two subjects. The armistice provided for the immobilization and disarmament of the French fleet in its pre-war harbors. Excepted from these requirements were " those units released to the French Government for protection of French interests in its colonial empire ". There were only two parties that might conceivably threaten those interests, Britain and the Axis—and the Germans were obviously not arming against themselves. For the British in early July 1940 there were too many imponderables in Pétain's position to permit them to sit by passively. They attacked units of the French navy at Oran, Algeria, but were driven off. Vichy declared its diplomatic relations with Britain at an end.

By the end of the summer the New Hebrides, Tahiti, New Caledonia, the Cameroons, French Equatorial Africa and French India had joined de Gaulle. They were placed under a Council of Defence of the French Empire which was recognized by Great Britain January 1941. With British help the Free French later gained control of Syria and Madagascar.

In Vichy the Pétain government gradually consolidated its control. Ambassador Bullitt returned to the United States reporting, " Marshal Pétain is universally respected in France as he is throughout the world. He is doing his best to bring order out of desperate disorder." Within a short time Pétain had suspended the parliamentary system and made himself " Chief of State ". For the benefit of American audiences he and his colleagues recalled Lafayette and Rochambeau and emphasized " the sincere friendship that France holds for America ".

At first it was Laval who dominated at Vichy, until his overt collaborationism forced him out in favor of Darlan. But Laval returned to Vichy in April 1942 to be " Chief of Government " under Pétain. For more than two years our diplomatic notes to Vichy were variations on a single theme. In Cordell Hull's

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words, "The fact that a government is a prisoner of war of another power does not justify such a prisoner in serving its conqueror in operations against its former ally." The United States constituted itself a diplomatic watchdog, repeatedly asserting its demand that the French do nothing beyond the terms of the armistice, that the fleet and the empire be not employed to German advantage.

With the appointment of Admiral Leahy as ambassador to France in the autumn of 1940 our policy toward Vichy took on certain positive aspects. Though we had early frozen French credits in this country, we had otherwise confined ourselves to admonitory notes. Now a concerted effort was made to contact Vichy leaders in Europe and in the empire, to convince them that both they and France would profit if they stood firm against Axis demands. The State Department put out feelers to strategically placed individuals. A neutrality agreement was reached with Admiral Robert, the Vichy governor of Martinique. In North Africa we negotiated with General Weygand. It was particularly in North Africa that we used the weapon of food and oil, for French ships were permitted to bring supplies in only on condition that American observers would be present to watch over their distribution and make certain that nothing was reshipped to metropolitan France. Robert Murphy used his position as head of American observers and consular officials in French North Africa to make contact with the highest officials there, paving the way for eventual Allied landings.

American policy toward Vichy appeared on the surface to be diametrically opposed to British policy. Even after we entered the war, we continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Pétain; and where Vichy governors were in control in the colonies, we tried to reach agreements with them. In territories which the de Gaullists ruled, we agreed to recognize the fact of their control. It was possible to ignore elements who claimed to be our allies, but we could not afford to ignore them altogether when they possessed resources and territory of value to us. When the collaborationist forces in France seemed powerful we extended Lend-Lease to the Free French, but generally we were

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reluctant to take any political action to insure that they rather than Vichy would administer the empire.

These limited makeshift relations with de Gaulle threw into sharp perspective our ostensible friendship for Vichy. In the British House of Commons our actions were regarded with scant sympathy. American pressure on Britain to permit the passage of food and oil shipments through the blockade came in for particular criticism. But the United States was not alone in its Allied affiliations at Vichy. Canada and the Union of South Africa, two of the British dominions who, unlike us, were already at war with Germany when France fell and had been since September 7, 1939, were also on diplomatic speaking terms with the French government at Vichy. In the House of Commons Prime Minister Churchill rose to say: "On the whole I have become convinced that it is an advantage to the United States to have contacts which in our case no longer exist."

Behind Mr. Churchill's words lay the policy and the experience of the Dominion of Canada. South Africa had a minister accredited to Vichy until Laval's return to power in April 1942, but Mr. Bain-Marais never left London and, without the insistent demands of the South African nationalist opposition for "normal diplomatic relations with the French government", one wonders if he would have stayed even in London as long as he did. The Canadian attitude was a very different one. Though the Canadian chargé d'affaires, Pierre Dupuy, was stationed in London, he made trips to Vichy and was in touch with members of the Pétain government.

In the Canadian House of Commons Prime Minister Mackenzie King was called upon to explain why Canada continued to maintain relations with Vichy. His answer is of particular significance for our Vichy policy. In February 1941 Mr. King stated:

> I may say that not only has Canada's action been approved by the government of Great Britain but we have been thanked very warmly by the British Prime Minister for the services which we have been able to render at this time through the association which this country has maintained with France.

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A year later Mr. King said:

> When . . . the Prime Minister of Great Britain was here, speaking to members of the press, he made the intimation publicly that he would like to have our relations maintained with the Vichy government. Mr. Churchill has authorized me to make it quite clear that such a desire does exist on his part. This government is most anxious to cooperate with the British government in all particulars, and we feel that in this matter we are cooperating in a way that will be helpful generally.

To complete the triangle, Mr. King on August 1, 1942 told the Commons:

> I have myself had intimate conversations with both the Secretary of State of the United States and the under secretary on this very matter, and . . . both the United States government and our government are of the view that it would be a mistake to withdraw our chargé d'affaires from France at the present time.

British policy toward France thus had its spokesmen in Ottawa as well as in London; and, far from running counter to American policy, it appears to parallel it. Britain had no choice when the break with Vichy came; but through Canada and the United States the Allies maintained a link with the Pétain government that lasted until the invasion of North Africa ended Allied relations with Vichy.

II

In the perspective of November 1942 our Vichy policy was hailed as having achieved its objective, for were not Allied troops in North Africa? When a series of diplomatic maneuvers is apparently climaxed by a military coup, it is second nature to assume that the one precipitated the other. But are we justified in allowing our Vichy policy to take on the aura of success and self-righteousness generated by our triumph in North Africa?

On November 9, 1942 Secretary Hull offered a five-point justification of American policy. He stated that American relations with Vichy had permitted us to:

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1. get from week to week highly important information virtually from inside German-controlled territory and from North Africa regarding Axis subversive activities and other important phases of the international situation;
2. maintain close relations with the French people and encourage leadership in opposition to Hitlerism wherever it existed;
3. keep alive basic concepts of freedom of the French people, looking toward the ultimate restoration of the free institutions of France as they existed before the German occupation;
4. retain the closest possible touch with all phases of the French and German situation; resist increased German pressure on France to go beyond the armistice provisions and collaborate with Germany; and prevent delivery of the French fleet or any part of it into German military hands, or military support to German arms (this includes French bases all along the Mediterranean and Atlantic coast); and
5. last, but most important, also pave the way and prepare the background for the planning and sending of the military expedition into the western Mediterranean area and assist the movements supporting present British operations farther east.

Each of these points merits individual consideration.

The importance of information from German-controlled territory cannot be overemphasized. It was an essential raw material from which propaganda offensives were forged and military strategy evolved. Europe was never completely cut off from the United States. Throughout the war, information filtered into neutral capitals, Berne, Stockholm, Lisbon, Madrid, Ankara. But only on the spot sources could report with authority on conditions in occupied Europe and North Africa.

President Roosevelt in his instructions to Ambassador Leahy wrote: "I have reason to believe that aside from the selfish interests of individuals there is unrequired governmental coop-

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eration with Germany motivated by a belief in the inevitableness of a German victory and ultimate benefit to France. I desire that you . . . report fully regarding it."

Facts of military and political importance came to us from loyal Frenchmen in touch with London, from British espionage and, after our entrance into the war, from the Office of Strategic Services. American diplomats, unlike these more unofficial agents, were under constant surveillance. The privilege of diplomatic immunity might have allowed them to send information out of the country, but that freedom did not extend to indiscriminate contacts with individuals in France.

Probably Ambassador Leahy and his staff were well equipped to report on the activities and sympathies of the highly placed governmental and military officials with whom they were in constant contact. It would be enlightening, though, to learn how much of this information came to us exclusively from diplomatic sources. Pierre Dupuy was useful to the British in sounding out the Vichy government. In North Africa Robert Murphy's activities were followed by spectacular events. It was doubtless true that Mr. Murphy's negotiations were prerequisite to the easy success of our military campaign. By 1942 the situation in France and North Africa, and in our relations with them, made the success of any other policy unlikely. But that such a situation had been permitted to develop calls into question some of Mr. Hull's five points.

Mr. Hull's references to the French people are of a piece with numerous official statements, Canadian as well as American. Our diplomatic correspondence disregarded the many difficulties that had punctuated our relations with France since the American Revolution and harped on the existence of a traditional Franco-American friendship. The Canadians felt themselves in the special position of a link not only between the British Commonwealth and the United States, but also between France and the British Commonwealth. It was to the French people, Prime Minister King explained to the Commons, not to the Pétain government, that the Canadian representative was accredited. This is dubious legal doctrine in a system of international law

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which is grounded upon the existence of states organized under governments. Doubtless Mr. King preferred to take his stand on broader issues than the law. But the assumption, which he shares with Mr. Hull, that, by maintaining contact with the Pétain government, Canada was maintaining contact with the French people remains a controversial one.

Mr. Hull listed " close relations with the French people " as one of the achievements of our policy. But actually, just as Admiral Leahy could give us information only about Vichy higher-ups, so his " close relations " were almost exclusively with Marshal Pétain and his colleagues. That was the natural result of both his office and his instructions. According to point two, our ambassador's contacts were designed to strengthen the democratic anti-collaborationist sentiments of the French people. But just how he accomplished this is not very clear. Mr. Hull seems to have identified the interests of the French people with those of Pétain. He seems to have assumed that both were fundamentally democratic and anti-German. That is a large assumption. Would Pétain himself have been as ready to make it?

Point three of Mr. Hull's statement suggests that we kept alive, by our relations with Vichy, " basic concepts of freedom of the French people, looking toward the ultimate restoration of the free institutions of France as they existed before the German occupation." That would seem to imply that the régime Marshal Pétain established at Vichy was an ideological makeshift, created by republicans as a temporary expedient to appease the Germans. But this was not the case. The Pétain government had a very specific philosophy and one that had remarkably little in common with French democracy.

Pétain scrapped the constitution of the Third Republic. Using the royal " we ", he declared his intention of creating an authoritarian corporate state. He replaced the republican slogan of " liberty, equality and fraternity " with that of " labor, family and fatherland ". " France ", he said, " will become again what she should never have ceased to be—essentially an agricultural nation." Few of Pétain's ideas were new. Considered singly, they were open to various interpretations; but

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collectively, their meaning was clear. Their ancestry was to be found in the writings of Charles Maurras and the *Action Française,* in the ideology of French reactionary nationalism.

The old Marshal was sated with democracy. Had there been a stalemate between the Allies and the Axis, his self-styled "national revolution" might have survived. There was little reason for him to hope for a clear-cut Allied victory, for it meant the restoration of French republican institutions.

Not only did our Vichy policy assume that we could encourage Vichy to safeguard French democracy; it also assumed that, in relation to the Germans, Vichy possessed considerable independence of action. There are two levels on which our Vichy policy could be viewed. One would be a day to day study of our political maneuvers, of our representations to Vichy and their results in France. It is possible, however, to cut beneath these to a few fundamental realities that remained constant throughout the entire period.

In the early years of the war the Germans had vast military power and they did not hesitate to use it. They overran virtually all of Europe, and threatened the Near East and North Africa. Yet throughout this time a considerable portion of France remained unoccupied and under French rule. The Germans could not have been blind to what we hoped to gain through our relations with Vichy, yet they chose to permit the Pétain régime to continue until the North African invasion. We are left with the disturbing awareness that the Germans found it convenient for almost two and a half years for the United States to maintain relations with Vichy. It is apparent that the United States was not the only country to have a Vichy policy.

The French fleet and the French empire were the two prizes at stake. They were potential assets for whichever of the belligerents could gain control of them. Keeping them from the British was a definite Nazi gain; but the Nazis would have profited even more from the use of them. Why then were they left in French hands? The only possible explanation is that the Germans were unable to take over the fleet and the empire without fighting for them.

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Among many influential naval officers and colonial officials, nationalism and political reaction had combined to create a state of mind hostile to both belligerents. The majority were anti-democratic and anti-British. However fascist their sympathies, they were first of all nationalists. They gave their allegiance to Pétain. The existence of Vichy, supported by the United States, obscured what might have been a clear alternative between the cause of French nationalism and the Allies, on the one hand, and that of the Axis, on the other. It put off a choice that many would otherwise have been forced to make. Whatever the personal convictions of Pétain, his government, by merely existing, did Hitler's work.

The intransigence of the fleet and the empire in regard to both belligerents gave Pétain what bargaining power he possessed. Within a restricted sphere he had sufficient freedom on relatively minor issues to provoke continual diplomatic interchanges with the United States—and also to convince many Frenchmen that he was at heart on the side of the Nazis. Had Pétain ever wholeheartedly gone over to the side of the United Nations, his usefulness to the Germans would have ended. Had he unreservedly gone over to the Germans, he would have lost what little independence he possessed and would also have estranged public opinion. His twilight zone of free action was confined within narrow boundaries.

Our Vichy policy was apparently directed at a government that was basically democratic in its sympathies. It was a government with considerable independence of action that controlled its fleet and its empire in its own interest; and that, as long as it did not go beyond the terms of its armistice, could be a neutral, friendly to the United Nations. These are the implications of Mr. Hull's five points. But no such government existed in Europe, certainly not in France.

III

It has become the fashion to hail our Vichy policy as a triumph of political realism. In the *New York Times* Arthur Krock called it a " very realistic adoption of Hitler's own tactics of infiltration and observation before action." He remarked

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with satisfaction, "Hitler must even have found familiar the President's statement that we had to invade the territory of a government with which we were enjoying diplomatic relations to forestall an invasion by our enemies."

The Nazis have in truth taught us lessons in the strategy of international politics: one of them is their use of fascist and German elements in other countries to weaken them. It is a curious inversion of logic, however, to suggest that we, too, were realistic in using antidemocratic groups. If the fascist fifth column was of value to the Nazis, it would seem reasonable to expect a democratic, not a fascist, fifth column to further American interests. It would be an unhappy commentary on American democracy if it could produce no political realism more dynamic than appeasement.

Throughout the period of our relations with Vichy the United States was in the anomalous position of continually making gestures of friendship toward a régime closely associated with our enemies, while treating with coolness and even hostility men who were fighting and dying for the Allied cause. Such behavior on our part needs convincing reasons to justify it. They are difficult to find.

General de Gaulle, unlike Pétain, had not come into power according to customary constitutional procedure. In 1940 he had a relatively small following outside France and it was predominantly military. He reorganized the Free French National Committee in London on September 24, 1941 to give it a broader political base, but few political figures of any importance were represented on it. At the same time, despite de Gaulle's references in speeches to the restoration of French republican institutions, many people in informed circles doubted his political intentions.

The lapse of six years since the initiation of our Vichy policy has not changed the validity of these objections to recognizing de Gaulle. But time has made somewhat clearer the fact that what was at issue was not a choice between two governments or two men. It does not follow that if we had broken with Pétain we would have had to recognize de Gaulle. Had such recognition coincided with our entrance into the war against

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Germany, it would have had great political value, but when it should have come is no longer very important. What is important is that, in 1940, France was confused, divided, even apathetic, and our relations with Pétain perpetuated that demoralization. Mr. Hull's five points were limited in their practice to relations with the men of Vichy, men who were in power because the Germans permitted them to be; and because the French people had not, from the start, been presented with a concerted Allied effort to give them a rallying point outside France, not exclusively in de Gaulle, but in the broad uncontroversial fact of French resistance.

Allied information far underestimated the extent of de Gaulle's following inside France. Possibly the limited contacts of our diplomats helped to mislead us. It is perhaps too soon to make definitive judgments on this point, but there is little doubt that our information would have been more complete from the start had we taken a stand clearly against Pétain, giving the underground concrete encouragement and impetus for organization.

In 1942 we needed Robert Murphy and unsavory negotiations with Weygand and other Vichyites to assure success; but that was after we had permitted the Germans to immobilize the fleet and the empire for more than two years. What would have happened had we taken a firm stand against Vichy in 1940? All of France might have been occupied. But from the start the issues would have been clearly drawn and it is not impossible that a center of French resistance might have been established in North Africa immediately following the armistice.

Consciously or not, we allowed ourselves to be used to support the efforts of Vichy and Berlin in obscuring the loyalties of the French people. Our negotiations with their pro-Vichy leaders were to meet with apparent success; but the Darlans and the Weygands could never have been so powerful, had we not permitted the people behind them to remain confused and disorganized, blinded by the legend of the Marshal who was above party, and by the fact that a shadow régime existed as a French state—in diplomatic relations with the United States as well as with Germany—and claimed their loyalty as Frenchmen.

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IV

It is difficult to discern any political wisdom in our Vichy policy. On the whole it appears more makeshift than Machiavellian. We kept at arm's length our natural allies, the French people and the Free French. At the same time we associated ourselves diplomatically with a government that lacked both the desire and the ability to give us substantial long-term support.

In our relations with Vichy, as with North Africa, and as with Germany herself, the ultimately determining factor was military power. American diplomacy did not succeed in bringing the bulk of the French fleet into the Allied camp. When, in November 1942, the Germans occupied all of France and tried to take over the fleet, it did not make a break for freedom; it scuttled itself. In our negotiations in North Africa we did not succeed in convincing the Vichyites of the merits of our cause. We convinced them that we had overwhelming power. It would have only been a matter of time before they recognized that.

All that our Vichy policy has proved is that when a country has a preponderance of power it can win a war, and that when other peoples are oppressed by your enemy they will fight on your side without any great encouragement from you. The French people were our allies, in spite of our relations with Vichy, not because of them. Our Vichy policy is scarcely a positive precedent for the future of American foreign policy.

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THE PROPOSED FEDERAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT

ON June 20, 1945, Senators Hatch, Burton and Ball introduced a bill for a "Federal Industrial Relations Act". The origin of this bill is so important, and has been the subject of so much willful misrepresentation, that its history should be briefly outlined before explaining the bill.

On May 5, 1943, Dr. William Draper Lewis, Director of the American Law Institute, invited a number of public officials, lawyers, business men, professors and publicists to meet with him in order to obtain their advice as to whether the American Law Institute should undertake a study of labor law and labor relations with the probable objective of "the drafting by the Institute of a model code or a series of statutes designed to bring the settlement of labor conflicts within the sphere of orderly legal process."

After discussing the subject for an entire day, the conferees decided to recommend the project to the American Law Institute, which recommendation was incorporated in a letter addressed to Dr. Lewis dated June 1, 1943 and signed by all those who had attended the conference and some of those who had been unable to attend. The Executive Committee of the Institute, however, at its meeting on June 18, decided against committing the Institute to this project. Labor law is in such a state of uncertainty and change that any efforts even to state the law, and certainly any efforts to improve the law, would be highly controversial. It can be easily understood why a scientific, nonpartisan body such as the American Law Institute would hesitate to embroil itself in such a controversial matter.

Those who had joined in recommending this project to the American Law Institute had become so convinced of its impor-

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tance that, after some months of correspondence, a number of them met in Philadelphia on February 4, 1944 and organized the Committee to Promote Industrial Peace as the agency for drafting a comprehensive revision of federal law affecting labor relations. The members of this Committee who participated in its work from the time of its organization through the introduction of S. 1171 were:

George W. Alger, Lawyer, New York City
(Former Impartial Chairman, Cloak & Suit Industry)
Samuel S. Fels, Manufacturer and Philanthropist, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
William Draper Lewis, Director, American Law Institute, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Donald R. Richberg, Lawyer, Washington, D. C.
(Co-author, Railway Labor Act, Norris-La Guardia Act, National Recovery Act)
Jerome J. Rothschild, Lawyer, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Kirk Smith, Lawyer, Providence, Rhode Island

In addition, the following served as members of the Committee for many months:

Frederick J. O. Blachly, an editor of Reader's Digest, serving as alternate for William Hard
(Mr. Blachly had to resign when he was inducted into the Army in the spring of 1945)
Lieutenant Commander Chester C. Ward, Specialist on Labor Relations
(Commander Ward resigned because of the requirements of his official position)

The Committee decided unanimously at its first meeting that no representative of any employer organization or labor organization should be invited to participate in any way in the Committee's work. All members agreed to serve without any compensation and to give the necessary time to attending meetings and reviewing drafts of proposed legislation which would be prepared initially by Mr. Richberg, who was named chairman. Mr. Fels agreed not only to serve as a member of the Committee, but to make a contribution to cover expenses of meetings and

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stenographic, printing and clerical expenses, which, as a matter of fact, were less than $5,000. This included a fee for services of Frederic P. Lee (formerly Legislative Counsel of the United States Senate), who was engaged in the later stages of the work to perfect the drafts tentatively approved.

In January 1945, the Committee work had proceeded to the printing of a first tentative draft of a comprehensive federal labor relations law. This draft was then submitted confidentially, by action of the Committee, to the following persons for their advice, with an invitation to them to join the Committee if they were willing to sponsor the ultimate draft to be made public:

Otto Beyer, Washington, D. C.
(Former member, National Mediation Board)

Harold Evans, Lawyer, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
(Former Chairman, County Relief Board)

Lawrence Hunt, Lawyer, New York City
(Chairman, New York Bar Association Labor Committee)

Dr. William M. Leiserson, Washington, D. C.
(Former member, National Mediation Board and National Labor Relations Board)

Dr. Leon C. Marshall, Chairman of the Faculty, American University
(Former member, NRA Board)

Charles B. Rugg, Lawyer, Boston, Massachusetts

George B. Sjoselius, St. Paul, Minnesota, Deputy Attorney General
(Author of various state labor laws)

Arthur D. Whiteside, New York City, President, Dun & Bradstreet
(Former member, NRA and WPB)

The printed draft was also submitted to the Senators who subsequently introduced S. 1171, in the hope that, if they approved a draft which in final form met with the Committee approval, they would sponsor it in the Congress.

During the following months, extensive discussions were had

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with the Senators and the others to whom the draft had been submitted. A revised draft was printed, for confidential consideration, in April. Then, in June 1945, a pamphlet was printed including the final, revised draft approved by the expanded Committee and three Senators. The official sponsors of S. 1171 therefore included Senators Hatch, Burton and Ball and the Committee to Promote Industrial Peace.[1]

It would take too much space, and serve no particular purpose, to review all the drafts of the proposed Act, Committee discussions, revisions by the Committee and by the Senators, and investigations which played a part in the final drafting of this measure. It can, however, be stated that one principle governed all those who participated in this work. That was the principle of providing a machinery for the peaceful settlement of labor controversies, which would operate first of all to protect the public interest and at the same time insure full opportunity for both labor and management to advance and to protect their economic interests through peaceful means, primarily through negotiation and voluntary agreement, but with the aid of government available wherever that aid could be extended without bringing into play government regulation beyond such controls as might be necessary to preserve peace and to permit processes of justice to prevail.

Our structure of labor law to date has not grown out of any sound and defined public policy. It has been the product of partisan efforts of employer organizations and labor unions, each seeking to gain an advantage in an economic struggle.

The ancient intimate relation of employer and employee has been completely changed by the modern development of machinery, big business, mass production, and distribution. For many decades the power of large employers to regulate the wages and working conditions of the wage-earners steadily grew. With a normal surplus of workers, maintained largely by immigration,

[1] The members of the Committee were: George W. Alger, Harold Evans, Samuel S. Fels, Lawrence Hunt, William Draper Lewis, Leon C. Marshall, Charles B. Rugg, George B. Sjoselius, Kirk Smith, Arthur D. Whiteside, Donald R. Richberg (Chairman), Jerome J. Rothschild (Secretary). It should be added that Mr. Lee, the Drafting Counsel, generously contributed far more services than he was engaged to render.

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the helplessness of the individual employee to determine his wages and working conditions became more and more obvious and distressing.

Furthermore, the laws protecting individual freedom and rights of property gave the employer an overwhelming advantage in combating efforts of wage-earners to organize and to insist upon a voice in determining the wages they should be paid and the hours and conditions under which they should work. The only effective weapon of labor organizations to compel consideration of their interests was the strike.

Public sympathy in this period ran largely in favor of the employees. They could usually demonstrate conditions of overwork and underpay which appealed to the public sense of justice; and the very fact that the government seemed always to be aiding the employer helped to justify, in common opinion, the frequent uses of violence and intimidation by the workers.

As a result, as the political power of labor organizations developed and they were able to have favorable laws written to protect and to promote their interests, these laws granted special privileges and immunities to labor organizations which endowed them with extraordinary economic powers. Labor unions were given positive aid in expanding their memberships by restraints placed upon any employer opposition. They were given the aid of government in settling labor disputes if they desired to utilize it, but left largely free from governmental restraint in using economic force and even physical violence in support of their programs. The hands of the federal courts were tied to prevent the issuance of injunctions injurious to labor campaigns; and a sweeping exemption from the restraints of the anti-trust laws permitted labor organizations to acquire and exercise monopoly powers forbidden, as a matter of essential public policy, to other economic groups.

The abuse of these extraordinary powers and devastating attacks upon public interests by irresponsible labor organizations have brought out clearly the necessity for a comprehensive revision of federal labor law in order to make it possible to preserve domestic peace and good order, and also to preserve that balance of economic powers essential to the maintenance of a

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free economy and indeed essential to the maintenance of a democratic form of government.

But those who have demanded laws to stop strikes and to regulate labor unions have usually been seeking partisan aid in a counterattack against labor aggression. That is not the way to promote industrial peace. What is needed is a comprehensive law declaring a national labor policy, and providing a program for the peaceful and just settlement of labor controversies. Such a law should sustain all the present legally protected rights of labor, and, at the same time, safeguard equally well-established rights of management.

Such a law should require both employers and employees to exercise their rights and powers in ways which will not be unfair or oppressive to each other, nor in violation of public rights and injurious to public interests.

The proposed Federal Industrial Relations Act was drafted for the primary purpose of providing adequate means for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes and for the secondary purpose of eliminating some of the encouragements to labor aggression and disorder which are inherent in existing federal law. The proposed Act may be summarized as follows:

It begins with a declaration of public policy which is, in brief, to facilitate the prompt, peaceful and just settlement of all labor relations controversies that may interrupt interstate and foreign commerce. To that end, it is designed (1) to encourage the making and maintaining of labor agreements; (2) to support genuine collective bargaining; (3) to provide procedures for settling labor controversies in the federal field; (4) to leave to the states the handling of local labor controversies.

The purposes of the Act are declared to be to promote continuity and regularity of employment by maintaining satisfactory labor relations.

The major administration of the Act is given to a Federal Labor Relations Board, which is to be substituted for the present National Labor Relations Board, and which will have a comprehensive authority over the peaceful settlement of all labor controversies in the federal field, except those now handled under the Railway Labor Act, which remains in full force and effect.

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The enforcement of prohibitions of unfair labor practices is lodged in a separate, but coöperating, Tribunal.

The Act makes it the duty of all employers and employees to exert every reasonable effort to settle controversies by agreement and to avoid any arbitrary, one-sided change of existing conditions while carrying on the settlement procedures provided in the Act.

These settlement procedures are:

1. Negotiations between authorized representatives of the parties to a controversy.

2. If negotiations fail, mediation by the Board, in aid of which the functions of the Conciliation Service and of the Secretary of Labor in connection therewith are transferred to the Board. This is necessary to avoid duplication of services, since now, for the first time, there will be a regularly established federal conciliation service authorized and directed to promote the settlement of labor controversies in accordance with a defined public policy, statutory duties of employers and employees, and legally established procedures.

3. If mediation fails, there is a machinery of voluntary arbitration provided, which is modeled on the Railway Labor Act arbitration process which has worked well for twenty years.

4. If arbitration is refused, provision is made for a hearing and report by a fact-finding commission—another device successfully employed under the Railway Labor Act, which has served to adjust every major unsettled controversy for twenty years.

There are three questions which may immediately arise in the mind of a well-informed person:

I. Isn't this a cumbersome machinery to settle a great many petty controversies?

II. What happens when a major controversy is not settled by negotiation or mediation, and voluntary arbitration is refused and the recommendations of a fact-finding commission are disregarded?

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III. How is the duty to use the settlement procedures going to be enforced so as to stop arbitrary action by employers or employees that will produce strikes or lockouts or some other one-sided change in their relations?

These questions will be answered in order. But, first, it is necessary to understand that the Act divides labor relations controversies into four classes and provides different methods of dealing with the different classes.

1. In Class One are controversies over representation of employees.

In dealing with Class One controversies the Board investigates and certifies (after a secret ballot if necessary) what representation the employees themselves desire.

2. In Class Two are controversies over the making of agreements. These are major controversies which can be settled satisfactorily only by having available the full machinery of negotiation, mediation, arbitration and fact-finding.

3. In Class Three are " grievance " controversies. These include the mass of petty disputes over applying an agreement, figuring wage payments and imposing discipline. In dealing with these controversies, the Board simply requires the parties to submit them to a bipartisan adjustment board, either established by the parties, or, if they cannot agree, appointed by the Board. If the bipartisan adjustment board is deadlocked, the Board appoints an impartial referee.

It has been the law for years under the Railway Labor Act that the awards of adjustment boards are enforceable in the courts. Many trade agreements make the same provision. These cases are like contract cases in the ordinary courts. In fact it is frequently possible, but unduly expensive, to bring an action at law to settle a grievance. There is no more " compulsory arbitration " in this provision than in the ordinary rule of law that any party to a contract can sue to enforce it. This is quite widely recognized by both large employers and large labor unions.

4. In Class Four is a catch-all of " other types of labor controversies ", which are to be handled in a manner similar to Class Two controversies.

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In answer to the first question, it should be apparent, after reviewing the procedures for dealing with these four classes of controversies, that the Board will not be overburdened with handling a mass of petty cases. There are other provisions which aid in giving this assurance, and particularly it should be pointed out that:

1. The Act specifically excludes controversies arising out of (1) employment by state or federal government or agencies; (2) employment by an employer of less than twenty employees (unless a substantial interruption of commerce is threatened); (3) employment in agricultural labor by farmers; (4) employment in domestic service; (5) employment by a labor organization; (6) employments covered by the Railway Labor Act.

Controversies predominantly local, that only indirectly affect interstate commerce, are excluded. These are left to the control of state authority. Controversies, where the place of employment is outside United States jurisdiction, are generally excluded.

2. The Act also provides that in the case of Class Three and Class Four controversies the Board will take jurisdiction only if in its opinion a controversy threatens a substantial interruption of commerce. In a word, the Board is not expected to deal with every clothesline dispute but to give its attention to matters of serious importance, which, of course, may be sometimes small in size but important for the maintenance of a fundamental principle.

Returning now to our second question: What happens when a major controversy is not settled by voluntary agreement in the end? First, let it be pointed out that Class One controversies are settled by a certificate of representation, which is reviewable and enforceable by the courts. Second, Class Three controversies are settled by an enforceable award. Class Four controversies are handled in the same manner as Class Two. So our second question is: What happens when there is no voluntary settlement of a Class Two controversy over making or maintaining an agreement?

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Here we reach a novel and vitally important provision of the Act. It is provided (in Sec. 11) that, when the Board determines that a special fact-finding commission should be created, the Board must also make public a finding of fact and an announcement as to whether it is necessary, in protection of the public interest, because of severe hardship resulting from the deprivation of an essential service, for the parties to the controversy to be required to accept temporarily a compulsory settlement of their relations. For example, the Board would not make such a finding if the controversy involved only one factory and its employees in a highly competitive industry. But the Board would surely make such a finding if a great city were threatened with a stoppage of electric power and light.

If, after such a finding, the parties continue to fail to agree upon a settlement or upon an arbitration, then the Board is authorized to invest the fact-finding commission with all the powers of a board of arbitration. Then its award is made effective as a final settlement of the controversy for a period of "normally one year" but not longer than two years, and the award will be enforceable by the courts.

During the war it was found absolutely necessary for the President to take over certain plants in order to continue essential production. The compulsory use of property and the compulsory service of men were justified by the needs of national security. The public interest is likewise concerned with the maintenance of essential services in time of peace. Certainly property owners, whose property can be expropriated by paying just compensation, cannot complain of injustice in having a government tribunal determine temporarily the terms of labor relationship when the continued use of their property is a public necessity. Certainly workers cannot complain of a temporary impartial fixation of the terms of their employment when they are unable to reach agreement with their employer and the continued coöperation of labor and management is essential to the general welfare. This governmental action does not impose involuntary servitude because the Act specifically preserves the right of any worker to quit his job. Any limitation of concerted action is clearly justified and within the fundamental

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authority of government to protect the public health, safety and welfare.

It should be noted that this limited provision for compulsory arbitration is only the last resort of government to protect the public, after every opportunity has been given to private industry to meet its public responsibilities. Only persons who have been unreasonable and neglectful of their public obligations would have any reason to fear the result of such an arbitration. Only those who wish to be protected by a government of people whom they are willing to injure for selfish benefit should be expected to oppose such a law.

The third question left open is at once the easiest and the hardest to answer. The Act provides ample measures for enforcing the duties imposed. But, forever, and forever the question will be asked: How can you make men obey a law? Disobedience can be punished. Fear of punishment may deter many from disobedience. But unless masses of men and women are willing, and indeed anxious, to obey a law of good conduct, can any prohibitions of bad conduct bring about a prevailing good conduct?

In proposing any law to maintain order by giving assurances of the just settlement of controversies it is necessary to rely on the interest of the masses of the people in peace and good order. One must assume that there will be general support of measures reasonably designed to make the use of peaceful means to settle conflicts more advantageous to most people than reliance on private force. Then, in such a law it is necessary to make it costly and dangerous for short-sighted, lawless, ruthless persons to violate the obligations which the great majority will voluntarily fulfill. In this way assurance is given to those who are inclined to be law-abiding that they will not suffer from the lawbreaking of those who will evade or violate a law if that course will seem to serve their immediate self-interest.

So this Act provides for the enforcement of administrative orders and for judicial proceedings to prevent and punish violations of the rights confirmed and the legal duties imposed by the Act. The enforcement provisions may be summarized as follows:

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1. The unfair labor practices which are forbidden in the present National Labor Relations Act have been restated and expanded to cover unfair practices by either employers or employees which interfere with the essential freedom of labor to bargain collectively or of management to fulfill its obligations to workers, investors, consumers and the general welfare. The enforcement procedures of the existing law have been retained. A separate and independent agency, named "Unfair Labor Practices Tribunal", is created to enforce this part of the law. Legal rights and obligations are to be clarified by regulations adopted by the Tribunal. (Secs. 23-27.)

2. It is made a violation of the Act for any person to fail to perform duties imposed by the Act, or to incite or support any such failure. The Board is authorized to proceed in the courts to restrain violations; and the limitations of the Anti-Injunction Act that might hamper relief are removed in such actions instituted by the government. The Board is authorized also to deny its aid to persons engaged in violations of the Act.

As soon as the Hatch-Burton-Ball bill was introduced, without waiting for time to analyze carefully a bill of this comprehensive length and coverage, the principal national labor organizations issued statements violently attacking the measure. In the months that followed, the basis for this labor opposition has become clear. The outstanding labor leaders have testified before Congressional committees with blunt candor that they are opposed to any labor legislation which will restrict in the slightest degree their aggressive powers, which will limit in any way their right to strike without warning and for any objective, or which will moderate any of the special privileges, immunities and monopoly powers with which labor unions have been invested by federal law.

The issue is therefore perfectly plain between these labor organizations and the people of the United States. They insist on remaining irresponsible organizations of private force, endowed by law with special privileges and immunities which they insist on exercising without regard to the resulting injury to other private interests or to the vastly more important public interests. The issue is whether these private powers antagonistic

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to the public interest shall be continued and protected by law or whether they shall be curtailed before it is too late.

It should be obvious that no such private power can be tolerated by any government without accepting an ultimate subservience of the government to the ruling class possessed of such power. A labor dictatorship is not and cannot be a democracy, no matter how desirable it may seem to labor dictators, whether they call themselves democrats or Communists!

A reasonable opposition to many provisions of the proposed Federal Industrial Relations Act has been voiced, however, by persons sincerely concerned with the protection of public interests, or of employer interests. Many minor criticisms may be disregarded, because they suggest either improvements easily made in the Senate bill or refinements of no great importance. The major issues seriously raised are: (1) Should employers and employees be required to defer aggressive action until peaceful methods of settlement have been tried? (2) Should compulsory arbitration of any labor disputes be required?

The requirement that peaceful methods of settlement be given a fair trial before disputants begin to fight is essential to the success of any labor peace program. So long as employees are free to strike, or employers free to lock them out, or otherwise to change conditions, while negotiations or public efforts to settle a controversy are in progress, there can be no insurance of industrial peace. The first essential of an orderly society is the establishment of tribunals for the settlement of disputes and the requirement that citizens utilize those tribunals and do not undertake to settle their disagreements by fighting in the public streets or in private homes. Of course the great difficulty in a dispute between employers and employees is that the dispute is likely to arise over what agreements they should make and not over the enforcement of an agreement they have made, or a liability which is fixed by law. That is the reason why labor disputes cannot be settled by the simple process of establishing labor courts. The freedom of men to make their own contracts and not to have contracts made for them by public officials must be preserved.

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But since the basis of peaceful labor relations, as of all other commercial relations, lies in contract, the law can properly require the parties to make every reasonable effort to reach agreements through negotiation and to use any aid that government can render before one party tries to force the other party to make an agreement he is unwilling voluntarily to make. Even if there were not the precedent of the Railway Labor Act, it could be demonstrated that there is no unreasonable limitation on individual freedom in requiring employers and employees to give a fair trial to peaceful ways of settling their disagreements before starting to fight at their own expense and at the expense of the public interest. But the Railway Labor Act has conclusively demonstrated that workers are not "enslaved", nor are employers denied any essential "freedom", when both parties are required to negotiate and to listen to government mediators and even to present their evidence and arguments to a government commission and listen to its recommendations, before they are permitted to start making war on each other and on the public.

The conditions in the transportation industry may be different from those in other industries, but the workers and the employers are the same kind of human beings, and there is as much public interest in preventing stoppages of electric power service, or truck transportation of food, or the production of coal or any other fuel, as there is in preventing stoppages of steam railroad transportation. The fundamental necessities are the same and the principles of preserving an orderly society are the same.

"Compulsory arbitration" has become an evil phrase. It is supposed to be enough to prove the iniquity of any proposal for the peaceful settlement of labor disputes to charge that it is "compulsory arbitration"! Yet the country is blanketed with federal and state courts and commissions ruling every day upon the most intimate, extensive, and important rights and duties of millions of people, whose disputes they compulsorily arbitrate. They do not merely enforce contracts. They decide what the relations ought to be between parents and children, husband and wife, corporation managers and investors, manufacturers or

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sellers of goods and the public, public utility companies and the consumers. What an extraordinary idea it is that practically every disagreement that is possible between human beings can be settled by compulsory action of the state, except a disagreement called a labor dispute!

It should be obvious that the enforcement of a labor contract is not only justifiable, but necessary, for the same reasons that require judicial enforcement, which is compulsory arbitration, of all other types of contracts. In fact the wisdom and necessity of this compulsory procedure is recognized in hundreds of labor contracts today in which employers and employees have agreed to have any unsettled disputes over the interpretation and application of the contract decided by arbitration. But a much more difficult situation is presented when management and labor cannot agree on the terms of their relationship, when they are unable to establish wages and working conditions by a voluntary agreement.

Even if we were able tomorrow to lay down the standards of economic justice, it would be practically impossible to have all labor disputes settled by government tribunals without subjecting a free-enterprise system to absolute control by government. Any such extension of government authority would be sure to result in more and more political controls of ownership, management and labor, and the ultimate end of a free economic and political system.

So we seem forced to accept the evils of a great many needless strikes and lockouts which are so costly to all concerned. There is a limit, however, beyond which such dislocations of the economic system become intolerable. When industrial warfare denies to entire communities the necessities of daily life, there are public duties which can and must be imposed on those persons upon whom vast numbers of people have become dependent for the production and distribution of essential goods and services.

It has been written in the law for a long time that the owners and managers of public utility services cannot abandon those services or withdraw their properties from public use. For the same reason, those who earn a living as employees of such public

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services should be required to fulfill an obligation not to abandon their work and to stop these services for the purpose of coercing managers or the public to submit to their selfish demands. In modern society, there are many enterprises upon which communities are as dependent as upon public utility services. There are the production and transportation of fuel and food, for example, which are absolutely essential to the health and safety of communities.

If employers and employees who are engaged in such essential production or distribution cannot agree upon the terms of their coöperation, they should both be required to accept for a trial period the decision of their dispute by an impartial public body. The truth is that such a dispute is always settled by compulsion, by the executive act of a mayor, a governor, or the President, or by the compulsion that the disputants bring upon the public which, in turn, compels one or both parties to submit. It is far more consistent with American institutions to require disputants to accept the findings of a judicial tribunal than to have them yield to executive action or private coercion.

There is no solution in a contest of force except compulsory arbitration. In a choice between compulsory arbitration through the use of brutal force by organized labor or organized money, and compulsory arbitration by an impartial government tribunal, is there any question as to which is the civilized and just method?

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A CRITIQUE OF PENDING LABOR LEGISLATION

THE relative freedom from industrial strife which this country enjoyed under a wartime system of compulsory arbitration, the post-war strike wave which occurred when that system passed out of existence, and the failure of labor and management to reach an agreement at President Truman's Labor-Management Conference have all given encouragement to those who believe, first, that present federal collective bargaining legislation is an important contributing factor to labor unrest; and, second, that industrial peace can be substantially achieved by new legislation. Most ambitious of the proposals emanating from these beliefs are the "Federal Industrial Relations" bill, introduced into the Senate on June 20, 1945 (S. 1171) by Senators Hatch, Burton and Ball, and the proposed "Labor Disputes Act, 1946" (H.R. 5262), bearing the name of Representative Case, which passed the House of Representatives on February 7, 1946. Although neither of these bills appears likely to become law in its original form [1], they include almost all of the provisions of the various labor bills which have been introduced in this session of Congress. An examination of them, therefore, will be in effect an analysis of all pending labor legislation of the type of viewpoint which these bills represent.

I. The Hatch-Burton-Ball Bill: Summary of Contents

The Hatch-Burton-Ball bill would abolish both the National Labor Relations Board and the United States Conciliation Ser-

[1] Senators Hatch and Ball have removed several sections from their original bill and have reintroduced the remainder, with minor modifications, as an amendment to S. 1661, which incorporates President Truman's "fact-finding" proposal. The Senate Labor Committee has reduced the Case bill to a law which does little more than establish a mediation board. As this article goes to press, however, the current coal strike appears to have induced Congress to enact legislation which may contain parts of both the Hatch-Burton-Ball and the Case bills.

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vice. The duties of the latter and the representation functions of the former would be transferred to a five-man "Federal Industrial Relations Board", which would thus have duties similar to the National (Railway) Mediation Board. Settlement procedures are modeled on the Railway Labor Act. The services of the Federal Industrial Relations Board would have to be invoked, if disputes arising out of contract negotiations cannot be settled; if mediation failed, voluntary arbitration would be suggested; if that were refused, an *ad hoc* fact-finding board could be appointed, or, in cases of extremely vital industries, this *ad hoc* board could be constituted as a compulsory arbitration board—an innovation not found in the Railway Labor Act.

Grievance disputes would be placed under bipartisan adjustment boards, which labor and management would have to establish on the model of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. If an adjustment board deadlocked, the Federal Industrial Relations Board would appoint neutral referees.

If a party refused to follow the bill's procedure, or threatened to violate it, the Federal Industrial Relations Board could seek injunctive relief. Individuals who were aggrieved by a violation of the proposed act, or were so threatened, could also seek injunctive relief, a section which would modify the Norris-La Guardia Act.

The unfair labor practice functions of the National Labor Relations Board would be rewritten and transferred to a new three-man "Unfair Labor Practice Tribunal". Unfair labor practices would apply to employees and unions as well as to employers. Numerous new restrictions, including restraints on the closed shop, the outlawing of foremen's unions, and an omnibus clause forbidding a variety of acts by unions which interfere with "management rights", would be introduced.

Finally, the jurisdiction of the federal government would be severely restricted, with numerous disputes now under the jurisdiction of the United States Conciliation Service and the National Labor Relations Board being left to the states. Throughout the bill new language appears, even when established principles are maintained.

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II. Hatch-Burton-Ball Bill: Analysis

The jurisdiction of the Hatch-Burton-Ball bill is rather paradoxical. On the one hand, government would intervene in labor disputes on a scale hitherto unknown in peacetime. To accomplish its purpose, the bill would require a huge bureaucracy, probably larger than the combined peak staffs of the Conciliation Service, the National Labor Relations Board and the National War Labor Board combined. On the other hand, large segments of industry would no longer be covered by federal labor legislation. In the absence of newly enacted state laws, this industry would have no substitute for such peace-aiding machinery as the United States Conciliation Service and the representation procedure of the NLRB.

The section of the bill dealing with representation disputes and the appropriate bargaining unit substitutes elaborate, novel and confusing language for the simple terminology of the Wagner Act. All the rules and policies which have been painfully developed over the past ten years would be discarded, regardless of their worth. Surely this would be an invitation to rival union strife.

Moreover, the bill would transfer representation duties, which are certainly judicial functions, from the NLRB, a quasi-judicial agency, to the Federal Industrial Relations Board, a mediation agency—all in complete contradiction of the much publicized purpose of "complete separation of the government's mediation function from its quasi-judicial function." This arrangement stems from the attempt of the bill's drafters to copy the "model" Railway Labor Act, which combines mediation and representation duties in the National Mediation Board. The results have not been altogether happy. In order to mediate successfully, the National Mediation Board has had to retain the confidence of the standard railway brotherhoods, the principal users of its mediation services. It has accomplished this by defining the bargaining unit almost without exception to fit the jurisdictional claims of these unions, and, in contests between them, by favoring the larger. Thus the whole weight of gov-

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ernmental authority has been thrown behind the larger unions despite the other equities involved.[2]

Dividing up the representation and unfair labor practice duties of the NLRB between two agencies, as this bill proposes, is also not likely to be satisfactory. For example, while the Federal Industrial Relations Board would be certifying one union as an exclusive bargaining agent, the Unfair Labor Practice Tribunal could be charging that union with an unfair labor practice, which under the bill would disqualify the union to act as a bargaining agent! Or else the board would have to hold up the certification until the charge is proved true or false. In one case an anomaly results; in another a party is punished before a trial is held in which it may be absolved. In neither instance does the procedure conform to sound public policy.[3]

A final feature of the bill's method of handling representation disputes provides for court review of all determinations relating to bargaining agents, unlike the Wagner Act (and the Railway Labor Act) which permits court review only in cases in which a refusal to bargain is also involved.[4] This appears unsound. Most requests for court review of bargaining unit or representation decisions are now brought by unions which have lost out either in their claim for a particular bargaining unit, or in an election. If the courts could substitute their opinions for the expert determinations of an administrative agency in all cases, not only might the results be chaotic, but individual disputes over representation rights would take years of settlement and would cause constant friction within affected plants, with management especially adversely hit. Moreover, such cumbersome machinery would be an invitation to unions to force recognition

[2] See the writer's article, "The Appropriate Bargaining Unit Question Under the Railway Labor Act", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LX (February 1946), pp. 250-69.

[3] For another point on this issue, see *infra*, p. 215.

[4] The Supreme Court has not as yet determined whether review of bargaining unit determination is possible in an independent suit in equity proceeding. See A. L. Shapiro and R. W. Gilbert, "Judicial Review of National Labor Relations Board Certifications by Independent Suits in Equity", *George Washington Law Quarterly*, XIV (February 1946), pp. 312-35.

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by direct action and thus to defeat the primary purpose of the bill.

Settlement procedures of the proposed law are based upon those of the Railway Labor Act, but with the addition of compulsory arbitration. There is the grave possibility that labor and management might regard these provisions, not as an invitation to settle their disputes, but instead as an opportunity to take them to the government for adjudication. The existence of the War Labor Board had that effect,[5] and it shows signs of becoming chronic. Moreover, even by creating a huge bureaucracy, it is difficult to understand how prompt attention could be given to the numerous disputes within the bill's coverage. There would then be the unhappy choice of either permitting a government agency to be intimidated into hasty action, or permitting delay to cause unrest. Experience with the War Labor Disputes Act and the Railway Labor Act has, in addition, demonstrated that the " cooling-off " and strike-vote provisions of the bill are inevitably used by unions in the industrial war of nerves. Workers are always willing to vote to strike, realizing that a strike is not necessarily contemplated, but that an affirmative vote will strengthen the hand of their representatives. Collective bargaining in a strike-vote atmosphere has usually little chance of success.

Aside from these obvious deficiencies, there are two fundamental misconceptions underlying the settlement procedure of the bill, even without its compulsory arbitration feature. The first of these is that the comparative absence of strikes in the railway industry is primarily attributable to the procedures of the Railway Labor Act, and that a similar situation would prevail generally if the procedures of the Railway Labor Act were universalized. Such reasoning fails to grapple either with the

[5] William H. Davis, when chairman of the National War Labor Board, stated that employers " tell their employees: 'Take it to the War Labor Board.' Negotiation is refused in an effort to discredit the union with its own members by making it impotent in handling routine shop disputes. In the same fashion, some labor leaders refuse to compromise on a dispute in plant negotiations. They attempt to hold over management's head the threat: 'Give in, or we'll take it to the War Labor Board.'" American Management Association, *Management's Stake in Collective Bargaining* (New York, 1944), p. 38.

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realities of the situation or with the experience of railway labor disputes. The Railway Labor Act appears to owe its success primarily to the fact that its procedures get the unions what they want. When that does not occur, as so often happened during the war, the railway unions seek out their political friends and secure additional demands either by political pressure or by a strike or threatened strike. This has been the experience of every railway labor dispute since 1941. For their part, the railways are mollified by price relief through the Interstate Commerce Commission, and by assistance against competitive forms of transportation by unions on the political front.[6] In short, the causes of peace on the rails are to be found in the peculiar institutional framework in which the industry operates; and the procedures of the Railway Labor Act have been much less successful than is popularly supposed.

The second fundamental misconception underlying this and similar bills involves "fact-finding".[7] The belief that mere knowledge of facts will settle labor disputes is utterly naïve. What is usually at stake is not facts, but their interpretation, and there are generally as many interpretations as there are interests involved. Who, for example, can define a "fair" wage to the satisfaction of any one else?[8]

[6] For a discussion of this issue, see the writer's article, "The Railway Labor Act and Railway Labor Disputes in Wartime", *American Economic Review*, June 1946. Recent events give added confirmation to this thesis. The nation is threatened with a railway strike because the procedures of the Railway Labor Act were not able to satisfy the unions. Apparently the strike can be avoided only by granting the unions more. Meanwhile the carriers have asked for substantial freight rate increases, and both unions and carriers are advocating restrictions on competitive forms of transportation.

[7] For an excellent discussion of fact-finding, see B. M. Stewart and W. J. Couper, *Fact Finding in Industrial Disputes* (New York, 1946). The authors conclude: "Industrial peace will come only as the result of free collective bargaining by responsible parties and there is no short-run expedient, whether fact finding, or anything else...."

[8] The height of misconception came recently in the General Motors dispute when national wage policy was established on the basis of Department of Commerce figures, later to be repudiated by the Secretary of Commerce, and a theory of "ability to pay", later to be repudiated by its union author. One must agree with the author of the "Topics of the Times" (*New York Times*, March 6, 1946): "We are living in an era when a fact-finding wage study is as certain to find 18½ cents an hour

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The belief of the sponsors of the Hatch-Burton-Ball bill that compulsory arbitration in peacetime will prevent strikes is not substantiated by experience. Australia, where compulsory arbitration has been most widely adopted, has had the worst strike record of any country.[9] There is no reason to believe that compulsion will work any better here without wartime patriotic restraints. Moreover, the advent of "fact-finding" and compulsory arbitration inevitably means the complete transference of industrial relations to the political field and thus the end of free collective bargaining. Settlements by political maneuvering are rarely as satisfactory either to the parties or to the public as the results achieved through collective bargaining; and compulsory arbitration of wages means some sort of permanent governmental price control.

The provision in the bill for arbitration of disputes arising out of the interpretation of agreements is sound in intent, but the method proposed is questionable. Grievances should be settled peacefully, if possible, by the parties, or by impartial machinery if the parties cannot agree. Otherwise collective bargaining becomes nothing more than an armed truce punctured by frequent outbreaks.

This fact does not, however, require that the government insist that arbitrators be appointed by itself, or that arbitration boards be formed in a certain specified manner. Such details should be left for the parties to work out, and there is a serious question whether such arbitration should be made compulsory.

Like so many sections of this bill, this one was modeled on the Railway Labor Act, which established the National Railroad Adjustment Board to arbitrate grievance disputes. The Adjustment Board is a bipartisan agency, such as this bill calls for, and

as a fact-finding language survey is sure to find that little children in France speak French.... One gets the impression that members of fact-finding wage boards earn their salaries very easily. There is a predestined fact lying in full sight for anyone to pick up: 18½ cents an hour...." While actually 18½ cents has not been universally recognized by fact-finding boards, the sum has become the magic formula by which disputes are settled in this era of government wage setting.

[9] On December 3, 1945, the *New York Times* reported that a proposed Australian Labor-Management Conference had been postponed by the Prime Minister because of the large number of strikes then in progress there.

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referees are appointed to break deadlocks by the National (Railway) Mediation Board. It is of more than passing interest to note that no administrative agency has been more thoroughly condemned by students of the administrative process or by the courts for undemocratic procedure than has the Adjustment Board;[10] and no less an authority than Professor Sumner H. Slichter has concluded that its awards are among the "strangest in the annals of industrial relations."[11]

The Hatch-Burton-Ball bill provides that awards of arbitrators and adjustment boards are enforceable in the courts. In addition, enforcement of the various proceedings is possible through court action, initiated either by the Federal Industrial Relations Board, or by affected individuals.

The Federal Industrial Relations Board, a proposed mediation agency, which in addition would also be a judge in representation disputes, is thus a prosecutor also. It is not easy to understand how it could successfully act as mediator after hailing a party into court. Moreover, its vast authority to seek restraint of violations or threatened violations is so broad that it may well be incompatible with free collective bargaining.

[10] Discussions of the Adjustment Board are found in Attorney-General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, *Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies*, Sen. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st sess., part 4; L. K. Garrison, "The National Railroad Adjustment Board: An Unique Administrative Agency", *Yale Law Journal*, XLVI (February 1937), pp. 567-98; W. H. Spencer, *The National Railroad Adjustment Board* (Chicago, 1938); "Judicial Review of Awards by the National Railroad Adjustment Board", *Yale Law Journal*, LI (February 1942), pp. 666-78; and H. R. Northrup, *Organized Labor and the Negro* (New York, 1944), pp. 65-78.

The critical attitude of the courts toward the Adjustment Board is well illustrated by *Nord* v. *Griffen*, 86 F. (2d) 481, cert. den., 300 U. S. 673 (1937), in which the appellate court said: "The trial below and this appeal do not involve the merits of the controversy. They involve solely the question of whether the appellee is to be bound by an order of an administrative board in a proceeding to which he was not a party, entered at a hearing of which he had no notice. The mere statement of the proposition is conclusive of its soundness. The rights of the plaintiff are protected by the Fifth Amendment." For a list of supporting cases, see Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., *National Collective Bargaining Policy* (New York, 1945), p. 86, note 41.

[11] S. H. Slichter, *Union Policies and Industrial Management* (Washington, 1941), pp. 195-96.

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Suits brought by individuals mean the revival of the labor injunction. The courts would thus again be the final arbiter of numerous labor disputes. That cross picketing, mass picketing to bar ingress and egress to plants, and other such union abuses need correction is readily admitted. But in order to insure uniform and fair policy toward both employers and employees, it would appear far preferable to make such union practices unfair labor practices under the Wagner Act and treat them accordingly.

The Federal Industrial Relations Board is also empowered to refuse to certify as a representative any one or group which interferes with the proposed act. The comment of Dr. William M. Leiserson on this point is worth repeating:

> A dispute at Montgomery Ward's can hardly be settled without recognizing Sewell Avery, nor a musicians' dispute without Joseph Petrillo. And how are coal mining disputes to be mediated by refusing to recognize the operators' association or the miners' union?
>
> This is an example of the bizarre results that come from mixing a voluntary system of adjusting labor disputes with compulsory judicial or law enforcement powers lodged in a mediation agency.[12]

Most of the attacks on the Wagner Act and its administration have centered on its unfair labor practice sections. Management representatives have been insistent that labor, like industry, must have duties written into this law which grants labor so many basic rights. This argument has much force, and undoubtedly guided the drafters of the bill. Unfortunately, the product appears neither sound nor workable.

The employer unfair labor practices now found in the Wagner Act are retained, but in new language. Management would thus be faced with a period similar to 1935-40, when it groped in the dark while its rights and duties were being adjudicated. Since these unfair labor practices would also be applied to labor,

[12] *New York World-Telegram*, July 16, 1945.

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it would be under the same disability. In addition, the application of all unfair labor practices to both labor and management, although nearly all are pertinent to only one, creates several anomalous situations and appears to go beyond constitutional limitations as well.

For example, unfair labor practices include " interfering with or attempting to regulate the organizing or function of an employer or labor organization " and " giving financial or other aid to an employer or labor organization ". The net effect would be not only to prevent " employers or employees or persons acting in their behalf " from interfering with the self-organization of each other's bargaining antagonists (which is of course desirable), but also to preclude employers and employees from assisting their own organizations!

Another section of the bill would outlaw foremen's unions and prohibit any union voice whatever in the ordinary terms and conditions of employment, that is, hiring, layoffs, discharges, apprenticeship training, or anything else " which is essential to the fulfillment of management obligations to consumers, investors, and workers. . . . "

To a harassed management which has seen its functions and prerogatives more and more limited by a militant union backed by the NLRB or the War Labor Board, this section may seem like a breath of fresh air. Yet the omnibus language goes so far and can mean so many different things that its workability may seriously be questioned even to those who desire a brake on labor's invasion of management's rights. This section merits the bitter antagonism of labor leaders, who regard it as a " union-busting " device which would outlaw many practices generally considered legitimate even by industry.

The outlawing of foremen's unions may well be contrary to constitutional guarantees of freedom of association. It certainly ignores the extent of foremen organization in many industries and trades, including the railway industry, for which Section 1, Fifth, of the " model " Railway Labor Act defines " employee " to include " subordinate official ". A preferable approach would be to limit the NLRB's discretion in determining foremen bar-

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gaining units, as discussed below in connection with the Case bill.[13]

The bill's restrictions on the closed shop were apparently copied from the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act which, prior to its recent amendment, also forbade the closed shop unless 75 per cent of the employees involved were union members; unless 60 per cent had voted for the closed shop; unless the union remained an open one; and unless fair trial for those whose discharge was initiated by the union was provided for.

The Wagner Act limits the closed shop to unions which represent a majority of workers in the bargaining unit. There is no sound reason why such unions should not also be compelled to remain open ones and why unfair discharges by unions should not be prohibited. Both reforms could be readily accomplished by amendment to the Wagner Act. But whether additional percentage requirements over a majority accomplish anything is doubtful. Wisconsin recently amended its legislation to reduce the 75 per cent to 60 per cent. What advantage any of these provisions have over 51 per cent is difficult to perceive.

The undesirability of creating a new "Unfair Labor Practice Tribunal" and divorcing unfair labor practice functions from representation cases has already been noted.[14] An additional objection is that it will hinder informal agreements along the lines daily consummated by the NLRB, whereby unfair labor practice charges are withdrawn by an agreement for a representation election.

III. The Case Bill: Summary of Contents

The Case bill may be divided into three parts: a section which establishes a new mediation board; a section which amends the Wagner Act; and a section which modifies the Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act.

A tripartite "Labor Management Mediation Board" would be given authority to intervene in any dispute interfering with interstate or foreign commerce or affecting the public interest, which is not subject to the Railway Labor Act, provided that

[13] See *infra*, p. 219.

[14] See *supra*, p. 208.

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250 employees were involved. Bargaining in " good faith " by both parties would be required as a preliminary procedure, followed by five days' written notice of intention to strike or lock out. Upon assuming jurisdiction of a dispute, a thirty-day " cooling-off " period would be enforced, during which time the status quo would be maintained while the board made every effort to settle the dispute, first by mediation, and second by persuading the parties to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration. The board could petition the courts through the Attorney-General for enforcement of its cooling-off provisions.

The Case bill would amend the Norris-La Guardia Act by granting to the federal courts authority to enjoin violence, intimidation, obstructionable picketing, or " threats thereof " in labor disputes; to enjoin boycotts or other concerted union activities aimed at securing recognition from an employer whose goods have been produced during the life of a labor agreement with a union certified by the NLRB, or who has an " applicable " labor agreement; and to enjoin violations or threatened violations of the proposed act if the production or movement of perishable goods is involved. Courts would, as now, be prohibited from issuing injunctions aimed at strikes, peaceful assembly, or peaceful picketing, although this section may not be compatible with restraints on threatened violations.

The Wagner Act would be amended by prohibiting the recognition of supervisory employees as " employees " under the Act; by excluding industries and employees engaged in the processing of agricultural products from the coverage of the Wagner Act; by providing that an individual who is found guilty of violence, or who violates any of the other prohibitions in the Case bill, would lose the benefits of the Wagner Act, and would not be entitled to act as a representative under it; and by providing that labor organizations which violate the proposed law " would cease to be entitled to a status of representative or labor organization under the National Labor Relations Act, for a period of not less than 90 days, nor more than six months."

An additional section of the Case bill would make all collective labor agreements enforceable in the federal courts, and would permit civil suits to recover damages against violators.

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IV. The Case Bill: Analysis

The Case bill was rushed through the House of Representatives without hearings and obviously without due consideration. Since the jurisdiction of the new mediation board would include all disputes not subject to the Railway Labor Act which involved 250 persons or more, it would have jurisdiction over unfair labor practice and representation disputes which under the Wagner Act are exclusively within the province of the National Labor Relations Board; and it would also have jurisdiction over labor-management disputes in which the United States Conciliation Service now intervenes (and presumably would still be able to intervene, since the Case bill is silent on the Conciliation Service's status). The net effect would be a chaotic situation whereby labor and management could "shop around among many agencies" [15] in search of the one which would be most sympathetic to their views; and it would subject to mediation the judicial functions of the NLRB which are essentially unadapted to compromise.

A mediation board composed of partisans is likely to be unworkable. Mediation officials must be impartial if they are to inspire the trust essential to the success of a procedure which depends upon peaceful persuasion. Partisan members of mediation boards are already committed to a viewpoint and owe their jobs to that commitment. They can make no claim to impartiality. Their sole usefulness would be to act as "messenger boys" between the board and the interests whom they represent. A tripartite mediation board would insure disunity of purpose and would promote suspicion rather than industrial peace.

The power which the Case bill would grant to the proposed board to secure enforcement of a "cooling-off" period and the maintenance of the status quo makes it a prosecutor, and would probably insure its ineffectiveness as a mediator. Moreover, the manner in which the Case bill was rushed through the House of Representatives by an avowed antilabor coalition would in itself

[15] See the testimony of Paul M. Herzog, Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, reported at 17 LRR 879.

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preclude any trust by organized labor in its mediation provisions. If the mediation services of the government are to be revitalized successfully, they must not be joined to a measure designed to amend prolabor or antilabor legislation; otherwise mediation will bear any onus attached to other provisions of the law.

That there is a vital need to integrate the Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction and the Wagner Acts is, to this writer, not debatable. Present law, for example, provides no adequate relief for the employer who has to deal with a certified union or violate the Wagner Act, but who invites sanctions from a rival union (and whose employees are likewise subject to coercion) if he obeys the law. The Case bill would remedy this obvious inequity by reinstating all the attendant evils which the Norris-La Guardia Act corrected.

Instead of seeking solutions for present difficulties in past injustices, it would seem preferable to aim merely at correcting present inequities. That would involve, first, cessation of any attempt to revive the courts' blanket authority to enjoin "threatened violations" in labor disputes; and, second, instead of endeavoring to remedy existing evils by means of the injunction, amending the Wagner Act to permit the NLRB to proscribe undesirable union practices, which should be carefully defined. That would place labor and industry on an equal footing, with equal opportunity for administrative protection and for appeal to the courts.

The Wagner Act amendments are designed (1) to narrow the Act's coverage, and (2) to narrow the NLRB's authority to protect employees' and unions' bargaining rights.

The Wagner Act's coverage would be narrowed by redefining agricultural employment and by excluding supervisory workers from its coverage. To remove food processing, canning, etc., from the coverage of the Wagner Act on the ground that such work is "agricultural" is discriminatory to the extreme. It amounts to a public declaration that one branch of industry should have special privileges. Why not equal privilege to the meat-packing industry; or, for that matter, to any industry

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which asks for it and has a powerful lobby to back up the request?

The Case bill's foremen amendments do not go so far as forbidding foremen organizations (as the Hatch-Burton-Ball bill would require), but they do, in this writer's opinion, go too far. Foremen unionization has long been customary for several industries (maritime, railway, printing, building construction), and has made sizable inroads in mass-production industries. Public policy might, therefore, recognize foremen organization as a natural and logical outgrowth of unionization, but one which involves peculiar problems. A middle-of-the-road approach is needed, between the extremes proposed by the Case bill, and the present policy of the National Labor Relations Board, which apparently recognizes bargaining units of foremen under all conditions.[16] Such a policy might limit foremen bargaining units to separate foremen unions (which might be affiliated with national labor federations) except in those few industries where foremen unionization along other lines has been customary.

The Case bill would narrow the NLRB's authority to reinstate or otherwise aid striking or boycotting employees who had engaged in violence. Unfortunately, the bill makes no distinction between gross and trivial misconduct. It imposes drastic penalties on employees who engage in any willful violence, no matter how petty that violence, and it leaves no discretion to assess the effect, either to the courts or to the NLRB. These penalties would be in addition to existing laws, which nowhere condone violence.

The sanctions against unions engaging in prohibitive conduct reveal the true antilabor, destructive character of the bill. A misdeed on the part of a single union official could deprive thousands of workers of the benefits of unionism. The analysis of this provision by Paul M. Herzog, Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, is impressive:

> It follows that an international labor organization comprising hundreds of thousands of members would be outlawed for misconduct of an official of one of its locals or affiliates. The union

[16] See the NLRB's decision in *Matter of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 17 LRR 971.

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> may thus become ineligible to be a bargaining representative in dozens of distant plants where it is the certified bargaining representative therefore disrupting long established bargaining relationships and resulting in industrial chaos. Employers in no wise affected by the dispute giving rise to the boycott would suddenly be freed of the obligation to deal with the union chosen by their employees. Other employers, most anxious to bargain with their employees' representatives, would fear to do so. The [National Labor Relations] Board could conduct no elections in which the ostracized union would otherwise be entitled to be on the ballot. In the interim, the employees will have no means of bargaining collectively through a freely chosen representative. They will inevitably turn to self-help. New strikes will follow and a chain reaction will set in.[17]

V. *Conclusion*

In sum, neither the Hatch-Burton-Ball bill nor the Case bill offers much, if anything, constructive toward the development of sound industrial relations, but rather both involve what appears to be a distinct step in the wrong direction. In the negative sense, however, these bills do make a contribution: they underscore the necessity of developing a constructive program for the revision of our labor laws. This program should include three points: (1) a reorganization of the mediation services of the federal government, either by revitalizing the United States Conciliation Service, or by supplanting it with a new agency; (2) an equalization of the Wagner Act, leaving representation and enforcement duties lodged in the National Labor Relations Board, but providing restrictions on unfair union practices in addition to those now placed on management unfair practices; and (3) additional amendment to the Wagner Act to safeguard individual employee rights against arbitrary and undemocratic acts of union officials. The amendments involved in the second and third points should be kept to a bare minimum, and should include cross picketing or boycotts in defiance of a NLRB certification, refusal of a union to bargain, closed unions with closed

[17] Testimony, 17 LRR 881.

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shops, arbitrary denial of membership, and arbitrary discharges resulting from closed shops.[18]

These proposals would build on what we have, without the confusion and lengthy litigation involved in throwing out all existing machinery and commencing anew, and without adding the vindictiveness or ambiguity of hasty, ill-conceived antilabor measures. Ultimately, of course, the success of these proposals in aiding the cause of industrial peace would depend not only on their administration, but also on the degree of responsibility and common sense exercised by labor and management in free collective bargaining.

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[18] For interesting and informative programs along this line which make an excellent point of departure for a study of national labor policy, see Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., *National Collective Bargaining Policy*; and Ludwig Teller, *A Labor Policy for America* (New York, 1945). These, together with other studies, will be reviewed by the writer in a forthcoming issue of this QUARTERLY.

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BRITAIN'S ELECTION: A DEBATE ON NATIONALIZATION AND CARTELS

THE surprising British election of 1945 was fought and won almost exclusively on domestic issues. Imperial problems received little attention, except in Lord Beaverbrook's papers. Diplomacy, so far as it entered into the campaign, dealt largely with the Conservative policy of pre-war appeasement. Little was said, even by leftist Laborites, about foreign affairs or the conduct of the war. Despite the usual Conservative red herring—this time the Laski letter—it was a fairly clear-cut argument concerning the merits of nationalization as propounded by the Socialists, and those of private enterprise as set forth by the Conservatives; the Liberals criticized with equal abandon the evils of unrestricted free enterprise and rampant nationalization. An examination of the arguments and evidence set before the voters during the election period by the British press consequently should prove both interesting and instructive.

The war was itself a great political and social experiment conducted by a united nation, which for the duration surrendered many of its former rights and privileges. To many, its very success was a potent argument for nationalization; while at the same time it threw into the boldest relief such perplexing social and economic problems as social security, coal and fuel, unemployment, town and country planning, education, and housing. Months before the war ended, the press was urging the Coalition Government to take constructive steps to solve these trying problems before peace had blunted the fine idealism of war, as after World War I.

Long before the election was hastily announced in May 1945, Parliament, moreover, was deeply concerned with social and economic issues. The press insistently demanded remedial legis-

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lation to synchronize demobilization and the slowing down of war industry, so as to prevent unemployment—that tragic aftermath of the last war. By 1942 special Parliamentary commissions had produced, among others, the Uthwatt and Beveridge reports, the former dealing in a highly constructive manner with town and country planning, the latter with social insurance on an equally broad basis. The public welcomed the Beveridge Report with unusual enthusiasm, and tended increasingly to consider the government's attitude toward it as the touchstone of its sincerity in solving post-war social and economic problems. Deep concern, therefore, was expressed early in 1943 over the Coalition's refusal to indicate its reaction toward the report, especially because the War Ministry had forbidden the circulation among the troops of a resumé of it prepared by Sir William Beveridge himself.

Suspicion of the Coalition's good faith increased when the government finally announced that it could not accept the report in its entirety. Labor extremists in the Commons carried their protest to a division, and almost produced a split in their own party. The Cabinet's pusillanimity also brought about the organization of a new party, called Common Wealth, which successfully challenged the Conservative candidate at the Eddisbury by-election. This was only the beginning of several successful by-election protests against the Coalition's innate conservatism. In its annual conference in May 1943, the Conservative Party welcomed the report, with some criticism of details, as an alternative to socialization, and the following month the Labor Party Conference called upon the government to give speedy effect to it. The resentment was consequently great when the king's speech from the throne in November indicated that the War Cabinet had not yet made up its mind about either the Beveridge or Uthwatt reports. An amendment to the address was, as a consequence, vigorously supported, not only by the Laborites, but also by some of the " ginger group " of the Conservatives, although it was not carried to a division.

The Churchill government, secure in its majority, was obviously unperturbed, for not until the following September

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(1944) did it issue the long-awaited White Paper on Social Insurance, which followed, however, Beveridge's Report much more closely than was expected. They differed so widely on workmen's compensation, however, that the Cabinet brought forth on that subject another White Paper, also distinctly liberal in character.

The ministry seemed equally reluctant to embark upon the ambitious housing program foreshadowed by Uthwatt's Report, for not until June 1944 did it at long last announce its post-war building program, which included a Town and Country Planning Bill as an alternative to this report. This bill encountered heavy going in the Commons, even from the Tories and Liberals. Labor was still more hostile, because it believed that the acceptance of the government's recommendations would be a serious obstacle to nationalizing the land, to them an indispensable prerequisite to any constructive housing program. On August 1, 1944, Mr. Henry Willink, Minister of Health, moved the second reading of a bill providing £150,000,000 for the speedy erection by local authorities of temporary bungalows, mainly steel Portal houses, which were expected to last ten years. The Commons were skeptical of this "bungaloid growth", and Mr. Willink later moved an amendment to his bill, placing upon the ministry concerned the responsibility for removing these houses after ten years, or when requested by the local authorities. He estimated the cost of these structures at £675 and the rental 10 shillings a week.

Lord Woolton, Minister of Reconstruction, reported to Parliament that the "blitz" and flying bombs had totally destroyed 170,000 houses in the London area, seriously injured 170,000 more that were still in need of major repairs, and damaged an additional 700,000 that required further attention to make them reasonably comfortable. The government also proposed certain amendments to the Town and Country Planning Bill, to obviate difficulties as to land titles, finances, and the powers of local authorities. The Socialists desired to extend the power of compulsory purchase to "blighted" as well as "blitzed" houses, and the Tories to reduce the period of compulsion from five to two years. Both proposals were defeated, but a bitter

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Parliamentary controversy developed over the compensation clauses. Only after a prolonged argument had the Cabinet agreed that land acquired for public purposes should be based upon 1939 prices. The Laborite ministers loyally abided by this compromise, but the Tories sought additional compensation for property owners. Feeling ran so high that the Prime Minister intervened, proposing that the bill be passed without these clauses, so that the local authorities might take some preparatory steps while a fresh compromise was being reached. The government agreed, however, that the new clauses should be added to the bill before the end of the committee stage. Although these amendments provided more generous compensation to landowners, amounting in some cases to a 30 per cent increase over the 1939 price, "standpat" Tories loudly (though vainly) demanded further financial concessions.

The address from the throne in November 1944 was severely criticized because it dealt so cavalierly with housing. Mr. Duncan Sandys, new Minister of Works, and son-in-law of the Prime Minister, replied that they had been able to put in a tolerable state 200,000 of the 700,000 damaged houses. His announcement that there was little hope for the much-heralded Portal houses before the end of the European war, however, was most disappointing. The poor were persuaded that it was the old story of "too little" and "too late", and that a large proportion of the demobilized service men would be unable to find decent living accommodations they could afford. Housing, indeed, touched the poor at their most sensitive spot. Before the war a third of a million houses a year were being built, but only 30 per cent were workingmen's homes. Except for indispensable repairs, building was at a standstill during six years of war, so that Britain, without any bombing, would have been short more than a million homes. But she suffered frightfully from the *Blitzkrieg* and robot bombs, especially in the London area, where half a million were homeless, and as many more shivered in temporary quarters far below the modest minimum standard set by the Ministry of Health.

During the war, Mr. Churchill assured the victims of bombings that the devastated areas would be rehabilitated as a war

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measure. When the elections came, there had been much careful deliberation, some excellent planning, but precious little construction. Even the project for half a million prefabricated temporary houses had first been cut in half, and then practically scrapped. Such things were partly owing to the enormous complexity of the problem. Securing clear titles to land for housing sites was frequently as exasperating as the matter of compensation. The war had shown the vital necessity for a policy of " decongestion "—checking the expansion of large cities, a more equable distribution of factories, and the more convenient location of workingmen's homes. The plan for restoring much-bombed Plymouth provided for a loss of more than 20 per cent of its pre-war population, and the dispersal of the rest over an area eight times that of the present town. House construction was, therefore, closely tied up with town and country planning. The proper allocation of power between the central government and a multitude of local authorities, frequently with overlapping jurisdictions, required wisdom, patience and drive on the part of the ministry, all of which were conspicuously lacking. In part because of the exigencies of war, trained men in the building trades were about one third of the pre-war number. Last, but certainly not least in the minds of the politicians, was the fundamental question whether the building should be done primarily by local authorities or private contractors.

Even in the midst of the election, the temporary " caretaker government ", which took over after the Coalition ended in May 1945, could promise no more than 220,000 completed houses in two years, after which they expected to turn housebuilding back to individual enterprise. The public was deeply aroused, both by the lack of a long-term program, and by a steady rise in governmental estimates as to the cost of new houses. Although conceding that houses would cost about double what they did in 1939, the government ignored all demands for controlling the selling price of houses, because of legal difficulties in enforcing such controls. This lackadaisical attitude continued despite the government's recognition of the most desperate urgency in providing at least a million homes, the *Manchester Guardian's* con-

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tention that by any standard of decency three million British people were living in slums, and the *New Statesman's* statement that four million British homes were ninety or more years old. The humane aspect received a great impetus by the publication, during the election, of a monograph on infant mortality prepared by two professors at Birmingham University Medical School. It covered the years 1928-1938, and included about one third of the population of England and Wales. Among the classes that were best off economically, the mortality was 23 per 1,000; for the overcrowded poor, 108; and for the unemployed, overcrowded poor, 158! A Gallup poll on the question as to which party would do best with housing reported the following percentages: Labor 42, Conservatives 25, Liberals 13, no difference 11, don't know 9. The women, stated Miss Ellen Wilkinson, now Minister of Education, look upon the government's housing program as the crucial issue of the campaign; and the *Times* insisted that in London this was the leading issue.

The Socialists were convinced that this vital program was being held up by grasping landowners, inefficient local authorities, avaricious building contractors, and monopolistic rings in building materials. The *Herald* emphatically summarized its position:

> The financiers, the combines and the landowners are not in favour of taking housing out of politics, and until these gentlemen have been persuaded, it is sheer, canting nonsense to ask the people who want houses to lay aside any political weapon for gaining their ends. . . .No one suggests, of course, that the financiers, the combines and the landowners do not want to build houses. They and the politicians who speak for them, realise the political menace of the housing shortage and the money-making possibilities of the situation. They would like to build quite a number of houses, although not too many to jeopardize such rent ramps as the law still permits.

The Laborites hated particularly such price rings, and produced some damning evidence against them. Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr. Herbert Morrison and Mr. Hugh Dalton, all recounted specific wartime difficulties with these cartels. Mr. Ellis Smith

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(Labor MP) asked the government to set up a full inquiry into the ramifications of cartels. He asserted that for a quarter century

> trading associations had been exploiting the people. Every material that went into the construction of houses was controlled by a trading association more concerned with profit than providing houses for the people. This was the background against which private enterprise could be seen. Industrialists, with their ally, the Conservative Party, had almost eliminated enterprise in this country. Duponts, I. C. I., I. G. of Germany had no regard to the national interests of any country.

Mr. Ernest Bevin, Coalition Minister of Labor and now Foreign Secretary, insisted that the steel industry was being strangled with " steel rings ". Firms that had not turned a wheel in four years, he asserted, had never missed paying dividends, thanks to subsidies from the ring, and he mentioned one firm that had contributed £3,000,000 a year to this fund. Mr. Bevin held that this ring, of which the British Iron and Steel Federation was the keystone, was largely responsible for maintaining prices one-fourth higher than those in America, although wages there were " four times higher than ours." This Federation, moreover, had joined the European steel cartel in 1935.

The Socialists complained unceasingly of the ubiquity (as well as the obliquities) of monopolies. A paper read before the Royal Statistical Society showed that in 33 different trades, 70 per cent of the output was controlled by not more than three firms each. Mr. Robert Edwards, Chairman of the Independent Labor Party, wrote:

> A great steel cartel concentrates the production in the hands of four mighty monopolies. Eighty per cent of all Britain's aluminum is controlled by one industrial enterprise. The manufacture of magnesium is wholly in the hands of two firms. The production of transparent plastic . . . of one firm. Five big banks control the whole credit of the nation. The coal industry is being organized into one great nation-wide cartel. Road, Air, Rail, and Sea Transport is to become the monopoly of half a dozen business men.

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Equally concrete were the denunciations of food cartels by Mr. Harry Pollitt, the Communist leader:

> The food of the British people is in the grip of 9 big combines. Between them these 9 own or control 236 other companies, together with 100 companies controlled by two companies registered abroad. Their total capital is £130,000,000. Four of these companies own no fewer than 1552 retail shops, besides 115 bakeries and creameries. These 9 combines have a powerful grip on all kinds of food . . . including sugar, butter, meat, margarine, lard, tea, fish, milk, cream and canned goods. They also control the bulk of the supplies of candles, tooth paste, face cream and perfume.

Viscount Sankey wrote in the *Fortnightly* that it might be necessary

> to control big combines and big associations, both in their national and international activities. Buying and holding and selling again simply to make a profit should not be lawful because it does no public service.

This was high ground, indeed, for a judicial luminary to take.

For a year and more before the elections, as well as during the campaign itself, the Socialists expressed increasing concern over the future trends of international cartels, and especially over the continued friendly relations among the German Farbenindustrie, the American chemical industry and the British I.C.I. The Standard Oil Company, Du Pont and the General Electric companies, all came in for much comment, because of their international ramifications, and pointed questions were asked as to the exact relations between Krupps, the *Comité des Forges,* the British Iron and Steel Federation, and the United States Steel Corporation.

British Socialists have always criticized severely the inefficiency (and excessive cost) of the present system of distribution. Mr. Dalton explained that in the cotton industry there were six middlemen between the cotton-grower and the spinner. The working classes had attempted to find some relief from this sys-

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tem through the organization of coöperative societies, which by 1938 were doing an annual business in excess of £260,000,000. Naturally, Laborites objected both to Lord Beaverbrook's repeated and envenomed attacks upon these popular "co-ops", and to his impassioned appeals to the government to make a speedy end of all wartime control over business, because they greatly feared increases in the cost of their food and clothing. Mr. W. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty in the Coalition, took up the cudgels for these societies:

> It was stupid nonsense to talk about the Co-ops as a monopoly. The Co-op societies, with 9,000,000 members, were open to any one on equal terms. The essence of a monopoly was that it could prevent new entrants. On the contrary, it was the only effective challenge to the giant trusts. For soap it was the only effective competitor of the Unilever combine; Co-op tobacco and cigarettes were almost the sole challenge to the Imperial Tobacco Company; Co-op milling was the single alternative to the Rank and Spiller combines. It was not the Co-op that threatened the small trader—it was the big financial interests who bought them up and drove them out of business. Lord Beaverbrook uttered no threats against the towering trusts like I.C.I., Unilevers, Imperial Tobacco, and Ranks.

Months before the elections, the *Guardian* complained that the Coalition Ministry was partly controlled by big business and the trade unions:

> It begins to seem even more probable that the omission from the King's Speech of any promise of legislation to deal with restrictive trade agreements and combines and trade associations indicates a retreat by the President of the Board of Trade [Mr. Dalton].... The *Economist* of Saturday suggests that the Board of Trade has been forced to drop "its very modest proposals for anti-monopoly legislation" in consequence of a joint offensive against it from "Big Business" and the Trades Unions.... The Board of Trade naturally does not like to admit defeat.... But Mr. Dalton knows that his hopes of getting the legislation this session have vanished. If the Cabinet has given way to pressure from outside interests, it is ominous for any employment policy.

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A recent study of the growth of monopolies by two Board of Trade officials revealed, moreover, that such articles as sewing machines, sewing cotton, laundry bluing, phonograph records, wallpaper, flashlight bulbs, and a multitude of other articles were almost completely controlled by "octopus-like monopolies. They dictated the price to the consumer. Every small trader was in the grip of these monopolies."

During the campaign, Labor leaders sought to show that the Conservative Party as a whole was notoriously friendly to big business, and to associate individual members of the "caretaker government" with monopolies. Mr. Shinwell, volatile Laborite, said in the Commons:

> the principal monopolists in this country were directly or indirectly in the Government. When Lord Beaverbrook fulminated against monopolists it was a clear case of Satan reproving Satan. Then what about Mr. Lyttelton, the President of the Board of Trade and Minister of Production? Would he care to disclose all his former interests, which were monopolistic in character? What about Sir Andrew Duncan, the Minister of Supply? He was the head and front of the British Iron and Steel Federation, and what greater monopoly was there than that? What about Lord Leathers, the great Minister of War Transport? He was the big noise in William Gory's, one of the greatest monopolistic undertakings in this country.

As the Tories attacked the Socialist program for nationalizing the bank, the coal mines, and inland transport, they pointed to the serious dangers involved in the destruction of private enterprise, and the egregious failure of several highly ambitious nationalization projects in the British Dominions, France and Belgium. They dwelt longest, however, on the absolute finality of nationalization, for, once embarked upon it, they maintained, there could be no return to the system of private enterprise, because the inevitable trend of nationalization was toward totalitarianism. The Socialists insisted that the entire system of private enterprise was rapidly breaking down in the face of national and international cartels, against which the present government was unwilling to proceed. Labor likewise scoffed

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at the idea of internal convulsions. They pointed to the colossal failure of the coal industry in the last three decades. Justice Sankey's Commission in 1919 had recommended nationalizing the mines, but its advice was practically ignored, so that the industry was now in a " tragic mess ". According to Mr. James Griffith, member of the present Labor government, a thousand mines had been closed since that date, fifty thousand miners relegated to the scrap heap, and many millions sterling were now required for the reëquipment of the mines, which could not be secured except through their nationalization.

The Laborites claimed, furthermore, that in the two decades before World War I, mining royalties and profits totaled a third of a billion pounds, and that the profits alone were more than triple the original capital investment in the mines. Mr. Bevin noted that £70,000,000 had been paid in royalties to this sick industry during the recent war. The increase in output per man shift in Britain between 1925 and 1935 was, moreover, only 14 per cent as compared with 81 per cent in the Ruhr, and 118 per cent in the mines of Holland, which were largely state-owned. The Socialists maintained that this bad record, which had grown progressively worse during the war, was due to the lack of modern equipment and business methods.

On the other hand, the Tories stressed the fact that despite large pay increases the individual miner's output had appreciably declined, and voluntary absenteeism greatly increased. The *Western Mail* (Cardiff) accused the miners of a " ca canny " policy, and of indulging in absenteeism and unauthorized strikes, even during the desperate stress of war. The miners replied that the government permitted the drafting of so many skilled miners as to create the threat of a coal famine, to avert which they had to conscript inexperienced young men (" Bevin's boys ") to work in the pits, so that it was inevitable that individual protection should decline. In the face of such chaos in the industry, the Labor leaders argued, the only remedy was nationalization, with control by a board made up of scientists, technicians, pit managers, miners and consumers. Scientific and technological changes, however, may require many revolutionary changes throughout the industry in the next decade.

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The mine operators sought to ward off nationalization by calling in Mr. Robert Foot to draw up a plan for reorganizing British mines. His report called for a closer affiliation of all the collieries. It was termed " coal fascism " by the *New Statesman,* and a " mirage " by the *Liberal Magazine.* At the beginning of 1945, the miners also took positive action by completing the amalgamation of 23 regional unions, and craftsmen from independent unions, into the very powerful National Union of Mineworkers with a membership of between 600,000 and 700,000, with an emergency fund of half a million sterling. This threatening move, coupled with the hostile reception accorded Foot's plan, led the " caretakers " to give their blessing to the Reid Report, which recommended definite controls over the administration of the collieries. Facing both a lack of fuel and an increase in price, homeowners and factory managers alike were inclined to wish a plague upon both the miner and operator. Fearing serious problems as to fuel and power for the future, engineers began again to think earnestly, as well as more optimistically, of the possibilities of the Severn Barrage as a cheap source of both light and power.

The activities of all types of monopolies were jealously watched by the Labor organ, the *Daily Herald,* which was greatly perturbed by extensive war profiteering. The Ministry of Aircraft Production obtained refunds of £7,600,000 because of unduly high profits, and the Ministry of Supply £10,750,000. The Admiralty, meanwhile, was severely criticized for being very dilatory in bringing malefactors to account.

It must be observed, however, that Labor's suspicion of the good faith of the Coalition or the " caretaker government " was not restricted to purely economic issues. Their fundamental distrust was of the so-called governing classes as a whole, whose characters and motives were equally impugned. Like the Bourbons at the end of the Napoleonic era, they seemed to have learned nothing and forgotten nothing, but were anxious only to return the *status quo ante* at the earliest possible moment. In forming his *ad interim* " caretaker government " on the very eve of the election, Mr. Churchill was apparently completely oblivious of this growing antagonism. The Socialists took de-

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light in pointing out that the ministry of 81 not only included representatives of four of the foremost British monopolies, but was made up very largely of aristocrats and plutocrats. Of the 64 who did not hold their portfolios because of Liberal or Socialist affiliations, or by virtue of administrative ability, 14 were members of the Cabinet, 14 were noblemen, 17 were married to peers' daughters, and 5 to baronets' daughters. All but 8 of the 64 were public school men, including 25 from Eton, 8 from Harrow, and 4 from Winchester. In the Cabinet numbering 16, Eton was represented by 7, and Harrow by 3.

The British people could not forget the Chamberlain era with its Gethsemane at Munich and its Calvary at Dunkirk. The Socialists contended, moreover, that the "caretaker ministry" represented the same "appeasement gang". A Labor member, Mr. F. Seymour Cocks, wrote in the *Herald:*

> In the present "National" Government there are many former supporters of the pro-Fascist, anti-Russian policy which nearly brought us to ruin. It includes Lord Simon, the worst Foreign Secretary since the days of Ethelred the Unready; Lord Croft, who described General Franco as a "great Christian Gentleman"; Lord Douglass, Mr. Chamberlain's Private Secretary in the days of Munich; Butler, Lennox-Boyd, Petherick, who were all supporters of the policy of appeasement. It also includes Lord Beaverbrook.

There was, besides, a growing distrust of Lord Beaverbrook's newspapers, which continued their irresponsible behavior during the election, with a steadily mounting suspicion of all the Conservative press, especially under government or voluntary [?] censorship. Mr. H. Wickham Steed, one of the foremost British journalists, in the *Contemporary Review* castigated in caustic language the "diehard" Tories, the social set and even Scotland Yard for their excessive kindness toward Hitler and Mussolini:

> It might not be amiss to compile an "honours' list" of members of both Houses, not to mention lesser mortals, who approached, or allowed themselves to be "personally conducted" to this august presence, there to be raved at. Some of them fetched and carried

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for him between Downing Street and Berchtesgaden. Nazi agents and propagandists infested London "Society", which flocked to Ribbentrop's receptions at the German Embassy. Scotland Yard kept and allowed agents of the Gestapo to keep a sharp eye on German refugees. Things reached a point at which any criticism of Hitler and Mussolini was discouraged by newspaper proprietors and editors, lest it spoil the international atmosphere by "irritating" those potentates. In fact Nazism and Fascism succeeded in imposing upon the British press an intangible censorship, both of news and of opinion.

Despite all such warning signs of increasing discontent with their lack of any farsighted domestic or foreign policy, and their abysmal failure to provide a truly constructive program of social and economic reforms, the Tories felt confident they could ride through to victory on their Prime Minister's coattails. At any rate the claims and accusations of Labor remained largely unchallenged, and there was no serious effort to emphasize the reform program of the progressive Conservatives. Some of the Socialist charges were difficult to answer, but others might have been met successfully. Apparently the "diehards" felt they would win anyway. The election results, consequently, came as a great shock to the Conservatives, and as a surprise to the Socialists. Yet the latter should have been astonished only by the size of their Parliamentary majority. The by-elections and Gallup polls had clearly shown the political trends, and the *New Statesman* had dared prophesy: "It would not be surprising to find a nation-wide revolution from the devastation of war in favour of new brooms, whose energy seems to promise that their reconstruction proposals will be carried beyond the stage of White Papers and inconclusive debates." A spokesman of the new Common Wealth Party wrote a year before the election, "The pollings at recent by-elections announce clearly enough what is to come. Politicians should prepare themselves for an earthquake at Westminster on the scale" of 1906. The *Glasgow Herald* shrewdly discovered the reason for the débacle in Mr. Churchill's inability to supervise personally both foreign and domestic affairs: "The Government's attitude on Social Insur-

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ance was dilatory, and on Housing it was nearly blank. Even more it was a blank that was advertised by the frequent change of Ministers for Planning and Reconstruction, each of whom seemed to achieve less than his predecessor.".

During the course of the election, the Liberals criticized the Conservative program for having "no more cohesion than an old-time music-hall poster." Lord Beaverbrook was the guiding spirit in their campaign, and, aside from his obsession for Imperial Preference, he had no constructive policy, but hammered incessantly against the coöperatives and demanded the immediate relaxation of government controls. Imbued with the spirit of private enterprise, which they were either unable or unwilling to control, the Coalition and "caretaker" governments had failed to provide an adequate supply of coal or houses. The Socialists had a definite program—nationalization. It might have serious dangers but, in the face of the general lassitude of the Conservative leaders, the British voters deliberately decided to run the risk. The *Economist* placed the responsibility for the Conservative disaster squarely on the shoulders of Mr. Churchill, who had generally been rather contemptuous toward far-reaching social reforms. It accused him of enacting the rôle of a "narrow party politician", and suggested that future historians may hold him "as blame-worthy for the inadequacies of policy in the calculations of peace, as ever Lord Baldwin and Mr. Chamberlain were for unpreparedness in war."

Never had the Tories encountered such a catastrophe. They received two fifths of the votes and one third of the seats, while the Socialists polled half the votes and gained five eighths of the seats. The two parties almost exchanged places as a result of the election, as Labor came into office, supported by a large majority. The slaughter among the Tory leaders was astounding; eight ministers of cabinet rank went down, and nineteen under-secretaries. Only seventy-three former MP's are found among the new Opposition. The casualties among lawyers and company directors were significant. The legal fraternity had only 84 representatives as compared with 119 in 1935; only 54 company directors were in the new Parliament contrasted with

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134 in the old one. The aristocratic elements as represented by Eton and Harrow suffered a severe setback, but the University of London and the provincial universities increased their political prestige. The character of the Socialist representatives also suffered a great change. Formerly, they were largely officials of trade unions or " co-ops ", but these make up only about a quarter of Labor's present representation, while about half come from the professional and middle classes.

The election of 1945 was, therefore, not only a political revolution, but also a social one, which may well usher in a new economic revolution. What may prove most important of all is the fact that, while the Reform Bill of 1832 and the Lloyd George Budget of 1909 brought about internal revolutions in Britain, this one, in the opinion of the *Manchester Guardian*, " is part of a European revolution."

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PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AS AN AID TO DEMOCRACY

THE thesis of this article is that the public opinion poll is potentially an extremely significant tool for political democracy, one that will supplement the ballot box in extremely important and much needed ways. In developing this thesis it is important to discuss, first, the present status of public opinion polling in this country; second, some technical and economic problems the polls must solve before they can achieve their real usefulness; and, third, their possible future development after they have solved these problems.

Public opinion polling as now carried on by Gallup, Roper, Crossley, the National Opinion Research Center and others is a young art but already in a dozen years or so of development the polls have reached a place where they are influencing the political process in this country. Not only is it becoming generally accepted that the polls can predict elections with but a small margin of error, but they also are doing something much more important—they are reporting public attitudes on current issues. What they say about such matters as the American public's reaction to compulsory military training, the various proposals for handling the atomic bomb secret, or our present policies in Japan and Germany is of interest not only to newspaper and radio editors and commentators but also to government officials and members of Congress. There is a natural tendency, of course, for those who happen to take the opposite side on any issue from that of a poll majority to decry the value of polling data and to attack, frequently with some justice, the conclusions that have been drawn from them. But the very fact that it is thought necessary to make this attack indicates that the polls have " arrived ", even though they probably have not " come of age ". The number of organizations engaged in public opinion polling keeps constantly increasing. In

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addition to the national polls, mentioned a moment ago, there are all sorts of state and local polls springing up, the results of which are also published. Moreover, much polling is now being done for private clients, the results of which do not often see the light of day.

It is hard to escape being somewhat worried about this boom in public opinion polling. One can have great faith in the ultimate future of the art and still not want to see its friends over-promote it in its early stages. There are still some important technical problems to solve before polling is ready to provide a thoroughly reliable guide for democratic statesmen, except on the simplest of political issues. In order to make clear what those problems are, and how they may perhaps be solved, it is necessary to present a brief review of the polling methodology as it is today.

The reliability of the results from polling may be said to depend on the correct performance of four different operations. These operations are: (1) choosing the right people to interview; (2) preparing an appropriate set of questions to ask these people; (3) conducting the interviews successfully, that is to say, asking the questions and getting satisfactory answers properly recorded; and (4) tabulating the results of the interviews, analyzing the tabulations, and drawing right conclusions from them.

The first of these operations, choosing the interview subjects, involves the problem of sampling. Until it could be demonstrated that a very small number of people properly selected could represent the whole population of the country, the public opinion poll, as we know it, was economically impossible. The development of the statistical theory underlying small sampling, and of the techniques for taking small population samples in accord with the theory, represents one of the truly great scientific advances of the twentieth century. It has taken time for the idea of population sampling to gain acceptance. The techniques were adopted in commercial market research long before the public had even begun to accept the idea that 3,000 people could actually stand for 130,000,000, and it is only recently

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that the Census Bureau in Washington has found it politically feasible to employ any such magic. Successful prediction of elections with small polling samples has probably been the major factor in bringing this about.

While further improvements in sampling technique will come, indeed are already on the way, it is fair to say that the problem of choosing the right people to interview has already been sufficiently well solved so that it no longer constitutes a limitation on the effectiveness of polling. Sampling errors due to inadequacy of the technique are now less than the other errors involved in polling on public issues, however important they may still be in other types of questionnaire research.

Let us turn now for a minute to the third of the essential polling operations, the interviewing process. We can say that here also, while continued improvement is desirable and is occurring, the presently available techniques are far enough advanced so as not seriously to compromise the accuracy of polling data. People in general like to be interviewed and are flattered to have their opinions asked. On most subjects they will answer freely and honestly, and most interviewers are well trained enough to maintain rapport with the respondents and to record what was actually said. There are some topics where the rapport problem is especially difficult or where manner of asking a question becomes as important as the question itself. Special techniques and better interviewers have to be used under such circumstances, but both are available and have been repeatedly used by the national polling organizations.

The major polling problem today arises in connection with the second of the four operations mentioned earlier, the operation of questionnaire construction. One can designate people to be interviewed in such a way that they add up to a miniature of the nation, and one can get honest replies to most answerable questions, but all this is to little purpose if the attitudes under investigation have not crystallized and the respondent does not know what he thinks. It is equally bad if he knows what he thinks but is afraid or embarrassed to say so.

Questionnaire construction is already a more sophisticated art than one might think, and the problems of uncrystallized atti-

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tudes and resistance to answering are dealt with fairly competently. Great care is lavished on the choice of questions to be asked, upon the way they are worded, and on the particular place of each in the sequence or order of asking. There are questions the only purpose of which is to get the respondent talking and which are used as interview openers; there are "parting shots" or "scuttle and run" questions that can be asked only at the end. There are also recognized kinds of questions that cannot be asked because they reveal the ignorance of the respondent, embarrass him, or otherwise disturb him and destroy rapport with the interviewer. Besides reliance on a general body of lore on "how to ask questions", there is in every well-conducted study a great deal of experimentation, or as the pollsters would call it, "pretesting". Questionnaires usually go through four or five and sometimes more revisions. The questionnaire is tried out in the field, brought back and revised, tried out again and again revised, in a process that goes on until all the "bugs" in it are eliminated.

Pretesting produces a polling questionnaire that is askable in the sense that it arouses no resistance and gets opinions on propositions that have been carefully framed so as to be understandable and meaningful to respondents. Pretesting does not of course guarantee that the basic design of the research is sound and that the questions asked are adequate to give a real picture of the attitudes of the public on an issue. It is on this point of adequacy that the polls are weakest today. They tell something about the attitude of a public on an issue, but often not enough; and frequently a little knowledge, because it gives a false sense of assurance, is more dangerous than no knowledge at all. There are three aspects of a public's attitude that are frequently neglected in the polls, and yet some judgment must be formed with respect to each of them before one can truly appraise the weight that should be given to an expressed opinion. The three aspects are (1) the information on which the opinion is based, (2) the strength or intensity of feeling back of the opinion, and (3) the stability or permanence of the opinion, or, in other words, the likelihood that it will be changed in any given future period.

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To illustrate the importance of these three dimensions of an opinion in relation to polling let us consider for a moment the question of compulsory military training which is currently agitating the country. The polls have repeatedly asked people whether they favor a year of such training and have consistently found anywhere from a two-thirds to a four-fifths majority saying " yes " to the question as phrased. What does this " yes " vote mean? Does it mean, for instance, that those who voted " yes " (or " no ") have a clear idea of what the training course would be like? Are they supporting a year of conventional army camp training? Do they think, instead, of something more like the C.C.C., with educational and work project features along with military discipline? Or are they thinking of something that is 80 per cent special and technical education coupled with some military features not much different from the R.O.T.C.? Probably most of the respondents have no very concrete picture of any of the plans under discussion and are merely expressing a general attitude in favor of preparedness, so that we shall not get caught again the way we were in 1941. But a single polling question does not tell us what *information* the respondent is basing his reply on; and we really need to know this if we are properly to interpret the significance of the large poll majority.

Much the same thing may be said with respect to the *strength of feeling* back of the " yes " for military training on a poll question. How much do people care whether their view prevails or not? Some are no doubt very much concerned, but one needs to be able to separate the concerned from the relatively unconcerned in order to interpret realistically the political significance of the military training affirmative. " Yes " or " no " answers from people who are apathetic when questioned should perhaps not count as heavily in determining national policy, any more than votes from the uninformed should. It is a debatable question whether a vitally interested and well-informed minority *should* outweigh an apathetic majority, but it usually does so whenever the facts about strength of feeling are available to the people's elected representatives. The point is that the polls should provide these facts.

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The third question about the pro-military training majority reported by the polls is: "Will the proportion of 'yes' answers remain reasonably constant throughout the debate, or is some argument, a few speeches, or a dramatic event likely to produce a big swing in opinion quite suddenly?" Many people would like to know the answer to this and other possible shifts in opinion. Some experts can make shrewd guesses already, based on their practical experience, but scientific prediction of future behavior—predictions in which the margin of error is reasonably small and can be accurately stated—is a difficult thing to do. The polling organizations may not be equipped themselves to do the basic research out of which rules for prediction will come, but they are certainly providing in great volume the data for such analysis. After all we can predict the future only from our experience in the past, and the polls are recording time-changes in attitudes on a systematic basis. Some useful work has already been done with polling data in studying shifts in voters' intentions during an election campaign. Eventually studies of other types of political attitude will be carried out.

While the third of the three questionnaire problems, attitude stability, looks difficult of immediate solution, the other two, information and intensity, are much easier to get at. Methods are already available to measure both, and, while they are sure to be further perfected in time, they can be used today if the polling organization is willing to undertake the added cost. Obviously one cannot cover the attitude itself, the intensity with which it is felt, and the information back of it in a single question. It takes more nearly a half dozen on an average even to scratch the surfaces of these three dimensional problems. That means that at the most only two or three topics can be covered in a single interview; and it would be better on any complex issue if the questioning were confined to the different aspects of one. A single-topic questionnaire, however, cannot serve as the basis for a dozen newspaper articles, as the present multiple-topic questionnaire does. Since the parts all fit together the study must be reported as a whole, and not in separate pieces. Space must be available to describe the attitude pattern that emerges from the multiple-question approach.

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All this militates against the newspaper as a suitable medium for reporting polling results on any but the simplest and most clear-cut of issues. The material fits much better into the magazine article, where there is space for a more thorough and comprehensive treatment, but there are not many magazines that think they can afford to spend on a single article the five thousand odd dollars that is the present cost of a good national opinion study. Something can of course be done at smaller cost, if the study is confined to particular sub-groups in the population, as, for instance, so-called " thought leaders "; but unless there are new inventions which reduce the cost of getting interviews, the economics of polling, at least of the kind of multi-dimensional polling job we have been discussing, is likely to remain difficult.

What, then, is the probable course of development of public opinion polling in the future? The rôle of prophet is a hazardous one, and it is assumed hesitantly. Nevertheless we can at least make a few reasonably good guesses, the first of which would be that we cannot expect, in the near future at least, much further development of the public opinion polling art on the single-question-per-topic basis that has become standard practice in newspapers. More newspapers will undoubtedly go in for polling, but it probably will not be of a sufficiently better quality to meet the very valid criticisms that are already being made of present newspaper-sponsored polling. Magazines, possibly even newspaper Sunday magazines, have an opportunity to take over and do the more adequate job an increasingly critical audience will require.

In addition to the polling financed as a news feature by publications there is bound to be an increasing use of polling techniques by private organizations and foundations interested in various " causes " and issues. If the work is done by a reputable and competent organization and enough money spent to cover the topics adequately, the results when made public will be valuable in the process of political decision. All in all there may be quite a little public opinion polling of a quality and comprehensiveness sufficient to justify calling it the " Voice of the People " on the issues covered. This material will certainly

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provide a much better and more reliable all-around picture of what citizens really want than can be obtained from most of the indices of opinion traditionally used. Analysis of newspaper editorials or of Congressional or Presidential mail, personal interviews with constituents by Congressmen, and the reporting of local sentiment by newspapermen, all have their uses in public opinion measurement, but the poll will supplement and perhaps eventually supersede most of these indices in the course of time.

In the long run it is doubtful whether private polling is going to prove sufficient to democracy's needs. Sooner or later the government itself will have to go into the polling field and provide both its administrators and its legislators with adequate and sound information on what the public thinks. Eventually this sort of information will become as necessary as census data and will be provided by an agency with a reputation for unbiased research equal to that now enjoyed by the present Census Bureau. Meanwhile the administrative side of the federal government has already been using the polling device. The author happens to know personally of at least seven different federal agencies that have made public opinion polls for themselves or had polls made for them in the last three years, and there are undoubtedly others that he has not heard about. Reports of the commercial polls also appear regularly on the desks of top government officials.

The legislative branch has been more resistant to polls, and for a variety of reasons. In the first place the device is new and many legislators know little about it. In addition, although the recent Congressional investigation of the Gallup poll has helped to inform legislators about polls, there are still a good many who have quite sincere doubts about the reliability of polling results and feel their own methods of arriving at an estimate of public reactions are better, or at least better suited to their own particular needs. The nature of American political processes requires the Congressmen to respond often to particular special interest groups who are well organized and have long memories about his voting record, instead of to the amorphous thing called the general public. To have a poll result purporting to represent the desires of a majority of his constituents waved in the legislator's

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face by one party to a controversy is sometimes inconvenient, since political realities and mass opinion do not in practice (as they are supposed to in theory) always dictate the same course of action.

If the legislator had his own confidential polling service he might find it easier to utilize the new tool in connection with controversial issues. Such service will be increasingly provided by the political party, or in some instances out of the legislator's own pocket. There are, however, such great advantages in the use of polling techniques in aid of legislation that Congress will ultimately begin to spend government money for research of this type itself. Legislative committees engaged in drafting tax legislation, determining foreign policy, deciding whether to vote some particular agricultural or industrial subsidy, or investigating social and economic conditions, to speak of only a few examples, will eventually discover that polling techniques will help in the solution of their problems. They will turn to a commercial or a government research agency to make their studies for them.

All of these predictions are based on the assumption that research techniques will be improved along the lines suggested earlier, and in other directions also. It is not so much what the polling technique is today as what it will be tomorrow that justifies the claims made for it as an *adjunct of democracy*. The ballot box has always been a central institution in our system of government, but it is inefficient in that a single vote taken infrequently is allowed to decide too much. Among the devices which have been used to supplement the voting booth by providing other channels for the expression of popular opinion the poll is one of the newest, but also one of the most flexible and potentially most reliable. If the remedy for the failures of political democracy is more democracy, rather than less, the public opinion poll is an instrument we cannot afford not to make full use of. By multiplying the opportunities for the citizen to vote on the manifold issues his government must pass upon, it brings the ballot-box democracy up-to-date.

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A NOTE ON THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

PROPERLY, the emphasis of Eric Williams' *Capitalism and Slavery*[1] is upon slavery and not upon the Negro. Slavery as an institution has its own special features, independent of the race enslaved, and may vary but little, regardless of who the slave is. This broad fact, that the institution takes precedence over the race most affected by it, has another and equally important feature, namely, that the cultural setting within which a problem develops has a reach beyond the people affected by it. The middle passage is horrible to contemplate. But the middle passage was as bad for the white indentured servant as it later proved to be for the Negro slave. The white servants were packed like herrings, each given but two feet in width and six feet in length for a bed, and sometimes kept beneath the deck for the entire voyage across the sea. What these white servants must have suffered on long voyages in small ships, insufficiently stocked with water, living on unrefrigerated food, subjected to the inevitable disease and the moral corruption, could not have been much less evil than what the Negro slaves endured upon their trip from Africa to the New World. Even the free, white, and paying passenger fared miserably on these crowded ships, haunted by a thousand unknown dangers.

Mr. Williams writes of slavery with the indignation proper to a child of the American and French Revolutions, and, at the same time, with a strongly flavored faith in the economic interpretation of history, given strident enthusiasm by a visible notion of Negro nationalism. All of these things may be good in themselves, or even in combination, but they provide an inadequate framework for an objective study of the history of slavery. Slavery is what it is, and the history of man is replete with the record. But it is not what the child of the belief in "equality, liberty, and fraternity" thinks it is. Nor yet is it what one raised in the doctrine of a "classless society", or on the assumption that malice is a tool essential to the preservation of status, thinks it is. In any society where slavery has been institutionalized, the issues between free and slave labor become infinitely vari-

[1] Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1944. ix, 285 pp. $3.00.

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able, and it is often a question of where slavery ends and freedom begins. Stated this way, it is better to speak of a slave society rather than of slavery, for the effects of the labor system—slave or free—permeate the entire social structure and influence all of its ways. If we are to speak of slavery, we must do so in its larger setting, as a way of life for both the master and the slave, for both the economy and the culture, for both the family and the community.

Slavery in America, as a system of labor, the author points out, had economic rather than racial origins. African labor was economically available. It was within reach at an acceptable price. It proved, in the tropics, more resilient than either Indian or white labor, and within nearer reach than labor drawn from either India or China. The fact that the labor drawn from Africa was black was incidental. It might have been yellow; it might even have been white. The labor was drawn from the available sources, and under acceptable conditions of price and survival value. But, in spite of Mr. Williams, the Negro had survival value. He endured the conditions of labor in the heat better than the Indian. The Indian died out, in fact. The Negro endured it better than the whites, because, for reasons not moral but physical, he outworked the white man. The tropics in this hemisphere are a sort of Negro empire—not by accident, but because the Negro did well in them, did better, in fact, than his master, and, in the long run, the master went his way, mainly to the grave, and the Negro has inherited the earth. That is a truer and, it seems to this reviewer, a more accurate way of stating the meaning of Negro slavery in the West Indies and in the American tropics than Mr. Williams here uses.

Historically speaking, the Negro has inherited the tropics because he could inherit them. He had the competency needed for the effort. The white man was merely a temporary instrument in making the achievement possible. The white man, for his own short-term interest, started the process of enticing the Negro to slavery, into a world which ultimately was to belong to the Negro. The white man served the Negro well—better than he had planned, in fact. But that too is only a part of the way history works itself out. The consequences are what they are, in spite of the immediate plans and purposes men strive for.

In this instance, a great migratory movement was initiated under duress. The duress under which it began has long since passed away, but the immigrant and his children have remained. In the sum total of it all, the Negro race has been given an additional large share of the

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face of the globe for its own. It received this territory as a kind of unplanned gift; but there is nothing unusual in that. It is, in its own nature, no different than the process which has occurred as a result of the allurement which led millions of Europeans to labor in American mines, fields and factories, and then within the century to become the backbone of American democracy, and the source of the movement that twice returned to Europe to save it from forced conquest. That, too, was unplanned and unforeseen. The result is one thing, the immediate purpose is another.

Objectivity must rule the historical judgment in appraising a process so vast as the migration to this hemisphere of millions of Negroes as slaves. The immediate purpose was " economic ". It was greedy, narrow, selfish. Let the devil, if you must, have his full day of unrestrained malice and conspiracy, lust and cruelty, and let us say that all of the history of the slave trade and slavery was motivated by nothing at all but evil intent. Say it if you believe it, but that would be stretching the matter a bit too far. The result has been moral. It has proved a good thing for the Negroes in the long run. They have achieved status, both spiritually and materially, in the new home to which they were brought as chattels, and the final judgment upon the process must include the last part of the story as well as the first.

Mr. Williams endeavors to prove that whites will do as well as the Negroes in the tropics. The fact remains that, after four hundred years of experience, the Negro is the chief occupant of the tropics, and the increasing occupant of them. The example of Cuba, given by the author, that the Canary Islander and the poor Spaniard dominate the tobacco industry, while the Negroes dominate the sugar industry, is not valid, because sugar is grown on the coast and tobacco is not. The same holds true of the example from Puerto Rico. The white *jibaro* lives in the mountains and has devoted his energies to coffee and tobacco. The sugar plantations in Puerto Rico on the coast are still largely Negro. The insistence of the author upon the equal fitness of the whites and Negroes in the tropics leads him to clutch at straws in the argument. He says: " similar white communities have survived in the Caribbean, from the earliest settlement right down to our own times, in the Dutch West Indian Islands of Saba and San Martin ", quoting Price.[2] But Mr. Williams neglects to quote from the same author the following: " As regards the future, Saba, in spite of its

[2] A. Grenfell Price, *White Settlers in the Tropics* (New York, 1939), p. 91.

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large proportion of whites is clearly turning colored, as are almost all of the islands of and borderlands of the Caribbean. No matter how greatly the altitude or the trade winds may mitigate the tropical disadvantages in favor of white settlers, the whites cannot compete with the prolific families of the negro. . . . The negro possesses greater immunity from tropical diseases. . . ." In fact, Price concludes that even in the most advantageous conditions in the tropics the whites, in the long run, tend to succumb. Of San Martin, which Williams uses as an example to show white survival, Price says that, owing to disease and isolation, the " people degenerated almost to the animal level ". Even of the Germans, in Seaford, Jamaica, cited by Williams as a shining example, the very source he uses says, ". . . the German communities in the Seaford region have deteriorated as a result of negro competition and will inevitably be absorbed by the negro population." Of the Queensland experiment, of which Williams speaks with such assurance, as indicating that whites can do equally well in the tropics as the Negroes, it needs to be pointed out that the Queensland area is " peculiarly favorable to white settlements ", that this region is marginal, and, most important of all, " the penetration is so recent that it provides no proof that the tropical climate will not cause degeneracy in later generations."

But the question is not the validity of the emphasis Mr. Williams chooses to place upon the stray examples of white survival in the tropics, but the straining for evidence of such survival. What after all is the point at issue? It would, if Mr. Williams were right, deny the easy adaptability of the Negro to the tropics. It would deny him the greater vigor given him by an immunity to some of the tropical diseases, such as hookworm and malaria, and would deny the four hundred years of experience that the Negro has not merely survived but thrived in the tropics—at least in the American tropics—because he is superior rather than inferior to the white man in that respect. Such long-range examples of persistence of type are not accidents and were not politically conditioned. It seems to the reviewer that Mr. Williams would have done better to accept the greater fitness of the Negro for the tropics and acclaim the fact that that fitness has given to the Negro an additional and highly successful habitat in the tropics—a habitat which he is even now expanding at the cost of both the white remnants and the Indians of certain tropical regions, for instance, the Choco area in Colombia, where the Negroes at this date are encroaching upon the Indians.

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The Negro's position, insists the author, marks the triumph of economic and not of geographic conditions. Why be so positive? It may well have been the triumph of both. It would have made little difference to the Negro if geography had something to do with it, and it may explain the present physical thriving of the Negro. Is human experience of four centuries of no value at all when set against a fixed idea that only economic forces are the ruling factors in shaping human destiny? When Bolivar wrote, as he did frequently, to Santander, begging him to set free some thousands of slaves and dispatch them to him as soldiers because in the tropics his white men, drawn from the mountains, were dying like flies, and saying that unless he could secure colored troops his campaign would be a failure—was that, too, economic? Or is the fact that on the Mamore-Madeira railway, which at a terrific cost in lives was built by people brought in from many parts of the world, only the Negroes have survived along the tracks and have, to all appearances, made a happy adjustment—is that too, not geographical, but only economic? What is there to be gained from such monistic theorizing about the forces of nature that shape human destiny, except the satisfaction of having supported a dubious point?

Negro slavery was a fact and a tragedy. But its causes may have been many rather than one. That would not change anything about slavery except the explanation of it. It would not prove the Negro inferior, nor the white superior. No one knows anything about the measure of inferiority or superiority in the moral sense, and prejudice weights every other measure. Surely a scholar like Mr. Williams might stop arguing an irrelevant matter as if it were important to the issue. The only ones who proclaim Negro inferiority are those who assume their own superiority and that constitutes no evidence of the point at all. In fact, the very enthusiasm with which Mr. Williams rises to the challenge presumes that he takes the charge seriously. Is it not about time that we accept the historical record for what it is and go on about our business of explaining the issues as they arise? A book such as this is not a political pamphlet. It is a serious study, and it is a pity to spoil it by bending the argument to prove an irrelevant theme. The author himself cites the complaints of the whites brought into St. Christopher after the abolition of slavery—that they wanted to return home because "if we continue much longer in this injurious hot climate (the West Indian) death will be the consequence to the principal part of us."

In his enthusiasm for an economic explanation, the author would whitewash the 'middle passage' by saying that its horrors were "ex-

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aggerated", and lighten the labor of slaves on plantations because it did not "differ fundamentally from the exploitation of the feudal peasant, or the treatment of the poor in European cities."

The freeing of the Negro, James Somerset, by Judge Mansfield is minimized because the judge limited himself to saying that "the case was not allowed or approved by the law of England" (as if that were not the question at issue), and any attempt to take note of this decision as evidence of a moral change is condemned as "poetic sentimentality translated into modern history."

It is hard to be a child of the Renaissance and a high priest of economic interpretation at the same time. If slavery was merely economic, and if economic forces are the only conditioning factor in shaping human institutions, then why all of the indignation and the sarcasm? Why the appeal to moral forces, to justice, and to humanity? If slavery was just an economic institution and abolition was merely a new form for the working out of changing economic forces, then the abolitionists were mere dupes of the new masters of the economic life in England. If all of this is true, then one has no right to be indignant at slavery or slaveholders, or to rejoice at abolition, or to prize freedom, or to give value to any code. All of life is a kind of automaton, a predestined pattern, dictated by an immutable law, inescapable in its impact, and unyielding to any human effort. Man is a mere tool for the working out of a plan, untouched by any ethical bias, unflavored by kindness, unenlightened by wisdom, and indifferent to justice or mercy. Destiny is implacable, the human will of no avail, and all strivings mere reflexes of the economic demon that dooms man forever to its own indifferent and unmoral ends. The law, the code, the prophecy, and the faith, the moral strivings for justice and decency, are witless and useless.

Even Mr. Williams cannot take all of this. He would claim that the Negroes have had a few friends, but why should they or anyone lay such a claim upon an unethical, unsentimental universe? Friendship is sentimental, and sentiment can, as Mr. Williams asserts in a hundred places, have no place in history. The Negro has had no justice; but why claim something that cannot exist in a universe where justice would be impossible, for only economic forces determine what men do? Mr. Williams, in fact, repudiates all of the values of human life, all traditions, all the tenacious notions of right, good and fitting, all of the ideals and beliefs that men have stood and died for. These are not just something imperfectly achieved, they are nonexistent. Man is not merely a fallible animal in Mr. Williams' sight; he is just a

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cog. He is duped to serve the false gods of some ethical faith, which is not only nonexistent but, in the nature of the case, nonexistable. The law of the economic interpretation of history has ruled ethics out of the pages of history, and where it survives it is some misguided sentimentalism that would force itself upon our attention, something we must repudiate in the name of reason, science and research, plus a doctrine of the economic interpretation of history.

Now, such an extreme position is neither science nor history. It is merely a new theology—not even a good theology because it is uninspired, it has faith in nothing but a verbal formula. It would rule Christ out of the Christian church, Lincoln and the idea of national unity out of the Civil War, Roosevelt and the concept of human dignity out of the battle against the Nazis. There is nothing in the world but a blind force which fools people into playing moral rôles—fools them! The rôle they play is inconsequential in the affairs of men, and the shape of the human drama would not have varied by a single line if all of the conscientious labors to affect the way of man across the face of the earth had not taken place at all. Man has nothing to do with history. The game is played by a blind and invisible hand, and, like a puppet show, he is present without participating. He is just merely there.

It is a pity that a good book is spoiled in the making by an acrid vehemence that makes Mr. Williams deride his teachers, and to attach folly or worse to those who disagree with him, as if by some strange magic he had laid wisdom by the heel all by himself. Now, there is some wisdom in charity, even to those who are in disagreement; there is some presumptive value in the recognition of human fallibility —a failing common to all mortal creatures, even the writers of books. There is no absolute evaluation of human experience, for even a great scholar knows only a very little and may not understand the little he knows. Facts are easily acquired by industry and diligence. The meaning of the facts, all of their meaning, is beyond the ken of any scholar—perhaps beyond the ken of mortal men.

FRANK TANNENBAUM

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REVIEWS

International Investment and Domestic Welfare: Some Aspects of International Borrowing and Lending in the Post-war Period. By NORMAN S. BUCHANAN. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1945.—xvi, 249 pp. $2.75.

In this timely and important book, Professor Buchanan discusses in the first place the capital needs of the war-ravaged nations in Europe and elsewhere at the end of World War II. He gives a vivid account of the economic effects of wartime disinvestment and destruction. As the book was completed shortly before the fighting ended, the picture is inevitably out of date in some particulars; but it is fully adequate as a background for the discussion of the real investment, domestic as well as international, which is necessary for the restoration of the capital stock of the countries affected.

The needs of primary producing countries endeavoring to develop their industrial activities are also given sympathetic and competent treatment. Here the standard on which Professor Buchanan bases his judgment is whether or not industrial development promotes a country's " maximum participation in world trade " (p. 92). The reviewer would suggest that the more fundamental criterion is whether or not industrialization increases real income per head in the developing country and the world as a whole. Especially under the conditions of " disguised unemployment " prevailing in many backward peasant communities, the same agricultural output might be obtained with a smaller labor force, so that almost any new industry that absorbs the rural surplus population may produce a net gain in real national income. In such circumstances industrialization may surely be beneficial even if it means, in the words of Professor Buchanan, " a diminution of world trade *in relation to* national incomes " (p. 85; reviewer's italics). It does not seem incompatible with an increase in the *absolute* volume of world trade. No doubt the cruder kinds of specialization in international trade—specialization between raw materials on the one hand and manufactures on the other—tend to decline with the spread of industrialization. But specialization of the " finer " kind (which characterized the trade between the advanced industrial nations

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before the collapse of the nineteen-thirties) may well enlarge the volume of world trade as real incomes and purchasing power increase.

One of the central themes of the book is its emphasis on the fact that a very high proportion of real capital resources is immovable and cannot therefore enter into international trade. It is an outstanding merit of the book that it directs attention to the "real" as distinct from the financial aspects of international investment and indeed of capital formation generally. In chapter 2 especially, the composition of the real capital structure is analyzed in a most illuminating way by means of statistical data which economists have hitherto tended to neglect, and which show very clearly the preponderance of buildings and other immovable assets in the total capital stock.

But what is the bearing of these facts on the problem of international investment? It is here that the reviewer feels some doubt. Professor Buchanan stresses repeatedly that, because of the immobility of so much real capital, projects of reconstruction and industrial development require mostly domestic resources for their execution, and that consequently the direct assistance which foreign loans can give to such projects can in general only be small. He is aware that foreign loans can be transferred in the form of consumption goods, permitting a redistribution of domestic factors of production in favor of investment projects. Yet the general impression which the book may create in the minds of untrained readers is that the immobility of capital goods sets in some way a limit to international investment. This, of course, is not the case. In the first place, there are for all practical purposes enough capital goods that are movable and that are required for reconstruction and development programs.[1] Secondly, even if there were no capital goods that could be moved from country to country, foreign loans could still be transferred in real terms in the form of consumption goods, and the real investment thus rendered possible could be just as productive and beneficial as in the case of transfer in the form of capital goods.

In Professor Buchanan's discussion of the effects of foreign investment on the employment situation in the lending country, the immobility of capital goods again appears as a limiting factor. Great stress is laid on the fact that foreign lending cannot directly stimulate the construction industry of the lending country. That is true; but it is equally true of certain domestic forms of investment (for example,

[1] In 1938, for example, nearly one half of the combined total exports of the United States, Great Britain and Germany consisted of capital goods (i. e., machinery, vehicles, metal manufactures) even though foreign lending was practically nonexistent.

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inventories and new machinery). When foreign loans are transferred from goods in stock, Professor Buchanan rightly maintains that the direct employment-creating effect is nil; but he omits to mention the probable "acceleration" effect of an undesigned reduction in inventories, which leads traders to place new orders and manufacturers to increase their operations. When the transfer takes place in the form of machinery and equipment made to order, there is, in addition to the direct employment effect in the capital goods industries, an indirect "multiplier" effect which Professor Buchanan sometimes omits to mention. In general, the thesis of the book is that American foreign investment is likely to be of minor importance for the total volume of employment in the United States. If this is true, is it not true of any single component of total investment taken by itself—for example, domestic construction, inventories, plant and equipment, as well as foreign investment? The *marginal* importance of the domestic employment effects of American foreign investment may well be considerable.

A large part of the book deals with the problem of servicing and repaying foreign loans. The difficulties of making the adjustments necessary in the American economy for the absorption of a sufficient volume of imports for this purpose, and the dangers of unfavorable employment effects resulting from such imports, appear as a further argument for restraint in America's foreign lending policy. Here the reader may perhaps wonder why it is that the "employment-destroying" effect of the ultimate return flow should be so serious, if the "employment-creating" effect of the initial outward flow of lending is relatively so important. Surely the servicing problem is mainly a matter of maintaining the American national income at a high enough level to induce the import surplus necessary for the transfer of interest and amortization. Professor Buchanan hints at this essential prerequisite in several places, but does not state it with the emphasis he gives to what the reviewer would regard as secondary points in this context. The "capacity of the American market to absorb imports" (pp. 175, 179, 210) is not a very helpful notion without reference to the volume of money income and effective demand existing, or assumed to exist, in the United States.

On the side of the debtor country, Professor Buchanan sees the fundamental difficulty of the servicing problem in "the fact that only a small fraction of the total investment undertaken with the assistance of foreign borrowing contributes anything to the foreign balance and that, as a result, the obligations contracted for are likely to be large

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relative to the foreign balances that increased exports can make available" (p. 116). This proposition, which is repeated elsewhere in the book, seems a little misleading. There are two conditions that must be met. The first condition is that the debtor country shall use the foreign loans for productive purposes which will increase the national income and provide a return in domestic currency out of which interest and amortization can be financed. The second condition involves the creation of an export surplus out of which the foreign exchange will be available to service the loan; and this, as just indicated, is a matter which depends on the creditor no less than the debtor countries. It is not necessary that a project financed by foreign borrowing should itself make a direct contribution to exports equal to the servicing charges. The particular projects in which foreign investment takes place are determined, in technical parlance, by the "marginal productivity of capital", while the particular exports through which the transfer of interest and amortization takes place are determined by the "scale of comparative costs" in international trade. No particular relation between the marginal productivity schedule and the comparative cost schedule is required; so long as the two above conditions are met, there is no inherent difficulty in the servicing problem from the debtor's end.

All in all, the cautious and somewhat skeptical attitude which Professor Buchanan adopts toward the problem of international investment may be amply justified on grounds of "practical politics", but it seems scarcely warranted by any inherent or inexorable economic difficulties.

This review has confined itself to the main subject of the book. There is no space to comment on subsidiary issues, such as the proposals made by the author for an immediate reduction in the American tariff or for the stockpiling of imported raw materials. These deserve the most careful attention. On the foreign investment problem which faces this country today, and which will largely shape the course of the world economy in the years to come, Professor Buchanan's incisive and original essay seems to be the only book so far available. Though the relative weight which the author accords to the various elements of the problem may be open to debate, readers will be indebted to him for raising or at least suggesting all the basic questions involved in the vital subject with which he deals. The book is written in a simple and lucid style, and should therefore appeal to a wide public.

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Price and Related Controls in the United States. By Seymour E. Harris. New York and London, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1945.—xx, 392 pp. $4.00.

Dr. Harris was associated with the Office of Price Administration and the agencies out of which it grew almost from the start. In writing of price control he does so with intimate personal knowledge of what was done, and who did it, and why. He supplies broad perspective and meticulous detail; theoretical principles and practical examples. It is, perhaps, his best book.

The Office of Price Administration has been one of the chief storm centers of Washington and nobody who knew much about it could write about it dispassionately. This would be equally true of the Congressmen who have undertaken inquisitorial investigations, the officials who have been kept for weeks on end in the Congressional goldfish bowl, and the business men who have approached the O.P.A. hoping for quick, decisive and intelligible decisions on their particular problems. Thus it comes about that Dr. Harris is probably at his best where he fears he is at his worst, and vice versa. For example, he warns the reader that his chapters explaining in detail the advantages and disadvantages of the "freeze", as compared with other forms of price control such as pricing formulae, dollars-and-cents ceilings, and differential pricing, are "dull reading"; actually they are the best in the book, full of interesting material well presented. On the other hand, when he is writing with more abandon he is less convincing. Like so many officials of the O.P.A., he appears unduly concerned with the level of profits and he is satisfied that the O.P.A. has cared adequately for the implications of their price-fixation in the field of supply. Moreover, he stoops to what is, surely, a most patent although familiar abuse of national-income economics: an attempt to measure in monetary terms what the government and the public have "saved" because prices did not rise as much as they might have.

Two of the most interesting chapters concern control of prices of exports and imports. In controlling the prices of United States exports, the O.P.A. was partly concerned to avoid a favored position for exporting groups but—and this is the interesting point—it was also concerned to prevent exploitation and inflation in foreign markets. This was, apparently, "the first attempt of a major power to protect foreign nations from paying exorbitant prices for the export products of its nationals" (p. 198). On the whole, Dr. Harris concludes, export price controls have been reasonably successful, although, where

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the exports have gone to countries where inadequate price controls existed, mark-ups from two to ten times the United States price have sometimes been exacted by the importer. Import price control has been less satisfactory and may have resulted in the exclusion of goods which would have benefited the country. This matter is of much greater importance now than early in 1945 when Dr. Harris was writing, because so many of the products of countries in Europe and elsewhere, which are engaged in industrial reconstruction after grave wartime dislocation, will undoubtedly be priced substantially above United States ceilings. A rigid price ceiling can act as a very important barrier to imports.

At the end of the book there are two chapters devoted to warnings against too rapid abandonment of price controls and other controls. At the time this review was written it did not appear that these chapters had been read in the White House.

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Food or Famine: The Challenge of Erosion. By WARD SHEPARD. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1945.—x, 225 pp. $3.00.

In style and approach this book is a crusade not an analysis or a report on the problems of soil erosion. It is a crusade, however, in a socially vital cause. In a democracy, conservation policies need the support of public opinion. Mr. Shepard's vigorous and well-written story will do much to arouse public interest in the dangers of soil erosion and in possible institutional remedies. This in itself is a worthwhile achievement.

It would be scientific snobbery to criticize the author's exaggeration, his colorful but somewhat vague terms and statements on the status quo of soil destruction and its causes throughout the world. Little harm will come from these shortcomings; they may even add to the popularity of the book. In the limited space of a review, therefore, it would seem more fruitful to focus on certain of the author's proposals for a conservation policy in the United States.

In the first place, the book proposes that soil- and forest-conservation districts should become the main agents through which most public policies for the improvement of agriculture and forestry, as well as the coöperative efforts of land users, find their expression. The author is especially outspoken on the necessity of the Agricultural Extension Service being absorbed by a nation-wide system of land-management

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districts. A glowing picture of the past achievements of soil-conservation districts is painted.

The reviewer believes that the idea of land-management districts in agriculture and forestry, as a form of publicly assisted coöperative service, self-improvement and self-regulation, is essentially sound. Such districts, however, should supplement rather than absorb other governmental agencies, especially the Agricultural Extension Service. In spite of its name, the function of the Extension Service is education and not business service to individuals. Mr. Shepard is correct in pointing out the shortcomings of the Extension Service, if it comes to applying education farm by farm, field by field, and month by month. Such help is better rendered by technicians employed by land-management districts which may be paid entirely, or in the long run partly, by public funds. A clearer separation of education and service functions will increase the effectiveness of both the Agricultural Extension Service and the Soil Conservation Service. Opposition of some extension workers to soil-conservation districts and rivalry between the services in some states are not justifiable nor are they conducive to the long-run interest of the two services.

With respect to self-improvement and self-regulation by districts, the author does not seem to be aware of the fact that existing soil-conservation districts do not have taxing power (the small amounts feasible under California and Colorado state conservation-district laws are insufficient). Neither is he aware of the fact that, after about ten years of experience, only an insignificant percentage of the districts have land-use regulations (the wording of most state soil-conservation-district laws makes such regulation practically rather difficult). Instead of the many superlatives praising existing soil-conservation districts, an analysis of their past performances and proposals for their improvement would be more helpful.

The chapter on forest-management districts and forest policy is more analytical and more realistic than the one on soil conservation. Most workers in the field will agree with this part of the book. The same impression holds true for the chapter on public acquisition of low-grade land.

With respect to public works in the field of conservation, the author advocates a "stable program of public works which would regularly employ a part of the available labor supply" (p. 99). He does not believe in public works as part of an anticyclical policy: "... the modern trend of economic thinking in the direction of withholding great public works programs for periods of depression, serves to unbalance the economy by over-stimulating industrial production and

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underemphasizing the role of public capital investment in the national economy" (p. 99). Statements, such as these, which lack logic and substantiation only serve to make public acceptance of conservation policies more difficult. This is also true of many other statements which venture into the field of social economics; for example: "... the value of a given acre of land is literally infinite, and the amount of money we can afford to spend to conserve it is limited only by its potential long range productivity and by the amount of human energy available to conserve it. Any other view of land value is moral nihilism" (p. 126). The proposal to tie conservation work permanently to compulsory military training (p. 104) seems unwise, from both the aspect of conservation and that of national defense.

The last chapters of the book are devoted to a passionate argument in favor of reorganizing the planning and the execution of public-resource policies in watershed authorities similar to the T.V.A. The author says: "... the minimum essential for complete watershed control and development is a unified administrative—planning—construction agency with full powers to do a full job." In view of existing weaknesses in intrafederal, federal-state, and interstate coördination of conservation policies, the T.V.A. constitutes a valuable experiment. Whether it is a model which should be used in other river basins would seem to depend on whether there are no better alternatives by which administrative coördination of resource policies could be made more effective in the future. The reviewer has suggested elsewhere [1] that such alternatives (for example, the recent Missouri River Inter-Agency Committee) exist. At best, proposed independent authorities for major watersheds would solve the problem of policy coördination for individual geographic areas by replacing existing, regular legislative and executive machinery at various levels (federal, state and local). The essential problems involved in the coördination of national planning (of which natural-resources planning is only one aspect) by regions, and for the country as a whole, would not be solved and might even be complicated and delayed. On the other hand, if these problems could be solved, separate river authorities would be unnecessary.

Mr. Shepard raises many broad and highly important issues of public policy. He believes that it is the function of the social sciences to elucidate these issues by "legislative experiment" (p. 199). One may disagree with such an interpretation of the function of the social sciences. The book as a whole, however, constitutes an interesting

[1] In "Administrative Coordination of Conservation Policy", *Journal of Land and Public Utilities Economics*, February 1946.

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and justified challenge to economists and political scientists to give more attention to conservation and to the problem of bridging the existing gap between economic analysis and its application in public policy.

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The World's Hunger. By FRANK A. PEARSON and FLOYD A. HARPER. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1945.—90 pp. $1.50.

This book, though slender in size, represents an important contribution to the debate on the world's food problem. It contains one of the first systematic attempts to evaluate statistically the chief factors determining the future food balance. It aims at a wide audience and the authors do not disclose their technical apparatus; they present the fruits of laborious research and necessary guesswork in a series of elegant little tables followed by terse comment. One may disagree with them on points of method (as far as they become apparent in the study) and query some of their information, more particularly as regards population and soil fertility. But there is little doubt that (considering the sketchy and approximate nature of available source material) they have succeeded in indicating the rough order of magnitude of the quantities involved. This book, while pointing to the need for further research, should do much to remove the discussion on food from the clouds where nutritional romanticists dwell to a land of earthy facts.

Obviously, food supply can be expanded only by utilization of more land or increased productivity per acre or a combination of both. In the past the first method predominated, and production per acre, as compared with production per man-hour, did not change greatly. The authors courageously undertake the difficult task of estimating arable land in the world; they use seven criteria (sunlight, supply of atmospheric carbon dioxide, adequate and reliable rainfall, temperature, topography and character of soil), each one needful for sustained and successful crop cultivation. Facts point to the conclusion that arable area is strictly limited (being only, according to the authors, some seven per cent of the land surface) and already mostly under some sort of cultivation. "Although unforeseen new techniques of food production may be developed . . . in the main, expansion of the World's agriculture beyond the area now being used is a hazardous undertaking." The world has at last reached the fatal point from whence increased crop production will depend mainly upon increased

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productivity per acre. The authors now evaluate the various methods by which this can be increased—the application of more fertilizers, labor, machinery, the introduction of improved varieties of crops, double cropping and livestock improvement. "Changes, however," they conclude, "will be slow and gradual with little likelihood that they will contribute much during any one generation. . . . Of course, farmers and scientists may make revolutionary discoveries. These possibilities, however, have been left to the Jules Vernes."

Demand for food depends on consumption per head on the one hand, and population numbers on the other. Considering the first factor, adequate national diets have been reached only in North America, Oceania and parts of Northwestern Europe. The great majority of the world's population exists on diets which, while quantitatively perhaps fairly uniform (the authors estimate that the per capita intake fluctuates as between 543 pounds dry weight in Asia and 572 pounds in Oceania), in most respects fall below currently accepted standards of nutritional requirements. By and large, the quality of the diet is determined by the proportion of foods of animal origin to foods of vegetable origin. Satisfactory diets seem reached on or about the North American standard which the authors estimate contain some 25 per cent animal food (dry weight). To produce globally such a diet, however, requires a largely expanded crop production; for it is estimated that if the world were fed on an American standard, the world crop production would suffice to feed 902 millions only instead of an actual 2.2 billions. In other words, in order to achieve something like freedom from want for the world's population, pre-war crop production would have to be more than doubled.

Already this task is, in the light of the authors' analysis, a formidable one. But worse still, population numbers are increasng at an explosive rate. If anything, the authors underestimate the exceptional intensity of present growth which if unchecked would increase the world's population about tenfold in two centuries. Hence, unless birth rates, particularly in the Orient, can miraculously be decreased, any practically conceivable increase in crop production would not suffice to take care of the potential population increase, even at present, not to speak about generally increased dietary levels. If signs do not deceive, nations poor in land and resources seem to be heading for a cycle of recurrent and ever more severe famines. The present local food shortages in India are a prelude of things to come in a world still deceived by the mirage of plenty.

JOHN LINDBERG

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

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International Cartels. By ERVIN HEXNER with the collaboration of ADELAIDE WALTERS. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1945.—xiv, 555 pp. $6.00.

Professor Hexner deserves much praise for attempting this much-needed survey of the whole field of international cartel growth, policy and controversy. The table of contents, supplemented by over two hundred pages of case studies and nearly a hundred and fifty pages of valuable documentary material, seems worthy of the task; and his belief, repeated almost to the point of tedium, that judgment of policies must await more careful consideration of the facts is an earnest and necessary invitation for the writing of a host of detailed monographic studies on individual cartels or lines of cartel policies. Despite the elaborate catalogue of cases, he warns that " it is impossible to make reliable generalizations with reference to international trade mechanisms on the basis of the selected examples now available ", and with commendable humility adds that he does not exempt " this study . . . from this proposition " (p. 162).

With this friendly invitation to the critic, it may be in order to observe that, beyond the above, there is little chance of much further agreement with Professor Hexner. Given the state of information and the qualities of the controversies centered on cartels, perhaps little more is possible. Certainly cartels should be judged on their merits and in terms of both what they do and the intent that lies behind their operations, and not prejudged with praise or blame out of hand. Even then, as G. K. Chesterton once remarked of wars, smallpox and mothers-in-law, they should be viewed in terms of origins and functions in a definite milieu and with a sense of the futility of lack of adjectival restraint. Yet it is hard to see how the state of confusion in the facts, the policies and the literature can justify the state of confusion in this book.

The Introduction is merely redundant. It shows that combinations of one sort or another have long existed, that cartels are combinations, and that some " cooperation of private entrepreneurs " may not be " necessarily bad " (p. 10). This is obvious, but tedious. The second chapter, on the " Cartel Concept ", is a medley of definitional miscellany capped by the statement that a cartel is a " voluntary, potentially impermanent, business relationship among a number of independent, private entrepreneurs, which through co-ordinated marketing significantly affects the market of a commodity or service " (p. 24). This definition will not stand investigation. Some of the pre-Nazi cartels

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were compulsory, the more important cartels sought means to make their controls valid over non-cartel members of the industry or trade, and the post-Nazi cartels were ruled by machinery of cartel origin which was typically governed by industry people and the rules of which found origin in cartel circles. The requirement of " potentially impermanent " is irrelevant. Operations, such as production quotas and patent pooling, while they affect marketing, are not made effective " through co-ordinated marketing."

The chapter on " The Structure of International Cartels " is mistitled. It has little to do with " structure ", but is confined almost entirely to general commentary on legal status. Chapter seven on " Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements and Buffer Stocks " does not, by definition and by treatment, belong in a book which confines its subject matter to international " private " and " voluntary agreements ". The next chapter, on " Political Problems ", centers almost entirely on the question of whether cartel-participating business men are or are not as patriotic as the run of the mill, and hence by-passes practically all the political issues with which international cartels have been tied up before, during and after World War II.

These confusions and evasions are not exceptions. There is no clarification of relationships between domestic and international cartels which Lord Melchett, Edgar Jones, and their critic, Corwin Edwards, have placed to the forefront. There is no clarification of the relationships between cartels and trade associations, nor even clarity on the fact that many trade associations—as the Antitrust Division, the F.T.C., the F.P.C., the F.C.C., and a host of court cases have established at home, and numerous other studies, such as those of Lucas and Levy for England, have made clear abroad—are in effect cartels or are engaged in cartel policies and practices. No effort is made to trace through the nature or the implications of inter-cartel compacts, alliances linking cartels and trade associations, or both of the latter and various pressures brought to bear to effect policies via governmental machinery to their own liking—not to mention their own fashioning. Yet these subjects lie close to the heart of the cartel problem, domestic or international, and irrespective of the point of view from which examined.

Much of the argument is fuzzy, some of the arrangement lacks order, and both author and printer seem to have been careless on detail. The book appears to be a hesitating case for cartels, protected to some degree at all points of reference by the citing of at least one defendant, however objective or interested (they seem equally valid), of any accusation or defense offered. This is not objective, but merely pusillani-

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mous. There are numerous technical errors. For example, Zeiss agreed to furnish Bausch and Lomb with patent and other information, not the reverse as asserted (p. 375), and the case in the United States was not settled by "consent decree". Similar errors appear in connection with the discussion of dyestuffs.

ROBERT A. BRADY

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Financing American Prosperity: A Symposium of Economists. Edited by PAUL T. HOMAN and FRITZ MACHLUP. New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1945.—xi, 508 pp. $3.00.

The subject of this symposium is one of great current interest. In it several prominent economists discuss the financial and other economic problems of the transition after the war and the ensuing years and suggest solutions. They have had a varied experience, and their analyses and conclusions reveal considerable disagreement as well as substantial agreement. Here it will be possible to present only a brief and inadequate summary of their views.

The title of Professor Benjamin M. Anderson's paper, "The Road Back to Full Employment", suggests his thesis. He wants economic processes to be guided by the system of free markets, competition, flexible prices, and profits, and not by government controls. Purchasing power is to be generated by productive private enterprise and not by government deficits. Injurious government controls and regulations should be removed, taxes should be reduced and should be employed for revenue rather than regulation, the budget should be balanced, the debt should be reduced, international competition rather than coöperation should be encouraged, and the world's currencies should be stabilized on a gold basis.

Professor John Maurice Clark discusses the topic, "Financing High-Level Employment". If the nation wants to get rid of substantial cyclical recessions it must resort to collectivism. If it chooses private enterprise it must accept some instability and unemployment. Government spending may be useful to fight cyclical declines with increased capital outlays and greater consumer spending but it is only a palliative, and not a cure, for our economic ills. Progressive taxation has already reached its practicable limits and cannot be extended to overcome chronic shortages of consumer spending. The mounting federal debt is no blessing. It brings with it rising interest charges, heavy taxes, and uneasiness over its eventual outcome.

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As his subject, "Economic Expansion Through Competitive Markets", indicates, Professor Howard S. Ellis desires a competitive economy. He accepts, however, necessary governmental services and regulations and proposes a more equal distribution of wealth and income and international coöperation. He joins other participants in attacking the Keynesian thesis of stagnation and argues that instead of less saving we should remove the institutional obstacles to saving. He advocates a broad program of social security, extensive public works during depressions, favorable tax policies, an increasing foreign trade, lower tariffs, and the removal of monopolistic practices in production, labor activities, and elsewhere. Government spending is essential for full employment but an increasing national debt is a menace to private enterprise.

Professor Alvin H. Hansen's essay on "Stability and Expansion" develops his theory of compensatory government financing to overcome the deficiencies of private enterprise in securing economic stability and a growing national income. Investment is the crucial point of the national income and it requires stimulation by public works, tax reforms, and other measures. State and local, as well as federal, financing should be flexible. Only if the increasing public debt which compensatory financing may require brings fixed charges rising faster than the national income will it produce serious difficulties. International trade should flow more freely, tariffs should be lowered, and currencies should be stabilized by international coöperation. Government action, in fiscal policy and other areas, will be necessary to guarantee prosperity and save private enterprise.

Professor Sumner H. Slichter, in "Public Policies and Postwar Employment", states that deficit spending deals with results rather than causes, that it may raise the price level instead of increasing employment, that it may cause only relatively slight increases in the national income, and that, as the economy grows more mature, deficits will expand public expenditures faster than the national income and limit the expansion of private employment. Governments should encourage employment without guaranteeing jobs for all. He discounts the oversaving arguments and declares that risk-taking should be nurtured in spite of some temporary loss of security and employment. Tax reforms and other methods of stimulating investment are proposed.

In his paper on "Free Enterprise and Full Employment" Professor John H. Williams argues that while fiscal policy is indispensable in promoting prosperity its advantages have been exaggerated and it raises many perplexing problems. Our experience in attaining full employ-

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ment during the war demonstrated that we can repeat this success if we wish to use wartime methods. With other contributors, he finds the oversaving arguments unconvincing. Fiscal policy is more effective in coping with the business cycle than in assuring long-run income growth. Private enterprise should be made to work more effectively and the economy should be made more responsive and adaptable within itself.

In a helpful summary Professor Machlup compares and contrasts arguments and conclusions and adds comments at certain points. He says the oversaving thesis is plausible if not demonstrable. Investment should be encouraged by tax improvements and other devices. Fiscal policy is held to be one of the "hottest" issues among economists.

The essays in the volume are stimulating and provide the reader with a range of opinion on the question, how can we attain reasonably stable and increasing prosperity? All of the contributors emphasize the necessity of preserving private enterprise although some would extend government action further than others. The symposium supplies useful materials for the reader who values the counsel of trained economists in formulating judgments concerning America's economic situation and the way to a higher level of living.

ALFRED G. BUEHLER

THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Guideposts to a Free Economy: A Series of Essays on Enterprise and Government Finance. By HARLEY L. LUTZ. New York and London, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1945.—ix, 206 pp. $2.00.

This book by a professor of public finance at Princeton consists of a series of essays dealing with current problems in economics and public finance. The point of view of the author is that of historic economic liberalism. He is in the tradition of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and the younger John Stuart Mill. Economics is oriented upon production or supply, and especially upon the efforts of the enterprising risk taker, who in quest of profits promotes industry, creates economic goods, and gives employment. Freedom means the absence of bureaucratic restrictions: the government should confine its activities to protection, education, sanitation, inspection and regulation, but should leave control of business mainly to the automatic operation of flexible market prices. The problem of distribution and demand may be practically ignored, since, if there is no surplus governmental control or bureaucratic interference, the success of production or supply will solve the problem of demand and distribution.

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This economic philosophy, like its classical antecedents, is based on certain presuppositions or assumptions. Among them are the dominance of the profits quest in economic motivation, the mobility of the producer, the wisdom of the consumer, the universal disposition to compete or the absence, or virtual absence, of monopoly, monopsony, oligopoly and oligopsony. From this point of view and assumptions, the author proceeds by inevitable logic to the social desirability of large business profits, the elimination of business taxes, proportional instead of progressive income taxation, approval of the sales tax, debt liquidation through heavy taxation, and a general disapproval of the modern school which proposes a dual economy, and which favors promoting effective demand by public works and the use of the credit resources of the federal government.

While admiring the sweep and symmetry of the logic of the book, the present reviewer feels that the author has ignored many important considerations. Specifically, his conception of freedom is too narrow; it is more appropriate to the early stages of the industrial revolution and the American frontier. Then freedom meant absence of restraints, and many specific liberties to do things for one's self. Now, with the passing of the frontier and the relative decline of the sole proprietorship, the rise of the industrial corporation, and the change from independence to interdependence, the concept of liberty has changed. It comprises a complexus of liberties, rights and obligations; and government is an integral part of the whole. Professor Lutz particularly ignores the growth of the corporation, giant power, industrial integration, and the rise of organized labor. He, like his classical antecedents, has no explanation of the industrial cycle. He would solve it merely by cutting wages, if necessary by one-half, in despite of the fact that modern organizations limit the downward revisions of a price economy. In other words, producers are no longer so mobile, prices are not so flexible, wages are not so easily adjustable downward as in the earlier era of small units and purer competition. Bargaining and group pressures supplement adjustments through price changes; and the government has a new rôle in setting price floors and ceilings, and in other ways intervening in what were formerly private economic situations.

Moreover, in the modern complex economy, incomplete mobility means that solution of the problem of production will not always and inevitably solve the problem of distribution. People at times may not wish to buy all the goods currently produced. Saving and investment may be out of balance, and the federal government may be the only effective agent that can act. The dual economy, the dynamic creative-

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ness of private enterprise in partnership with the stability and the vast financial resources of government, may be the feasible solution. Professor Lutz is out of sympathy with nearly all modern trends in economic thinking; but some economists feel that thirty years of profound analysis cannot be lightly dismissed by such terms as "unsound", "naïve", "new-fangled", "phony", "half-baked", and similar inexpensive epithets of derogation.

On the other hand, emphasis should be placed on the quality of the book. The author has reconsidered half of a problem that has of late been somewhat neglected. While he ignores the problem of demand, other economists have been equally prone to neglect the problem of supply. Professor Lutz has emphasized principles to which most economists would agree: that the producer should have ample incentive and reward; and that, in times of great expansion and change, vast sums should be included within so-called profits as an insurance against risk. The reviewer would like to agree with the generalization that business taxes are more likely absorbed than shifted; and he would like also to commend the chapter, "Social Security", as an example of penetrating analysis. In style the book is eminently clear and readable.

HARVEY W. PECK

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

Inflation and the American Economy. By SEYMOUR E. HARRIS. New York and London, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1945.—xxiv, 559 pp. $5.00.

Inflation, the plague of nations during and after wars, is the subject of the latest of Professor Harris' studies. It is, in his opinion, the most important economic problem which America faces because it may be an obstacle to the attainment of the economic goals of maximum production and the optimum distribution of consumers' goods. His concern about inflation has led him to write a book on this fascinating and terrifying subject, a book which analyzes the American economic situation during World War II and at its close, indicates the danger signals, and suggests the controls that are needed to combat inflation.

By inflation Professor Harris means a rise in prices resulting from an excess of demand over supply at the prices of the preceding period. The rise in prices may occur in other markets, but he is primarily concerned with the markets for civilian goods. He finds, as other economists have, that the conventional cost of living indexes have not accurately measured the rise in the prices of consumers' goods because

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they are applicable to the purchases of the lower income groups rather than of all classes. Increasing demand has been fed by increasing purchasing power, and supply has not been adequate to meet the growing demand.

Some inflation in wartime is inevitable. However, the pressure of price controls, priorities, rationing, taxes, credit restrictions, unexpectedly large savings, and other factors kept wartime price advances within moderate limits. The greatest relative gains in wartime income arose in farm income, wages, and corporation profits after taxes. Professor Harris states that the main inflationary influences in the private sector of the economy arose from the great increases in farm income and wages and to only a minor extent from the improved corporate earnings, large amounts of which were saved by corporations and shareholders. The workers and farmers also saved considerably. It is argued that wartime wages had to be increased to provide necessary incentives to workers and to offset rising living costs, and that there was a substantial correlation between increased wages and increased productivity. The farmers, on the other hand, received increased incomes that went much beyond fair remuneration for greater productivity.

Professor Harris believes that the country did a fairly good job in wartime taxation, although we did not cover as great a part of the war costs by taxation as Britain or Canada. Taxation should be levied with a consideration for its effects on factors other than prices as well as its inflationary or anti-inflationary influences. The progressive principle should be followed as fully as possible; direct taxes will have less effect on costs and prices than indirect taxes; and indirect taxes will be less inflationary than borrowing.

The low-interest-rate policy of the Treasury is found to be relatively advantageous. Although the federal debt soared to great heights, the interest rate continued to decline. Higher interest rates would not appreciably increase saving, Professor Harris believes; hence they are not required to fight inflation unless the economic situation is fundamentally altered.

The war has left the nation with serious monetary inflation and with restive economic forces which, if not controlled, will burst into an inflationary boom that will be followed by the inevitable deflation. In the long run, the latter is the more serious problem. Instead of removing wartime controls, we should retain them and add new controls. The private-enterprise system, with its activating profit motive, should be preserved because it seems to promise the highest possible living standards. It is fails, other alternatives to an increasing and equitably

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distributed national income will have to be considered. In the long run, if deflation threatens the country, increased public spending will be required to avert mass unemployment. With a rising national income, a growing national debt need not necessarily be feared.

The author has brought together in convenient form a wealth of information concerning America's wartime economic situation. Perhaps the casual reader will find the array of statistics somewhat confusing because of their abundance, but the careful student will appreciate the clear and comprehensive analysis. The author's theories are indicative of much of the current economic thinking. They will be accepted by many and will be attacked by others, but all will agree that Professor Harris has made a significant contribution to the literature of inflation and that he has performed a most valuable service in calling our attention to the necessity of powerful preventive medicine if we are to halt the cancerous growth of post-war inflation.

ALFRED G. BUEHLER

THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. By ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN. Publications of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of California. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1945.—xiv, 170 pp. $3.00.

Dr. Hirschman's compact and provocative study "is concerned with the nature of a system of international trade that can very easily be exploited for purposes of national power policy. Is there in the trading system some inherent weakness which makes it vulnerable to the will of any government so minded to use it in the pursuit of power? . . . Upon the answer to this question may depend our position concerning the kind, extent, and organization of foreign trade, the most important constituent of international economic relations." In his attempt to solve the riddle of the relationship between national power and foreign trade Dr. Hirschman shows erudition, thoroughness and imagination. His study opens with a brief historical survey of the attitude of the leading economists, from the Mercantilists to the present day, toward the interrelationship between political power and foreign trade. The next section, which is the core of the volume, offers a penetrating, albeit somewhat abstruse, theoretical analysis of foreign trade as an instrument of power politics. The author then turns to the practical aspects of the problem, surveys opinions on "economic aggression" during World War I, with special emphasis on the Paris Economic

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Conference of 1916, and offers a program of economic action for the better and happier world which is supposed to have emerged from World War II. A notable feature of Dr. Hirschman's investigation is a statistical inquiry into the structure of world trade. In these chapters he displays great resourcefulness and ingenuity; if the results obtained are not entirely convincing, the fault lies in the baffling complexity of the problems which the author courageously attacks and in the avowed inadequacy of the data he has to use.

It is unfortunate that Dr. Hirschman's study was written during the war (his preface is dated August 1943) and that he chose Germany as the stock example of "economic aggression". It is difficult to write impartially on an enemy country in wartime. The author makes a commendable effort to be fair and, indeed, states specifically that, although the economic activities of Germany in the pre-war period fit into his theoretical scheme of "power policy in foreign trade", one should not assume that "Germany has consciously worked out such a master plan" (p. 35). He admits that "the initial impetus to German policies in the 'thirties was given even before Hitler's advent to power, not by political motives, but by the economic fact that Germany, a debtor country with a weak currency, found herself attracted to the central and southeastern European countries which were in a similar position" (p. 40). This all important weakness in the international economic position of Germany which was aggravated in the late thirties, and the stifling trade and transfer restrictions practiced by so many other countries, receive, however, little recognition in the bulk of Dr. Hirschman's study and thus tend to impair the validity of his argument. The author rightly notes that "the accusations voiced against Germany" during World War I "were in their substance very similar to those we hear today"; but he is surely too optimistic when he adds that "the intellectual level" of those earlier writings, for which he shows no admiration, "compare rather unfavorably with contemporary literature" (pp. 53-54).

Dr. Hirschman's program for the future is in the nature of an anticlimax to a study which contains much clear thinking and shrewd common sense. He believes that, while "approximation to the free trade principle. . . remains a goal for which. . . it is important to strive on the grounds of economic welfare", it "does not have the additional merit of doing away with the political aspects of international economic relations" (p. 76). The authors' solution is "a frontal attack" on "the institution of national economic sovereignty." He suggests that "the whole of international economic relations" should

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be "effectively limited" and that "the international authority should be not only the unlimited supervisor of the machinery of foreign trade, but should also provide several of the most essential mechanisms of this machinery," namely, "consular services, chamber of commerce, import-and-export-banks, organizations of international transportation, etc." (pp. 79-80). This proposal, needless to say, has not the slightest chance of being acted upon within any predictable future, if ever.

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Unwritten Treaty. By JAMES P. WARBURG. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946.—186 pp. $2.00.

For decades men have sought to define aggression. Elaborate tests have been devised, and some of them have found their way into the formal texts of treaties. But it is significant that no mention of a test of aggression can be found in the Charter of the United Nations. This was not an inadvertent omission; it was a recognition of the fact that the problem has become increasingly so complex that no fixed criteria can fit all possible situations. And one source of this confusion has been the development of clever methods of psychological aggression designed to prepare the way for, and to simplify the task of, the actual military aggression which will follow later when the enemy's morale has been weakened and his will to resist has been rendered negligible. Because it is such a gradual, and by definition so hidden, a process, the problem of dealing with it may be one of the outstandingly difficult tasks of the new security organization.

The other side of the coin is the matter of the free interchange of information among the nations, an interchange that is clearly a requisite to the building of a durable structure of international peace. But how can this full freedom of information be assured without opening the way for psychological aggression? That is the question which Mr. Warburg has attempted to answer in this thoughtful little book.

Drawing upon his experiences as Deputy Director of Propaganda Policy in the O.W.I., Mr. Warburg sketches the background of the problem by analyzing the measures of psychological warfare used in the war by the Axis Powers and the leading United Nations. His judgments as to the effectiveness of these measures may be challenged by some of his readers, but this is incidental to the main thesis of the book, which is a plea for international agreements on freedom of information and on the use of improper propaganda.

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Mr. Warburg proposes an information agreement which would obligate each signatory Power to permit accredited citizens of each other country the right to travel freely within its borders, save for areas containing defense installations, to write freely about it, and to transmit their reports without censorship. In order to make provisions for desirable propaganda, each country would agree to allow others to maintain libraries of information within its territory, to allow its citizens freely to listen to foreign broadcasts, to view foreign films, and to read foreign books. Discriminating regulations to prevent these facilities from being made available to the citizens of a country would be forbidden.

A supplementary agreement on psychological disarmament would outlaw attempts to discredit the government of any signatory Power, especially among its own citizens, to divide the people of a signatory Power among themselves, and to stimulate prejudice, hate or discrimination against any racial, social, economic, political or religious group anywhere in the world. Secret agents are not to be employed within the territory of any other signatory Power.

No one could quarrel with the objectives which these two agreements would attempt to reach. But the great difficulty, that of implementation, is one which the author fails to deal with in any adequate manner. His view is—and he may be right—that the mere existence of these agreements would constitute a step in advance of the present world situation. The fact remains, however, that this field is one of the most difficult of all to deal with administratively, and the mere existence of an unimplemented agreement would have little meaning unless all signatories were equally determined by voluntary action to observe its stipulations. If this were not the case, the premature conclusion of such an agreement might be equally as ineffective as the Briand-Kellogg Pact of unlamented memory. For this reason, it would seem far better to limit the agreement at the present time to the matter of freedom of information because a violation of this would be easily detectible and could be the subject of diplomatic representation. If it were observed fully by all states, the other side of the matter in time would take care of itself. But psychological aggression cannot be exorcised by any international agreement, so the important thing is to create a climate in which it cannot easily flourish. This is the task which can best be accomplished by a full and free exchange of information. Mr. Warburg's plea on this score is sound, and his proposals deserve wide reading.

GRAYSON KIRK

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America: Partner in World Rule. By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN. New York, Vanguard Press, 1945.—xiii, 318 pp. $3.00.

The partnership of which Mr. Chamberlin writes is an uneasy one, though not inevitably headed toward insolvency. No enthusiast for the war to begin with, Mr. Chamberlin is not very enthusiastic over the peace. The American people are entitled, he says, to ask of their government "an accounting for the still uncounted dead of this Second World War . . . to ask how far this sacrifice has made more secure the stable peace which is America's only reasonable war objective." Without saying so, Mr. Chamberlin plainly does not believe the answer would be convincing, and on the showing of the first half year of the peace it would be difficult to refute him. Also he has no patience with the "curious theory, implicit in the reasoning of some well-known American commentators, that we were under an inescapable obligation to fight the war, but possess no right to a voice in the peace." On that point, too, it is difficult to dissent from Mr. Chamberlin.

The peace is going badly, he says—said in fact when he was writing, soon after the end of the war, when he thought he could already see symptoms. It is going badly because the promises of wartime have been betrayed, the worst betrayal being at Yalta. There, he thinks, the Atlantic Charter was emasculated, principally in the Polish settlement and the provision for veto power by the great Powers. Yet Mr. Chamberlin looks to the future rather than the past and therefore analyzes the relations among the three great Powers, particularly America's relation to the other two.

With Great Britain, he thinks, we can come to accord, the test being Great Britain's chance to recover economic viability. With Russia the problem is less simple. One of the bitterest anti-Russian polemicists, Mr. Chamberlin has nevertheless managed to remain objectively analytical. He has fears, which even the unpolemical must share, of what will happen in the two great vacuums on each side of Russia. Will Russia move in to fill either Europe or Eastern Asia or both? He is fearful though not without hope, but he wants to see more tokens of good intention from Moscow. If they are forthcoming, then the two countries can coöperate. Even their antithetical economic philosophies do not lay an insuperable obstacle.

There are certain conditions precedent to a workable system of peace: international organization with provision for peaceful change to ensure economic justice for all nations but without veto power for

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any one of them; no nation to be placed under undesirable alien rule; cultural autonomy for minorities; regional federations to be encouraged; maximum limitation of armaments for all; liquidation of imperialism, politically for more advanced subject peoples, economically for others.

Mr. Chamberlin writes out of long experience and reflection, and in his pages there is a good deal of astuteness as well as wisdom.

NATHANIEL PEFFER

The United States and Britain. By CRANE BRINTON. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1945.—xii, 305 pp. $2.50.

The editors of the American Foreign Policy Library, Sumner Welles and Donald C. McKay, have made a fortunate start for their series in both the subject and the author of this first volume. Professor Brinton writes about the problematical Anglo-American relationship in an attractive, intimate, almost conversational, manner which seems to reflect his experiences at some sixty meetings in Great Britain during the war where about fifty Americans and Britons discussed their two countries in forum before audiences composed of their armed services. One consequence is that, while his book has conspicuous merits as current debate, it has somewhat less organic quality than might have been expected of a historian. The author pretty well settles the dilemma between analysis and genesis by plumping for the former.

In general his analysis builds up to two useful working principles. The first is summed up (pp. 244-245) by the figure of the parent-child relationship in which the child has outgrown the parent, but in which "there is no prospect that in any span of years that need concern us Britain will 'grow old' to the point of helpless invalidism, utter senility." The second is the conclusion (p. 266) that "it is in this task of building up international government by discussion and compromise, *and only in this task,* that Anglo-American cooperation can usefully continue the work it began during this war." The underlying structure consists of an enlightening survey of modern Britain and of its peoples' ways, a candid examination of the effect of the recent war, and a sketchy account of past Anglo-American relations. The whole usefully modifies Mr. Welles's introductory statement (p. viii) that "the problems which are now arising . . . are economic rather than political, and social, rather than strategic."

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By the frequently used device of stating polar opposites and commending courses between them, Mr. Brinton maintains a reasonable line of his own which tends on the whole toward a conservative kind of practicality. The device permits him some notably blunt speaking about extremists and it spares him some embarrassments from the effect of the course of events on a semi-prophetic text which was written during the summer of 1945. It also evades the pitfalls which may be dug by stressing unduly either similarities or differences. As is probably inevitable, the analysis fares worst when the author shifts to and fro between arguments in terms of outright international contests in armed power and in terms of efforts to avert them. For instance, Mr. Brinton can contemplate (p. 223) the assimilation of "some of the Dominions . . . into a power bloc dominated by the United States," but in his urgent arguments for Anglo-American promotion of multilateral trade he fails to note or make use of Canada's rôle as their most important economic associate during the past generation.

J. B. BREBNER

Soviet Politics: At Home and Abroad. By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1946.—xxii, 663, xxv pp. $4.00.

"Area" courses were among the media utilized during the war to prepare military and civilian officials for the task of governing our enemies and coöperating with our allies. Courses touched upon history, geography, political theory and organization, external politics and a prognostication of the future of the area. Professor Schuman has written a volume which might be described as an "area" course for the civilian seeking to understand the major factor with which the policy of the United States will be concerned for the entire foreseeable future.

The book is divided into sections relating to Russian history, or more properly the history of the area that is now the U.S.S.R., Soviet political theory, organization of the Soviet state, evolution of Soviet foreign policy and an analysis of current events with emphasis upon those points which might lead to World War III if they are improperly handled. The great mass of information contained in the book is set forth in a most readable style and enlivened by comments and well-turned expressions of a type for which the author has become well known. In view of the comments, which sometimes become short legal briefs for a point, the book is more than an encyclopedia. It is a

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highly personalized study by a scholar who abhors equally the bloody revolution of the type made famous in Russia and the excesses of the free-enterprise system.

The early history of Russia is well covered in a manner which goes far to provide that appreciation of the background of the Russian peasant, without which Soviet politics are completely mysterious. The sections on political theory are less systematically organized, but spread at convenient places in the text and never comprising a full statement of what Soviet leaders believe. One is left feeling that, even though the political scientist who reads the acute comments of the author on the subject will find them stimulating and even entertaining, the neophyte will be rather confused. The chapter devoted to the organization of the Soviet state and the bill of rights will help in explaining Soviet thinking on democracy, which plays a part in the Soviet attitude toward international politics. It is not detailed enough, however, to serve as a text in courses on comparative government.

The several chapters on Soviet foreign policy bring up to date Professor Schuman's earlier books and include material which has come to light with the publication of diaries of Axis leaders and the opening of Axis files. Such is the pace of disclosure, however, that in the short time since the book was written some new facts have been uncovered such as the testimony at Nuremberg on the Hess flight to Scotland which would change the book's evaluation of this event.

The final section of the book will arouse the sharpest controversy. It is here that Professor Schuman sets forth his advice to those who conduct American foreign policy. He insists that world peace must rest upon recognition of the fact that the United States will fight before it will permit any other Great Power to dominate Latin America, the Western Atlantic, the Caribbean or mid-Pacific islands; Britain will fight before it will permit any other Great Power to dominate the Low Countries, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea or the approaches to India; and the U.S.S.R. will fight before it will permit any other Great Power to dominate Danubia, Balkania, the Black Sea, Iran or Northern China. He urges that these facts be the basis of foreign policy and criticizes any attempt to retard Soviet domination in her orbit as doomed to failure and a cause of war if persisted in.

The author anticipates that the Russian Revolution will never be reënacted in Western lands. He reaches this conclusion because he finds the continental Socialists are leaders of followers who want to be prosperous and patriotic burghers, not revolutionary proletarian internationalists. One must admit that this conclusion is not current in

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many sections of the United States and that refusal to accept it is giving rise to hostility to Soviet moves upon the world chessboard.

Professor Schuman's thesis that the U.S.S.R. is not a threat if left to herself in her security orbit, and that the Soviet type of revolution will not spread beyond that orbit, is plausible in the light of the facts available in the spring of 1946. Perhaps if Soviet leaders find it possible to indicate the limits to their demands for a security zone, and if Western European voters show their abhorrence of the programs of the communist parties in their midst, the thesis will be accepted by the American public, who are frightened of the U.S.S.R., not because of what she does at home or in her orbit, but because they fear she is interested in conquest either by the sword or through the communist parties of the world.

John N. Hazard

Foreign Service Educational Foundation

Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945. By Harriet L. Moore. Princeton, Princeton University Press, under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945.—xvii, 284 pp. $2.50.

This book has been so frankly appraised in its Foreword and Preface that further comment is almost superfluous. "It does not", says the Research Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, "tell the whole story of Far Eastern affairs in relation to the U.S.S.R. during those years, but it tells an essential part of the story." What that essential part is cannot be better stated than as formulated by the author herself: "It gives approximately the picture which the Soviet people themselves have of this part of the world scene, for the study is compiled almost exclusively from Soviet sources. In addition, the appendices include translations of Soviet editorial comments on the most important developments. As far as possible, the account of actual events has been checked against non-Soviet sources but the author has not been able to make use of materials in Chinese or Japanese."

About half of the pages are devoted to documents, ranging from the almost forgotten Treaty of Portsmouth to the declaration of war on Japan (though this last is inserted as a postscript to the text), and to statements culled from the Russian press, extending from the initial reaction to Japanese operations in Manchuria to denunciation of the neutrality pact with Japan. For obvious reasons these documents do not reflect archival research. The earlier ones are taken from Yakhontoff's *Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East*, published fifteen years ago; others are derived from Litvinov's *Against Aggression*, from

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Tass, and from the *Moscow News*. The official correspondence which lies back of the agreements here recited is of course unavailable. All that can be offered in explanation of the texts is the editorial comment of the official Russian press, together with official public pronouncements by high Russian officials. Circumstances have not permitted Miss Moore to make a thorough check on these explanations from non-Soviet sources. Little of this nature is offered beyond citations from Moscow despatches to the *New York Times* and references to the *Japan Weekly Chronicle;* in the light of Miss Moore's statement in her Introduction, not much importance can be attached to comments such as "Sections of the Chinese press have for many years been critical of the Soviet Union." Indeed, for the purpose of presenting an approximation of "the picture which the Soviet people themselves have of this part of the world scene", such a check would have been superfluous.

The result of such an approach does not, indeed, shed much light on the true nature of Soviet Far Eastern policy in those nervous fifteen years. What emerges is a lack of any positive policy, a concentration on defense of existing holdings and a determination to avoid the taking of risks. There is a striking unity between Soviet policy toward Germany and toward Japan. In the West, after years of fulmination against the Nazis and urging of collective security, Russia made a neutrality pact with Germany at the moment when Britain and France were about to attack Germany in the name of orderly and peaceful international procedures. In the East, as American pressure on Japan steadily mounted, Russia similarly concluded a neutrality pact with the Power against which she had long been blustering. The present study leaves the field wide open for speculation as to the reasons why these pacts suddenly lost their validity. Miss Moore had apparently intended to conclude the story with Russia's denunciation of the pact with Japan, which she took as meaning that Russia, concerned about the "sanctity of her frontiers", intended to seek collective security through the U.N.O. Her postscript merely records, without comment, that the Soviet Union followed denunciation with violation of the pact.

Useful as this book is in tracing the story of boundary and fishery disputes between the Soviet Union and Japan, it is to be regretted that even a study sponsored by the high authority of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations cannot at this time add substantially to what is already known about matters of such vital concern to Americans and to the world.

JESSE D. CLARKSON

BROOKLYN COLLEGE

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Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century. By GLADYS BRYSON. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1945.—ix, 287 pp. $3.00.

Miss Bryson's study of the eighteenth-century Scots—principally Ferguson, Hume, Hutcheson, Lord Kames, Lord Monboddo, Reid, Smith and Stewart—is, as she indicates, " only another chapter dealing with the development of social science, but a chapter of another kind." The qualifying clause is all-important here; for what Miss Bryson has written is a study in some central eighteenth-century ideas, ideas which were not limited to the context of the social sciences. Thus *Man and Society* will be of prime interest to all students of Scottish and English life, thought and art in the eighteenth century. Thus too, it is as a study in the history of eighteenth-century ideas that the book must be viewed.

The Scottish writers of whom Miss Bryson treats were able to conclude, after what was for them an empirical investigation, that that which was "natural " to society was simply society itself. There had been no chaotic state of nature, no need of social contracts. Man was innately a social animal. Starting at this point, Miss Bryson proceeds to analyze Ferguson's " typical " moral philosophy and goes on to write of the Scottish view of man's place in nature, of his past, of " conjectural " accounts of that past, of his own nature, of his society, and of that society's institutions. She concludes with a valuable brief analysis of the complex of empiricism, uniformitarianism, and passion for the ordered and typical which are integral in this view and with a briefer note (deriving largely, as she says, from Teggart's *Theory of History*) of the work of the Scots as " the chief theoretical background of our modern social sciences." Throughout she proceeds, not from man to man (a list of important writings is appended, however), but from idea to idea.

Miss Bryson's approach is sound and competent. But one must notice various inadequacies—all related to her work as a study in the history of ideas. First, some minor inadequacies: She goes too far in trying rigidly to classify Kames's theory of the origin of man as in the end orthodox (p. 66); for Kames could not make up his own mind, and his contemporaries often thought of him as one who opposed the " Mosaic account ". She overemphasizes (p. 79) " nostalgia " as a force in the Scots' historical writings; for, whatever might have been their personal idiosyncrasies, they were constrained to demonstrate the inevitability of social development and to rationalize " nostalgia " out of existence. Indeed, her whole chapter on the Scottish view of

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"Man's Past" is disappointing; for she examines inadequately the matter of methodology and methodological implications, and the relationship between Scottish psychology and Scottish theory of historical process. It is, however, her treatment of eighteenth-century Scottish interest in language and esthetics which leaves most to be desired. Even her apologia for the lack of a discussion of Scottish esthetics is unsatisfactory, since for the Scots the arts were demonstrably social vehicles and were moreover found to derive their standards from an empiricistic psychology, a psychology which, in turn, derived from man's social nature.

Furthermore, as a study in the history of ideas ("a chapter of another kind"). *Man and Society* exhibits certain major structural inadequacies. One would like, as support for a necessarily idea-by-idea analysis, a brief chronological sketch of the writers and writings involved; perhaps an appended outline would do. One would like a chapter discussing influences, minor writers, and provenience and impact of main ideas. On the whole, one wishes that Miss Bryson had been willing to go further, to depart even more from the limitations of "only another chapter dealing with the development of social science". We are in need of works which cut across several disciplines, as they treat unit ideas and ideologies in their protean appearances. Yet Miss Bryson has made a beginning toward such a work. And students of the history of political science, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, psychology, and the arts will find that this is much, if not quite enough.

ROY HARVEY PEARCE

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The Liberal Tradition: A Study of the Social and Spiritual Conditions of Freedom. By WILLIAM AYLOTT ORTON. New Haven, Yale University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1945.—xiv, 317 pp. $3.50.

This is an exhilarating and a profoundly disappointing book. The comment would be unnecessarily dramatic and paradoxical were it not for the avowed urgency on the part of the author to make "an attempt" (and a brilliant one) "to restate in terms suited to our time" what many will agree is "the noblest of political philosophies." Professor Orton is erudite far beyond his special field of economics and he is gifted with insight into intellectual history. He has written in many respects a wise book and he has frequently made his points wittily. But the promise of the early chapters is not fulfilled, the de-

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tachment and breadth of view are not sustained. Although the author's lofty purpose is maintained to the end, the anger and the prejudices that break through the refinements of his thinking are not worthy of his eloquence.

In asserting some cardinal principles of liberalism and in much of his discussion of historical foundations Mr. Orton is convincing. He does well to distinguish between liberalism and mechanistic, deterministic, and transcendental systems. He persistently points out that human personality is the beginning and end of liberalism. He effectively associates liberalism with the Aristotelian rather than the Platonic view of life, and he indicates the significance to liberalism of the synthesis of early Christianity with the Classical doctrine of nature. He has an interesting analysis of the Politiques as the precursors of modern liberalism, and he successfully defends the humanity of the great middle-class liberals, John Locke and Adam Smith. Among the many penetrating observations he makes are those on French history and character.

The more controversial interpretations which enliven Mr. Orton's pages may be dealt with through two fundamental criticisms, one historical, the other analytical, and both closely interrelated.

In the history of liberalism he has not sufficiently recognized the nature of its dialectic and dynamic process. The old Church of the sixteenth century and the Syllabus of Errors of the nineteenth century are made to appear as if they had more affinity than they do with liberalism, and the fragmentation of the Western world brought on by the Reformation and the subsequent materialistic and atomistic phase of liberalism are credited with far too much evil. By a kind of scholastic legerdemain, mathematical rationalism and materialistic individualism are made to lead directly to the totalitarian state. The humanitarianism and the profound respect for personality characteristic of so many of the mathematical rationalists and the materialists from Spinoza to John Dewey are ignored, as are the deepening roots of individualism in Western civilization as compared with the Classical. Mr. Orton also ignores the more recent transformation of atomistic individualism (*vide* T. H. Green and Renouvier) into its modern social and egalitarian phase, thus missing the true significance of modern pluralism, guild socialism, and many other manifestations of the liberal tradition in twentieth-century guise.

In his analysis of liberalism Mr. Orton justifiably asserts that it should be "open-ended", that is, not permanently committed to specific ends; but in the contemporary period he is, for the purposes of practical politics, either too literal-minded in his application of the

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dictum or else he openly violates it. Mr. Orton is well aware of the nature of modern monopoly capitalism, but through a fear of statism he will not implement a necessary social service program. In foreign policy, however, he appropriates, as the goal of liberalism, the nineteenth-century concept of nonintervention, thus transforming a viable principle of liberalism of the era of the *Pax Britannica* into an anachronism for the twentieth century. Pressing his kind of liberalism, Mr. Orton dreads not only the state, but political power itself, yet, at the same time, says nothing of the peril to liberalism from a failure to intervene against the supremacy of Nazism.

The author of this book is more concerned with deploring the realities of present national and international politics than with adjusting these realities to his liberal faith. Authentic liberals like de Tocqueville and Justice Holmes spent few words bemoaning the evil tendencies of their times. Is it not possible today that, with a little more zeal for action, modern liberals can influence their Left-wing competitors without succumbing, as Mr. Orton fears, to a totalitarianism of the Left?

WILLSON H. COATES

THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

Law and Orders: An Inquiry into the Nature and Scope of Delegated Legislation and Executive Powers in England. By CARLETON KEMP ALLEN. London, Stevens & Sons, Limited, 1945.—xvi, 385 pp. 15s.

On January 27, 1937, Mr. Dingle Foot moved in the House of Commons, "That in the opinion of this House the power of the Executive has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished." This was avowedly intended to challenge comparison with John Dunning's famous resolution aimed at George III's system of personal government in the days of the American Revolution: "That the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished." Nobody, to be sure, suspected George VI, as many had suspected his ancestor, of harboring tyrannical designs. "The dangers which we believe exist today", said Mr. Foot, "are not dissimilar from those which existed then, but they come not from the Crown, but from the servants of the Crown," and he went on to speak of "the continuous encroachment of the Executive at the expense of the House of Commons" and of "the attempt that has been deliberately made in Statute after Statute in recent years to invest Government Departments with completely arbitrary powers." There is a significant contrast between the fate of the two resolutions. Mr. Dunning was able to carry his by

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a vote of 233 to 215, but Mr. Foot addressed empty benches, and his speech was cut short by notice given that the requisite quorum of forty members was not present. His efforts had no effect whatever, and the Second World War carried executive powers in England to unprecedented heights, as is shown in detail in the volume in hand.

The principal subjects with which Professor Allen deals—delegated legislation, administrative justice, and the position and privileges of the executive in litigation—have long engaged his attention. His *Bureaucracy Triumphant* (1931), consisting of a collection of articles which had appeared in *The Quarterly Review* and elsewhere, was a not unimportant contribution to the considerable body of literature evoked by the growth of executive powers in England during and after the First World War. His point of view, evidenced in many passages in the present work, remains essentially what it was in his earlier writings. While he rejects the idea of a bureaucratic "conspiracy" against parliamentary supremacy and the "rule of law", propounded notably by Lord Chief Justice Hewart in his book, *The New Despotism*, he believes, with James Madison, that power is inherently "of an encroaching nature", and he emphasizes the fact that good intentions are no guarantee against tyrannical behavior, for the encroachments of power, "more often than not, are for the sake of what are sincerely believed to be good, and indeed necessary, objects."

Mr. Allen refers to various proposals for reform that have been made, but he thinks that on the whole they have had little effect. For a great many years there have been frequent complaints and criticisms of the anomalous and inequitable privileges enjoyed by the Crown in litigation, and at length a committee, with the Attorney-General as chairman, was appointed to study the problems involved and make recommendations. After six years' deliberation it produced, in 1927, a Crown Proceedings Bill (reprinted by Mr. Allen in an appendix) which would have made sweeping changes, radically altering the position of the Crown as litigant, but the bill did not become law, nothing has been heard of it since, and the situation remains practically the same as it was when the committee was appointed. Mr. Allen finds it "difficult to resist the inference that a silent but powerful hostility to any change exists among the Departments." In 1929 Lord Chancellor Sankey appointed a committee to examine and report on a subject to which a great deal of public attention had been given, the subject of the powers, legislative and judicial, conferred upon ministers by statute. The author makes much use of the report of this Committee on Ministers' Powers, as it was called, together with its memoranda and the minutes of evidence given by witnesses. A few improvements,

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mainly in the realm of delegated legislation, resulted from the committee's recommendations, but in the main its report, to quote Mr. Allen, " passed quietly into the oblivion which is the fate of so many reports." He has something to say about existing parliamentary "controls" and " safeguards " against the abuse of executive powers, but his conclusion is that, while not wholly without value, they " impose only a very small degree of the control which they are, in theory, intended to impose." The most hopeful reform came in 1944, when a recommendation made by the Committee on Ministers' Powers in its report of 1932 at last bore fruit, and a committee was appointed to scrutinize statutory rules and orders laid before the House of Commons for the purpose of determining whether they contain objectionable provisions or are immune from challenge in the courts. Dr. Allen expresses the hope that the activities of this committee will result in an increase of executive caution and parliamentary vigilance.

In preliminary chapters, on " The Balance of Powers " and " The History of Delegation ", the author views his subject broadly, from the constitutional and historical standpoints. He holds to no doctrinaire theory of the separation of powers, and he shows that the conferring of powers on ministers and other administrative authorities by act of parliament has a long history, though its great development belongs to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He is not opposed to the delegation of powers within due limits, but he points out that the argument that Parliament is not qualified to legislate directly on " technical " matters has been greatly overworked by the champions of delegation. He reminds us that a vast mass of technical legislation was passed by Parliament in the nineteenth century and remarks that " the notion that Parliament is a body whose main function is only to think beautiful thoughts and adumbrate noble ideals is of quite recent origin."

From the standpoint of a liberal, what Mr. Allen has to say about recent events and developments is deeply disquieting. The sub-delegation of legislative powers to administrative officers, for one thing, has been carried to great lengths, and when authority passes from a delegate to a sub-delegate the possibility of any effective control is greatly diminished. A conspicuous example of sub-delegation is to be found in the discretionary autocratic powers conferred during the late war on National Service Officers, powers which seem clearly to have exceeded the needs of national defense. The story of the powers of detention exercised by the Home Secretary under Defence Regulation 18B, made under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, explains and justifies the author's hope that it " will always be remembered as one of the

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most odious products of war." The war is over, but paternalism remains, and paternalism is the soil in which executive powers flourish most luxuriantly. Paternalism could scarcely go further than in the phenomenon of what Mr. Allen calls "vicarious litigation". It is actually true that under the Catering Wages Act, 1943, "an officer authorized by the Minister of Labour to whom it appears that a sum is due from an employer to a worker, on account of payment to him of less than the statutory remuneration, may institute civil proceedings for the recovery of such sum on behalf of or in the name of the worker", and this may be done, seemingly, even against the wishes of the worker. The author calls it "something new in English law, and something big with evil tendencies, that a man should be made a plaintiff, whether he wishes it or not, at the bidding of a Departmental understrapper."

The prospect, as seen through the eyes of this thoughtful student, is not encouraging:

> We are faced not only with Reconstruction, which of necessity will demand officialdom on a huge scale, but with vast new programmes of State organization and control. Will the Civil Service continue to grow as it has done since 1914, and to centralize its powers more and more, and if so, what possible prospect is there but bureaucracy, in its true sense of government by the bureau? And what result has ever ensued from that form of government, at any time or in any part of the world, but national enervation, corruption and servility?

The exaltation of the executive and the depreciation of representative legislatures have been preliminaries to the establishment of totalitarianism in other countries. The reader of Mr. Allen's well-informed book is likely to find difficulty in escaping the conclusion that England has traveled a good way along that primrose path.

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER

Political Reconstruction. By KARL LOEWENSTEIN. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1946.—xii, 498 pp. $4.00.

In the quest for some means of preventing another war, the main emphasis, quite naturally, has centered upon the adequacy of existing organizational arrangements. Professor Loewenstein takes the position that no international organization, regardless of its organic and functional perfection, can achieve its objective unless it is composed of states which are truly democratic. It follows that the political reconstruction of the states of Europe—he excludes Japan from his analysis—must be accepted as an integral part of the larger task of maintain-

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ing peace. Before they are admitted to the international community the governments of the reconstructed states must meet certain minimum standards of representativeness, responsibility, and respect for civil liberties within their own borders.

At first glance, few would dissent from this view; but, as the author takes pains to point out, this position involves a commitment not yet undertaken by previous or existing international organizations. The doctrine of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a nation—in so far as its form of government is concerned—has dominated the international law of the past century. Herein lay the single most vital defect of the League of Nations, in the opinion of the author. Because of the dogma of internal self-determination, the respect for free institutions and constitutional guarantees on the part of its constituent members was not considered a matter of concern to the League itself. The dictatorships among its members were not willing to observe basic obligations in their international relationships that they did not recognize in their own internal affairs.

Professor Loewenstein fears that this important lesson from history has not been fully understood. He calls attention to Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter guaranteeing " the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live. . .", as an indication that this dangerous doctrine of international laissez faire still dominates our minds. Although he concluded his manuscript before the completion of the United Nations Charter, his misgivings have been substantiated, for it seems clear that Article 2, Section 7 of that document places the form of government of a state outside the area of permissible intervention by the organization. In the author's view, this defect must be corrected if the United Nations is to succeed. This thesis he develops by a series of propositions which will be set forth briefly.

History has demonstrated that political democracies are more willing to coöperate peacefully than are other governments. In the era of political reconstruction ahead only democratic governments must be permitted to come into existence. The ancient maxim that the internal self-determination (right to determine its own form of government) of a state is not a subject for intervention must be scrapped. Through its central agency, the United Nations Political Control Commission, the United Nations must assume responsibility for the propagation of democracy in the countries concerned. Through this system of political tutelage, of indeterminate duration, the seeds of popular government may be given full opportunity to develop and attain stamina before the helping hand is withdrawn.

In outlining the process of political reconstruction, the author lays

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down specific rules of guidance. These include: the "nuclear demands"—the basic principles that must be met by all new governments; the successive steps in setting up such governments; the criteria for provisional governments until the country is ready to adopt its permanent constitution; the types of an acceptable government, etc.

The hypothesis that the success of international organization is dependent upon the governmental homogeneity of its constituent members raises issues of great magnitude. Many persons will not accept this view because it runs contrary to most of what has taken place in the realm of international collaboration. Indeed, it can be said that the very rationale of the United Nations has been based upon quite the opposite premise; namely, that, irrespective of their forms of government and their standards of political and civil liberty in their own internal affairs, nations can coöperate successfully on the international plane.

One wonders just how far the author extends the implications of his argument. Although he explicitly directs his observations to the semi-despotic régimes of southeastern Europe, much of what he has to say applies with even greater force to the Soviet Union, and it touches upon a point that has tormented many people. Here is a question for which history offers no satisfactory answer, but the experience of the United Nations to date has made one thing painfully clear: the Soviet brand of democracy and the Anglo-American brand of democracy as yet have very little in common. Whether this fundamental difference will eventually produce disastrous results must remain uncertain for the present. Professor Loewenstein's stimulating book puts this problem sharply in perspective.

LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

France and Britain. A Report by a Chatham House Study Group. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1945.—110 pp. 6*s.*; $1.75.

France, Yesterday and Today: A Short Survey. By KATHARINE MUNRO. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1945.—107 pp. 4*s.* 6*d.*; $1.25.

France, at the moment, is inevitably in eclipse, as she has been since 1940, for her effective power is small. But, in the portion of Europe between Russia and the Atlantic, a region whose future importance will still be considerable, France remains, after the defeat of Germany,

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the most important single item. We may sometimes forget this fact, concentrating on the detailed intricacies of German occupation; it might be well to bear in mind that certain things might happen in France which could render all our too elaborate plans for Germany wholly superfluous. The dwindling, if still considerable, importance of the Channel makes it impossible for Britain to take so detached a view either of French internal developments or of the consequence of these developments in the rôle and position of France.

That close collaboration is to the mutual interest of the two countries is clearly demonstrated; for if France is weaker than Britain, British power too has suffered a considerable relative decline. The war itself has introduced new factors into the problem of Anglo-French relations. It is true that the fatal divergence of policy of the two countries is likely to be attenuated, mainly through Britain having come around to the more realistic French view that the eastern European countries are not so far away after all.

But the situation in eastern Europe is undergoing revolutionary changes with respect to domestic as well as foreign policy. This is recognized, but perhaps not sufficiently stressed. The importance of France to Britain as a base of operations on the continent and because of the French position athwart the western Mediterranean is incontrovertible. But to stress this in order that Britain may fulfill her obligations to the Russian ally does, in 1946, seem somewhat ironical. As far as meeting the German danger is concerned, France might feel that a Russian connection is sufficient. What should be pointed out is that such a connection would not be an alliance of equals, and that in order to restore some equality it is necessary to have a partnership between Russia on the one hand and, on the other, not Britain or France alone, but an Anglo-French bloc. Blocs, however, other than Russian sponsored, are frowned upon in Moscow, and the possibility is also recognized that the continental pull might, under proper circumstances, be revived with a stronger and sounder basis than Vichy could ever hope to give it.

Granting the desirability of Anglo-French collaboration, both countries must make contributions to it. Britain, in addition to accepting continental responsibilities, must handle French susceptibilities with deftness, while France must recognize the peculiar position of Britain in the Commonwealth and be prepared to make a greater industrial contribution than hitherto.

From the nature of the discussion, its compass is limited. Perhaps this is all the more reason why it may be profitable for Americans: British policy toward France has, on the whole, been better balanced

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than ours or Russia's. Certainly a policy *à la* Potsdam of making arrangements without consulting France but giving France a power of veto over such arrangements is less an illustration of high statesmanship than of how to obtain the greatest possible disadvantages from an intended compromise. Unfortunately, Britain alone is not strong enough to make her views prevail. But that, as the report soundly indicates, is all the more reason for Britain *and* France together using their joint weight to make the voice of Europe heard in the councils of the future.

Of the second publication, little need be said beyond stating that it is a useful companion to the first, a concise, but clear and up-to-date, survey of the current French scene and its background, done with the competence that one associates with Chatham House productions.

René Albrecht-Carrié

Barnard College

China's Crisis. By Lawrence K. Rosinger. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1945.—xii, 259, xiii pp. $3.00.

During the revolutionary era which has rocked China since the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911-12, Chinese history has been in large part a continuous series of crises. These have been a natural consequence of the new nationalism and of resulting major adjustments in China's relations with the Powers—adjustments which in a few years have carried China from a status of semicolonialism to one of independence in fact as well as in name. Indeed China has achieved greater success in her foreign than in her domestic affairs. In these latter, the ideological goal has been the philosophy of Sun Yat-sen as expressed in the *San Min Chu I* or Three Principles of the People, nationalism, democracy and livelihood. Since the passing of Dr. Sun in 1925, the question has often been asked whether the revolutionary Kuomintang leadership which followed him has not diverted the revolution to new goals of which Sun would never have approved. This is essentially the crisis that Mr. Rosinger seeks to analyze. He has not attempted to write a history of China during the war years but rather to provide a background for some of the questions American newspaper readers frequently ask about China, and to provide answers to some of them.

China's Crisis, which it should be remembered was written while the war in the Pacific theater was still going on, has something to say on four major aspects of wartime China: (1) conflicts in domestic poli-

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tics, (2) the fighting fronts, (3) affairs economic, and (4) China's place among her allies.

Part II, devoted to the fighting fronts, is exceedingly brief and sketchy. Part IV on China's relations with her principal allies is open to the same criticism. Since the book is obviously directed to a broad general audience, it should be pointed out for example that the general reader who is not well versed in the background of Russo-Chinese relations is not likely to find his thinking clarified by the chapter which deals with Soviet relations. Here it is not so much a question of what Mr. Rosinger says but of what ten and one-half pages will not permit him to say on an extremely difficult subject.

In contrast with the limitations noted in Parts II and IV, Part I on political crosscurrents is a balanced and penetrating series of essays on China's contemporary politics. To those who are disturbed when the suggestion is made that China is not a democracy, Mr. Rosinger replies that "the most significant question to ask about China is not whether it is a democracy but whether it is moving in the direction of democracy." He points out that national unity in China has not yet been translated into the framework of a political structure but it is nevertheless one of the most vital forces in contemporary China. Mr. Rosinger finds evidence of this in the experiences of the war when "it was not Chiang Kai-shek who led the nation [in resistance], but the nation that led Chiang Kai-shek." A careful distinction is drawn between the patriotic and national spirit of resistance as against what the author regards as the unjustifiable efforts of the Kuomintang to impose uniformity under party dictatorship. This retarded instead of promoting prosecution of the war. The chapter on the Kuomintang is a forceful summary of those elements within the party which have sought and still seek to prevent the development of a truly democratic society. These are contrasted with what the author regards as the more socially conscious leadership of the Chinese Communists who regard themselves as Communists but whose program during most of the war years, far from being communistic, has provided the best example of Sun Yat-sen's principles in action.

Mr. Rosinger's study is not an answer to all China's political troubles but it is a remarkably accurate, frank and stimulating discussion of basic contending forces. The author believes that only through application of the democratic process, as yet largely untried, can these forces find a common denominator for future unity in a free civilization.

PAUL H. CLYDE

DUKE UNIVERSITY

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I Accuse de Gaulle. By HENRI DE KERILLIS. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946.—xiv, 270 pp. $2.75.

When Charles de Gaulle resigned as provisional president of France, last January, observers were reminded of Winston Churchill, for both men had proved themselves essentially war leaders, too Rightist for the post-war political and social temper of their respective countries. But where Churchill even in defeat remains a product and a symbol of British parliamentary democracy, de Gaulle's political position is more obscure. Nominally he has withdrawn from political life, but he has left behind him an "ism" that takes its name from his—a dubious distinction for a French republican leader.

Henri de Kerillis, a Rightist journalist and pre-war deputy, later a prominent member of the Free French, broke with de Gaulle in 1943. In *I Accuse de Gaulle* he ascribes to the General authoritarian inclinations and ambition for personal political power. For de Kerrilis "De Gaullism is a phenomenon originating in fascism. . . . It is the Pétainism of the exile" (p. 259).

I Accuse de Gaulle is a necessary corrective for the inspirational type of writing turned out during the war. But, in its way, it is as undiscriminating in its choice of facts and as prejudiced in its interpretation of them.

In his efforts to discredit de Gaulle, de Kerillis showers uncritical praise upon the State Department. He minimizes the fact that when the French were touchy and antagonistic in their relations with the United States, it was not merely because of de Gaulle's vagaries, but because our diplomatic relations with Vichy, our reluctance to recognize de Gaulle, and our collaboration with Darlan had given them reason to doubt our intentions.

In an all-out attack it is perhaps inevitable that if the villain of the piece is to be black, everyone else must be white, but that is unfortunate for it weakens de Kerillis' case. He bitterly deplores the loss of Syria-Lebanon and blames it on de Gaulle. This is surely a short-sighted reading of recent happenings in the Arab world. He favors Giraud as a nonpolitical military leader and does not give adequate consideration to the fact that, whatever the personal politics of the two generals, de Gaulle was supported by representatives of all groups, notably the Left, whereas Giraud's following was almost exclusively Rightist and ex-Vichyite.

De Kerillis' most controversial statements are supported by scant documentation. Is it true that de Gaulle was surrounded from the

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beginning by Cagoulards, many of them pro-German? Is it true that he refused to help political prisoners like Reynaud and Mandel escape to London because he feared they would challenge his political supremacy? Granting that Darlan was murdered by a de Gaullist, is that to be explained merely by the threat offered by the Admiral to de Gaulle's political future?

De Kerillis is not always careful to prove a causal connection between specific events of which he complains and de Gaulle's alleged political ambitions. To attack de Gaulle for denying the legal existence of Vichy and proclaiming his National Committee the "political power" representing France seems overly legalistic. In condemning de Gaulle's desire for a Fourth Republic, de Kerillis gives insufficient consideration to French popular opinion as evidenced not only in the overwhelming vote for the Fourth Republic, but also in the large electoral losses suffered by the Radical Socialists, the party most closely bound up with the political tradition of the Third Republic.

To accuse de Gaulle of being too political, as de Kerillis does, is not the same as proving him authoritarian. *I Accuse de Gaulle* makes too little of the fact that France's collapse was not merely military but political and spiritual as well, and the only effective leadership that could rally French resistance was one that was all of these.

Within France, de Gaullism became the focal point of virtually all of the resistance; outside France, de Gaulle's highhanded leadership and the exaggerated nationalism of his press antagonized many Frenchmen. De Gaullism has become more narrowly defined since the liberation of France. Events have by no means disproved de Kerillis' thesis. But it is far from certain that de Kerillis himself has proved it.

ELLEN HAMMER

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
NEW YORK CITY

Brazil: People and Institutions. By T. LYNN SMITH. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1946.—xxiv, 843 pp. $6.50.

What would you like to know about Brazil? You will probably find the answer in Dr. Smith's book, the best the reviewer ever read on Brazil's agriculture, land tenure, people, family, education, religion and government.

Brazil is a country of great cultural diversity. The urbanized coast contrasts pleasantly with the huge hinterland which contains most of

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the people. Its fine cities are supported by a primitive agriculture. Plows are few and cultivation methods crude. A few modern plantations are the exception that proves the rule. The living standards resulting from the inefficient use of the land are low for the workers but high for the landlords. The sight of the well-fed landlords side by side with thousands who have been reduced to the level of stray animals is a common one in rural Brazil.

Almost forty-two million people of all the main racial groups make up the population. The Brazilians are difficult to classify since they do not share the American's horror of a bit of colored mixture. Even so, the statistical distortion is probably no greater than in the United States where many people who are ethnologically more white than black are regarded as Negroes. Perhaps one half of the Brazilians are white; one seventh Negro; the remainder mixed, with a few Indians in the interior. The whites predominate in the south, the Negroes along the coast from Santos to north of Baía. Immigration and miscegenation have increased the proportion of whites, particularly in the south which has enjoyed the greatest population growth. A high death rate has hindered a more rapid increase of Brazil's people.

The key to human welfare in Brazil is the relation of the people to the land. The landed estate has predominated since the sixteenth century when grants ranged upward from six thousand to several hundred thousand acres. The homestead was lacking. As late as 1920 three fifths of the farms were of the 1,000-hectare size or larger. However, small holdings have recently increased, the number of farms tripling between 1920 and 1940. Sugar cane lands are an exception to this rule. Formerly Brazil's sugar was produced on great estates by *Senhores de engenho* who owned small sugar mills, occupied the top stratum of society, and dominated Brazilian politics. Now the modern sugar factory, owned by urban capitalists, has displaced the *engenho;* and the capitalists themselves are displacing the *Senhores* in politics.

The change in economy is reflected in a change in government. Traditionally Brazil had a strong federal tendency growing out of the scattered settlements in an immense territory. The landlords were the *de facto* rulers in spite of royal efforts to centralize administration in a viceroy. The basis unit of government was the *município,* dominated generally by the landlord class, and consisting of the city and the surrounding territory. This system continued after independence, state control being in the hands of the politicians who controlled the *municípios.* The states themselves were independent of federal power in many essential ways. However, the trend is now toward federal as-

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sumption of functions once exercised by the states. The Vargas régime indicates this trend; its clearest expression was the creation of the totalitarian *Estado Novo* in 1937. Still further centralization will probably come with continued industrial and urban development.

What of Brazil's future? Dr. Smith is optimistic, with reservations. He believes Brazil will develop to the extent that she improves health standards, adopts modern technology, finds an equitable system of wealth distribution, and overcomes her general cultural lag. From the evidence presented it is clear Brazil is making notable progress.

The technical apparatus of Dr. Smith's book is excellent. More than one hundred photographs, twenty-nine figures and maps, seventy-eight statistical tables, an excellent glossary (lacking only pronunciation), and two indexes, one of authors and the other of subject matter, enhance its other merits. The footnotes are a splendid guide to the best printed information on Brazil. No reader who wishes to know Brazil can ignore this book.

BAILEY W. DIFFIE

THE CITY COLLEGE
NEW YORK CITY

The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United States. By CARL BRENT SWISHER. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946.—x, 261 pp. $2.50.

This volume by a leading student of constitutional development is an elaboration of his lectures given early in 1945 on the Walgreen Foundation at the University of Chicago. If much of the material seems familiar, Professor Swisher has provided a convenient review of the great landmarks in constitutional interpretation. And parts are so suggestive that they deserve careful attention.

Professor Swisher has chosen to discuss his subject in the framework of democratic conceptions about government. He has pointed to a continuing conflict between the positive and negative provisions of the Constitution. We often forget that the first purpose of government is to perform various social activities. In the author's view the negative characteristics of the Constitution have received too much emphasis. Largely then, in terms of constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court, the author has discussed federalism, checks and balances, the expanding authority of the federal government, and civil and property rights. The more recent interests of the constitutional lawyer are illus-

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trated in the two chapters devoted respectively to "Administrative Justice" and "World Affairs".

Of these chapters which make up the bulk of the book, the most valuable perhaps is that discussing "The Pendulum of Checks and Balances". Here Professor Swisher presents a brief historical survey of changing relationships between all three branches of government—the Executive, the Legislature, and the Supreme Court. He criticizes Marshall for his "permanent influence in insulating the judiciary against coöperative interchange with Congress and the President" (p. 57). In his discussion of the shifting boundaries of federal authority, the author clearly points out that much of the controversy is motivated not so much by a fine concern for state rights as by a desire on the part of certain economic interests to escape any form of government control.

Professor Swisher is no blind admirer of the New Deal. Indeed, he is frequently critical of President Roosevelt, and, for this reviewer at least, exaggerates the "administrative chaos" in both pre-war and wartime Washington. At the same time the author is firmly convinced that in striking down eleven important acts of Congress in the two years 1935 and 1936, the Supreme Court was too far out of line with popular sentiment, and that many of its members expressed in their opinions outdated conceptions of social values.

It is in the last two chapters that Professor Swisher fully reveals his constitutional scholarship. His discussion of the Supreme Court in the years since the court-packing episode of 1937 is probably the fairest and at the same time the most penetrating discussion of the subject which has yet appeared. He concludes that current criticism of the highest tribunal for "diversity of opinion" is unjustified. Indeed, he feels that in certain fields of constitutional law there is greater stability now than twenty years ago. He points specifically to utility rate regulation and to simplification of the concept of due process of law. Even the fact that we can now assume the constitutionality of most measures which Congress sees fit to enact "implies a kind of stability or, at any rate, a kind of certainty in law which has long been absent" (p. 232).

In his discussion of the constitutional system of today, Professor Swisher puts forward an intriguing suggestion about "a new type of federalism". He points out that if government be viewed in terms of "aggregations of power", then our federal system has two new elements—our great corporate enterprises and our labor unions. He contrasts the conflicting philosophy of organization between government

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and corporations and asks the challenging question whether a political democracy and corporation dictatorship are compatible. In any event, he seems on safe ground in concluding that the American constitutional system " during the decades ahead must increasingly involve supervision of the sweep of enterprise upon which the well-being of the American people depends " (p. 241). Of the three branches of government, he feels that the Legislature presents the greatest problems as well as the greatest need for change. But on the whole he is optimistic about the future. " With the people properly on guard and properly active, the growth of constitutional power in the United States should be a matter of pride and not at all of anxious concern " (p. 252).

JOHN D. MILLETT

Woman as Force in History: A Study in Traditions and Realities. By MARY R. BEARD. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1946.—viii, 369 pp. $3.50.

This work is full of interest to the social historian and the feminist, though the latter may find some parts of it strange doctrine. Mrs. Beard affirms that woman's part in history has been grievously underestimated. This she attributes to the tradition that women have been members of a subject sex throughout history, a subjection from which they have been emerging in the past century. She demonstrates very capably that the tradition is of comparatively recent origin and shows that it is probably the result of Blackstone's statement of the position of women under the common law. By careful examination she reveals that this theory, though technically correct, was actually offset in practice by equity jurisprudence. There is some evidence that Blackstone's position may have been influenced by animus on his part. Through a variety of circumstances which are discussed at length this concept of woman's subjection to man was transmitted to the United States. It became the special target of the feminists of 1848 and their successors, although the use of contracts and other practices under equity had alleviated the situation before the struggle began. Mrs. Beard makes a study of women's property and other rights in English law before 1765 and concludes that women were far from being in utter subjection. Elsewhere she gives much attention to the political rôle of women throughout history and suggests that manhood suffrage may have brought a temporary decline in woman's political activity but that women gained the ballot with greater speed and on the whole less painfully than men. The leaders of the woman's movement tended

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to concentrate on the legal and political disabilities of the sex. This tradition persists in the struggle for equality which still characterizes organized feminism and finds current expression in the demand for the equal rights amendment. The treatment of the legal tradition is very thorough and should lead to a new approach in historical work on the feminist movement.

The book is much broader in scope than the mere analysis of the Blackstonian concept of woman's place. It treats of woman's place in history and the proper approach to the understanding of human life. The author, herself, describes it as a "study" which does not pretend to completeness. She thereby paves the way for further research into the problems discussed. She notes three views of sex relations struggling for mastery today. Communism holds that women will find satisfaction only in complete equality with men under a communistic organization of society. Fascism keeps woman in the home and makes her primarily a bearer of children. Under democracy woman "has the right to choose her way of life even to the point of self-centered interests." This is the way of the liberal and the one to which Mrs. Beard inclines. The book is thus a plea for the idea of progress and the ideal of civilization and for a recognition of the large contributions which women have made to these concepts in the past and an encouragement to their study as a basis for future human development. The problem is not the "woman question" but a "human problem of knowledge, intelligence, and morals."

Mrs. Beard touches on many phases of woman's activity and suggests matters which can be more fully developed. This should have an especial appeal to the social historian of whatever period. Women's economic, social, educational and intellectual activities in the Middle Ages are treated with considerable detail. An expansion of the section on western social philosophy should prove particularly interesting. At moments the listing of individual women and their achievements suggests a catalogue overmuch but these data may be needed to show the fullness of women's rôle in periods under discussion. The relative proportions of masculine and feminine contributions in various movements remain so far among the unsolved problems. The important thing is that women have been very much a part of the stream of history, that their rôle should be realized and used in building for the future.

MARY S. BENSON

MILWAUKEE-DOWNER COLLEGE

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Arms and Policy, 1939-1944. By HOFFMAN NICKERSON. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945.—xi, 356 pp. $3.50.

Major Nickerson is a man of strong opinions and violent prejudices. It is much simpler to ascertain what he is against than what he is for. He has long been opposed to large national armies, which in an earlier volume he described as " armed hordes "; and, as the French Revolution produced the *levée en masse*, he is against the principles of 1789 and 1793 and all their modern manifestations. He is nostalgic for " the mild rule of eighteenth-century kings ", as compared to our present " governmental tyranny " whether manifested " in the form of conscription or of its corollary, high taxation." Although he is against communism—which he variously describes as "a crime " and as " tyranny and wholesale theft, established by means of wholesale murder "—he also is against capitalism, which is founded upon " usury " (used in the sense of extortion). Naturally enough, he is against the Soviet Union and all its works. He is against autocracy, but he is also against democracy. He is against the " savagery " and the " rectangular half-wittedness " of modern architecture. He seems, however—one cannot be quite sure—to be in favor of slavery and of collaborationists (*cf.* pp. 11-12, 319). He is obsessed with the desirability of limited wars on the early eighteenth-century model, despite the fairly obvious fact—not to be dismissed by tantrums—that wars are an inherent part of the social system within which they are waged. In a discussion of " Air Power and Team Play " Major Nickerson dismisses military aviation as " long-range artillery " and most aviators as " baby-killers " and " publicity seekers ". Throughout his book there is a sometimes bizarre sometimes vicious anti-Semitism (see pp. 16, 21, 22, 25, 54, 147, 155, 331) which is altogether irrelevant and hence all the more reprehensible. There is a bibliography of seventeen titles, which Major Nickerson describes as being " partial ", that is to say, " incomplete ". It is partial also in another sense of the word.

One might regard all of the foregoing as harmless foibles and the present book as a mere polemic. But the author enjoys a considerable reputation as a military critic, and even this latest volume from his pen shows in some matters a greater degree of competence than would be evident from his prejudices. For example, on the military history of World War II—which is really the subject of the book and which occupies two thirds of its space—Major Nickerson writes well. Although he underestimates the rôle of the Luftwaffe in the Polish campaign, he understands Blitzkrieg; his discussion of German strategy is well above

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the average of military journalism; his account of the Battle of Britain is excellent. But even in his military history, Major Nickerson is given to intemperate statements such as that German invasion of Britain in 1940 was a "moonstruck idea" and sheer "nonsense". He is not always well informed concerning the plans of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Consistent astigmatism concerning air power limits his perspective on strategy and military operations.

The title of this volume is a misnomer. Only two chapters make any pretense of discussing arms and policy; and in these chapters Major Nickerson reveals himself as an economic nationalist, a continental strategist, an "anti-imperialist", an opponent of universal military training, and a bitter Russophobe. Advocates of a somewhat broader concept of security are dismissed as "globaloney people" and "do-gooders". As regards American policy this volume will delight Senator Wheeler.

EDWARD MEAD EARLE

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

If Men Want Peace: The Mandates of World Order. By Members of the Faculty of the University of Washington. Edited by JOSEPH B. HARRISON, LINDEN A. MANDER and NATHANAEL H. ENGLE. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1946.—viii, 292 pp. $2.50.

Let's Talk about the Peace. By HENRY G. ALSBERG. New York, Hastings House, 1945.—viii, 324 pp. $2.75.

The first of these two books is the result of a coöperative effort which began with the organization of a faculty group at the University of Washington to coöperate with the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems under the chairmanship of Professor Ralph Barton Perry. The end product is a worthy tribute to the wholeheartedness and intelligence of the work done by the members of the Washington group during the war years as their contribution to this nation-wide effort to mobilize the interest and constructive thought of members of college and university faculties in the study of post-war international problems.

The range of the book is very broad indeed, covering the topics of the maintenance of peace, political and human rights, economic and social welfare, and the cultural basis of world order. Since many of

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the chapters were originally suggested by the Problem Analyses prepared and distributed by the Universities Committee, there is considerable parallelism between the subject matter of this book and that of the publications of the Universities Committee. However, the University of Washington faculty group have done their own planning and thinking. They have included in their volume subjects not separately treated, at least, in the Universities Committee program; they have of course brought their own individual and collective thought to bear on the matters considered. The result is a substantial contribution to our understanding of the problems of the post-war world, as well as a useful record of fruitful coöperative activity.

In a coöperative enterprise of this kind there is bound to be some lack of proper synthesis. No numerous group working together can expect to attain the degree of synthesis which should be achieved by one person. On the other hand, it is difficult for one person to combine the variety of skills and insights which are given expression in this book.

It is inevitable that the chapters in such a book, written for the most part by different authors, should be unequal in many respects. Obviously in a study of modest proportions where the attempt is made to cover a wide range of subjects, it is unwise to attempt to present very much factual information. The primary job to be done is that of analysis and generalization. Judged by this standard, some of the chapters are of unusual quality. Professor Quainton's chapter on "The Collapse of World Order" is an exceptionally good short survey of the historical background and introduction to the chapters that follow. Professor Rader, in "The Moral Basis of Peace", has made a notable contribution to the elucidation of this important approach to peace. In a somewhat lighter vein with an episodal flavor, but with real understanding, Drs. Williston and Michael discuss "National and International Aspects of Race". These special recognitions are not intended, however, to belittle the achievements of the other contributors.

Mr. Alsberg's study is of a quite different nature. Though it covers much of the same ground, it is written in a distinctly more popular manner. The body of the book is, in fact, a dialogue between a G.I. student and the lecturer (Mr. Alsberg). In spite of its popular style, however, the book has real substance. The author is deadly serious and it is clear that he writes from much more than a superficial acquaintance with world events. There are factual mistakes but, generally speaking, they do not detract from the value of the volume as an exposition of ideas.

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The author's thesis is a relatively simple one: that the peace problem is the most important single issue facing the world at the present time; that, just as the League failed, so a United Nations Organization based on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals (the book was written before San Francisco) will most likely fail and for many of the same reasons; and that what is needed is the organization of a "New League" whose organs will derive their authority directly from the people and which will have real power to deal with individuals as well as governments.

Mr. Alsberg's analysis of post-war problems and his organizational prescription are definitely challenging. Like so many of the advocates of world government, he has certain blind spots, or at least so it seems to the reviewer. In his proposal for a "New League", that is, world government, he fails to take into account the obvious reluctance of the Soviet Union to sacrifice its freedom of action. Does he accept eventual war as the only alternative, or does he see the possibility of making an organization based on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, that is, the United Nations, serve a useful and constructive purpose? He suggests that there is no such middle ground, but, if that is the case, then the future is indeed black. Furthermore, Mr. Alsberg, basing his argument on the premise that the economic causes of war are relatively unimportant, thinks an international organization set up to keep the peace does not need any real power to control international trade and related matters to be successful. Even though the motive of trade rivalry may be of secondary importance as a cause of war, it seems to the reviewer that conditions of economic dislocation and discontent are extremely unfavorable to the development of those attitudes favorable to peace. The author seems to take too narrow a view with regard to the causes of war, and to overlook, not wholly, but in certain of its aspects, the need for creating fundamental conditions—economic, cultural and moral—favorable to peace.

LELAND M. GOODRICH

BROWN UNIVERSITY

Nationalities and National Minorities (With special reference to East-Central Europe). By OSCAR I. JANOWSKY. With a Foreword by James T. Shotwell. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1945.—xix, 232 pp. $2.75.

This is a timely, sincere and well-intentioned book. It does not belong to that type of research which ends only in an increase in the footnote wealth of the country. It sees the real problems and tries to find

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their solution in the interest of suffering and hard-hit people. The author is aware of the consequences of the nationality problem and of national minorities. He knows that if mankind cannot find a solution for these troubles they will again poison the atmosphere of the whole world. Yet, he somewhat understates the importance of this issue in the post-war world because one gets the impression that he thinks that it remained practically the same, whereas we face an utterly new situation which is far worse than it ever was in the history of nationality struggles. Mr. Janowsky has still too much faith in the practice of the defunct League of Nations, and there is great danger that the United Nations will adopt the committee, blueprint, and hushing-up method of its predecessor. The mild criticism of the author and other admirers of the League could reopen the door to procedures and tactics which culminated in the destruction of the Minorities Treaties and the Mandate System.

But the greatest danger for the future is the fact that the very spirit has collapsed in the whole of East-Central Europe without which any effort for the solution of the minority problem will remain ineffective. What we have achieved in the field of nationality theory and practice was a result of the centuries-old struggle of liberalism for the emancipation of the individual.

Minority problems can be solved only in an atmosphere in which the individual is more highly regarded than the state. That is the reason why we have only one genuine solution of this problem, and this is *Switzerland*. To give a kind of equality to the South African and to the Soviet solution to that of Switzerland, as the author does in his otherwise useful and interesting analysis, confounds the value and the dignity of these experiments. Whereas the Swiss solution is a complete and final solution, the other two are only of a transitory nature. This Swiss experiment can give full satisfaction to the whole community consisting of four different nationalities because it fulfills the needs of the individual in the cultural, political, administrative and judiciary fields, whereas the African is only, as the author himself recognizes, a compromise between two ruling oligarchies of a colonial nature. As to Soviet Russia no one should minimize its accomplishment as a gigantic Berlitz School which for the first time gives opportunity to the Russian masses to learn their own mother tongue, but this is not enough for final solution because without freedom of intellectual and spiritual life the real essence of the nationality aspirations cannot be satisfied. So-called cultural autonomy or "national federalism" alone will not achieve the true results of national aspira-

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tion in a country in which, according to the very sympathetic presentation of the author, "no function of government or aspect of life is outside the competence of the central authorities of Moscow. They lay down general principles, supervise all activities and may veto or disallow any measure taken by the orders of the National Regions or Republics. National freedom does not extend to the sphere of Communist ideology, and there is no Federalism in the fundamentals of economics and politics" (p. 97). Now the reviewer thinks there is no political alchemy by which a country could solve truly and finally the nationality problem on such principles.

This is the reason why the great doctrine of liberal nationalism, the doctrine of Mazzini, Eötvös, Fischhof, Masaryk the elder and many other great minds, has become annihilated in the whole region and the liberal experiments in the field of national autonomy are replaced by the cruel expulsion of millions of national minorities in the spirit of Attila and Ghenghis Khan. Mr. Janowsky merits praise in the demasking of all the hypocritical arguments by which even the so-called liberal statesmen have adopted the wicked principles of the removal of national minorities (they call it now euphemistically "exchange"), even of those who never belonged previously to the sovereignty of the newly established states and were put under strict guarantees of minority treaties. And there is very little consolation in the two quotations which the author extols, the passages in which the once influential Czech statesman, Mr. Stefan Osuský, defends the old traditions of Palacký and Masaryk the elder because these phrases were written in 1941 and would have, at the present time, not the least effect on President Beneš and Masaryk the younger.

In general, the book deserves a careful reading as a convinced statement of a fundamental position without which the nationality problem is unsolvable. The reviewer doubts, however, whether the formula of "national federalism" of Professor Shotwell which the author admires would be a new or a fertile one. The only consequent presentation of this doctrine, that of Karl Renner, proved to be inadequate for appeasing nationality rivalries in Austria, and, since the great Fischhof, all the deeper students of nationality problems agreed that national federalism has a meaning only if it is put into all essential fields of the daily human life of humble citizens. The interests of nationality groups and individual rights are ultimately and inseparably common.

OSCAR JÁSZI

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League of Nations and National Minorities: An Experiment. By P. DE AZCÁRATE. Translated by Eileen E. Brooke. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1945. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.—ix, 216 pp. $2.00.

This is a useful book, instructive rather than provocative or original. P. de Azcárate, professor of administrative law in Granada University, during twelve years coped with minority questions in the Secretariat Service of the League of Nations and attained there the high post of Director of the Minorities Section.

The author does not like to philosophize on the minority problem. He does not pretend to resolve it, and he even doubts whether this problem is as susceptible to solution as those of physics and mathematics. He prefers, and with right, to present his experiences, "impressions", "feelings" and personal opinions, which after all can be very helpful for future theoretical and practical attempts to solve this acute and painful problem. Inasmuch as the secret diplomacy of the League of Nations in regard to the minority question remains unknown to this day, it is to be regretted that Mr. Azcárate's observations and testimony are not elaborated in greater detail. At any rate, his personal experience and recollections are much more worthy than his reproduction—in an incomplete form—of an old and widely known document of the League of Nations, Special Supplement No. 73 of March 7, 1929, which comprises a quarter of the entire book.

No one will doubt Professor Azcárate's *bona fides* and good intentions. He tries his best to be "dispassionate" and impartial. But, with very few exceptions, he arises time and again as a strong supporter of the practice of the League of Nations. He is quite right to assert that "the guarantee of minority rights established by the League of Nations on the basis of the Minorities Treaties did not give satisfaction to the governments of the 'minority' countries, to the minorities themselves, or—and this was the most serious factor of all—to that world public opinion which was interested in minority questions during the last post-war period" (p. 130). When, however, he tries to locate the responsibilities and faults, he attributes them chiefly to the minorities, seldom to the governments of the "minorities", and practically never to the apparatus of the League of Nations and to the procedure established by the League.

In some cases the author is greatly mistaken in his statements and unjust in his judgment. This condition is evident when he overestimates the fairness of the treatment of the Jewish minority in

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pre-war Poland as well as the treatment of the Armenians in pre-war Turkey (pp. 34, 55). In those cases Azcárate's opinions can hardly be called impartial and objective.

The author presents himself as an advocate of supernational methods of coercion organized by rule of law. At the same time, until such an order is established, he attacks a political approach to the minority problems, as well as the applicability of a "legalist criterion" (p. 133). The maintenance of the latter, Azcárate compares to the practice of his fellow countryman, Don Quixote: the Knight of the Doleful Countenance, as a champion of justice, boomed his fellows instead of helping them, in spite of all his good intentions and plans.

It is difficult, however, to realize clearly how the extolled "rule of law" could work, even in the future, without both the political and the legalistic approach. As concerns the recent past, it must be said that the "impartiality" of the League of Nations and its efforts to avoid both these approaches resulted practically in an appeasement policy toward the stronger side—in a "Munich policy" before Munich.

MARK VISHNIAK

NEW YORK CITY

The Lesson of Germany: A Guide to Her History. By GERHART EISLER, ALBERT NORDEN and ALBERT SCHREINER. New York, International Publishers, 1945.—222 pp. $2.50.

The three authors of this book all were active Leftist leaders of the German labor movement during the 1920's and early 1930's. They seem to dislike nobles, industrialists, bankers, professors, churchmen, members of the bourgeoisie, well-to-do farmers, social democrats, and Englishmen. They rely for historical interpretation largely on the works of Marx, Engels, Mehring and Lenin. They view with favor communism as practiced in the Soviet Union. Yet the volume under review is interesting even to one who disagrees with the authors' slant and cannot accept many of their interpretations.

The first five chapters of the book are least well done. They try unsuccessfully to cover the four centuries of German development from 1517 to 1914 in sixty pages. There is much oversimplification and distorted emphasis. In the chapter on the failure of the Revolution of 1848, for example, there is no reference to the influence of the rising spirit of nationality. Again, on page 56 it is baldly stated that Britain, France and Russia were "brought together" in the Triple Entente by the "political purposes behind" the Bagdad Railway enterprise.

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The authors, however, do much better in discussing the aims, methods and motives of the Hitlerites and in describing the guilt of "the great mass of the German people" who "followed the Nazis, rejoiced in their victories, participated in their outrages, profited from their booty, or passively tolerated their barbarous rule." Well they show how "the heroes of the [German] underground swam futilely against the current of the entire Nazi-infected nation." Having been "rejected" by "its own people", the German underground was unable to resist Nazism so effectively as was done by the undergrounds in the several occupied areas.

In this period of doubt and indecision respecting final arrangements vis-à-vis the defeated Powers, it may be well to ponder the authors' quotation from the *Deutsche Wehr*, organ of the German General Staff: "A victor who allows the vanquished to rebuild their industry and continue to develop their economy has made his heavy sacrifice in vain and jeopardizes his own existence. The only prize of victory which justifies such a risk and compensates for such sacrifice is the complete liquidation of the vanquished as future rivals, their destruction as independent and significant economic powers." That was the fate in store for the vanquished in the event of a Nazi victory.

In the final chapter, entitled "The Downfall of Germany", the authors make it abundantly clear that the Germans now have tried nearly every "reactionary highway and byway" in their historic development, but have not yet attempted "the necessary road of human progress and the realization of the rights of man." They have never yet "recognized as *the* German party, *the* German idea, and *the* German man those parties, ideas and men who have been the bearers of progress and who have never compromised or trafficked with the reactionaries." Hence the authors hope, as doubtless do many citizens of the United Nations, that the catastrophic experience of Nazism may help "whatever progressive German forces exist slowly to become the teachers and leaders of their country." For only "if the overwhelming majority of Germans draw up a balance-sheet of their history in such a way that they honor their heroes in the fight against reaction and Nazism as true national heroes; if they recognize the victories of the United Nations' armies over the Hitlerite armies as national victories; if they look upon the initial victories of the Nazi armies as themes for national mourning—only then will a new German nation be born." Only then will Germany be able to fulfill a mission as a co-civilizer of man.

WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM

WAGNER COLLEGE

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Balkan Background. By BERNARD NEWMAN. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1945.—354 pp. $2.50.

In spite of the numerous favorable reviews of Newman's book, the reviewer simply cannot work up any enthusiasm for it. It is true that the volume is graphically and entertainingly written but, readible as are his pages, one in annoyed by the frequent oversimplification of the various deep-seated problems of the Balkans, numerous misstatements of the facts, and Newman's tendency to pretend that he writes as a scholar. The volume is but a broadside from the guns of the British Ministry of Information which employs Newman as its principal speaker and lecturer.

To start with, Newman whitewashes British policies in the Balkans and deliberately omits many facts necessary for a proper understanding of that area. Significantly enough he tells us nothing about the story of the British in Cairo and of their maneuvers in favor of Greece's King George II. He neglects to inform the reader about the British support of EDES while EAM was being villified over London radio broadcasts. He supports the cause of Mikhailovich in Yugoslavia, but fails to note what part the British Foreign Office played in deepening the rifts between the Chetniks and the Partisans. The Metaxas dictatorship in Greece held power "against the King's will" (p. 254). Newman assigns Greece's political future to "closer links with the British Empire." But "if actual inclusion is not possible, then many Greeks would like an association on the Egyptian model" (p. 265). The reviewer's Greek friends tell him that such Greeks exist only in Newman's imagination; likewise, where are those Greeks who favor "a powerful movement towards a Balkan Federation" (p. 293)? The Bulgar "is the gentleman of the Balkans" and "the realist of all the Balkan races" (p. 31), claims Newman in spite of the record established by the Bulgars in both World Wars.

Newman visited the United States as a lecturer in 1942 on behalf of the British government. He is still lecturing. We read: "America, with her traditional generosity, will surely not deny a helping hand to the Balkans" (p. 279). But all investments of the United States should be immediately forgotten, since "the world tried to repay its capital debts to America after the last war, and the world economic slump of 1929 was the result" (p. 283). Hence "it would be understood that the capital would never be repaid" (p. 283). After all, "Lend-Lease is a euphemism for a gift" (p. 303); and, more than that, "In a hundred years the United States alone received thirty-seven

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million immigrants from Europe; the capital value of these people cancels the War Debts and Lease-Lend bills" (p. 332). Britain, *of course,* is willing to help out also, for "We might loan them [the Balkan peoples] a few incorruptible administrators, as we loaned police officers to Albania" (p. 333).

Newman traveled through the Balkans on a bicycle. Surely he must have traveled very rapidly to have made so many historical misstatements. For instance, he states that Nikola Pashitch was "another peasant chief"—although he was a civil engineer by profession who headed the reactionary Radical Party of Serbia. In spite of Newman, Maniu is not "a peasant" (p. 108), but a lawyer who comes from a family with long legal associations and who studied jurisprudence at Cluj, Vienna and Budapest.

All this indicates that the discerning reader would do well to regard the book as an exhibit of successful international propaganda emanating from Britain rather than as an authoritative source of light regarding the Balkans. The result is unavoidably confusing in its total aspect, although innocents might value it highly. A scholar looking for a dependable and unbiased introduction to the Balkan backgrounds will do well to be skeptical when looking over Newman's book. It is loosely written, prone to overstatements (and even more frequently to understatements) and falls far short of a careful and authoritative treatment which the title leads us to expect.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

HOFSTRA COLLEGE,
HEMPSTEAD, LONG ISLAND

The Arab Island: The Middle East, 1939-1943. By FREYA STARK. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1945.—xxiv, 236 pp. $3.50.

Miss Stark's knowledge of the Arab Near East is direct and intimate, based on personal experiences which cover a period of nearly twenty years. Diligent work on the language and the area, an adventurous spirit, and an artist's keen perception have given her an insight into the Arab world enjoyed, perhaps, by no western woman since the days of Gertrude Bell. During the war she served in the Near East on behalf of the British Ministry of Information. The present book is an episodic account of her war work. Like her earlier writing, it is evocative and highly readable, if rather frilly here and there: "They [the Yemenite soldiers] march four or five in a row, and if one falls

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out, he makes it up with a skip, not military but endearing" (p. 28). Sheikh Mahmud is delightful (p. 202). (The reviewer has heard him called many names by the British, but never that.) Much of it is exciting; for example, the early weeks of the war as seen from Aden, or the siege of the British Embassy in Baghdad during the Rashid Ali rebellion.

The author repeatedly expresses her bewilderment with things political, although her book is necessarily replete with references and allusions to politics. In the end the reader will be hard put to it to decide whether Miss Stark's obvious naïveté in handling various political questions is artful or merely ingenuous. She holds that the British motive in the Arab world is "safe transit and not 'imperialism'" (p. xxi) and that the dominant Arab attitude toward the British is one of firm friendship. This is difficult to reconcile with the numerous manifestations of obsessive nationalism and xenophobia in the Near East, directed as often as not against the British. An Egyptian Prime Minister, Ahmad Mahir, recently paid with his life for his alleged partiality to the British on the occasion of Egypt's last minute declaration of war on the Axis. The one-sided presentation of the Palestine problem is scarcely a real service to the Arab cause. The Arab, the Zionist, the British side—none is all black or all white. If one follows the author, the British government has been consistently high-minded and unanimous on the subject, while the Zionists have remained unconciliatory. It is precisely this sort of propaganda that has taken the play away from the moderates among the Arabs and the Jews and has encouraged extremism within both groups.

Miss Stark's principal task proved to be the organization and stimulation, throughout the area, of branches of a society known as Brotherhood of Freedom. We are told how many members joined up in Egypt and in Iraq, how diversified were their ranks, and how touching their faith and courage. Yet little definite is said about the ideals of the Brotherhood, the shades of opinion among the representative members, their influence on public opinion, the kind of opposition to their activities, and the like. All such matters are either ignored or obscured by vague generalities.

The book is dedicated to the "young effendis", the rising class of professionals and bureaucrats who are expected to gain for the Arab states their rightful place in the society of nations. "This thing in England [democracy] has grown from roots in the soil and in the hearts of those who lived upon it. Here in Iraq its form has come from abroad, and it is men like yourselves who carry the seed of the

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little plant..." (p. 211)—a strange sermon to be used in Iraq where the seed of democracy was sown four thousand years before the foundation of the Mother of Parliaments; stranger still to preach it to the effendis, many of whom seek to foreswear their traditions in their superficial attachment to western doctrines and customs. To many who see a great future for the Arabs, the effendi appears as unpromising as his name is un-Arabic. Instead, the next step would seem to be real and integrated progress from within, in stride with, but not in jejune imitation of, alien ideals from the west. One may doubt whether the effendis can furnish the leaders for such a movement.

The author makes frequent use in this book of the term "charming". Another of her favorites is "dilapidated" (with gay disregard of etymology). In the opinion of one reviewer at least, *The Arab Island* is amply endowed with both these qualities.

E. A. Speiser

University of Pennsylvania

A Man From Kansas: The Story of William Allen White. By David Hinshaw. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945.—xi, 305 pp. $3.00.

This loyal and uncritical biography leaves the reader between laughter and tears. Mr. White himself must have often felt that way, for he wore his emotions upon his sleeve. He was "almost certainly" the greatest "obit" writer that ever lived; and Mr. Hinshaw, who first thrilled as a Kansas farm boy, almost fifty years ago, to the joyous spirit of the Emporia editor, has written a loving obituary in the best White manner. It lacks only the typical White valedictory: "He did what he could."

William Allen White's career will always distress the intellectuals because his highly personalized, dramatic understanding of life was as elusive in the field of ideas as a blob of mercury in the laboratory. Even "Kansas" and "The West" were to him merely expressions of ideas interchangeable with his own optimistic self-awareness. There is no hint in his editorials (an excellent collection of which was published as *Forty Years on Main Street* in 1937), or in this biography, of any traditional philosophical qualities of ironic detachment. But of course William Allen White never pretended to be a traditionalist; he was true to a hopeful understanding of his own time and place, and thus true to ideas that may be called "typically American", in the best sense of that stereotyped phrase.

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One may, of course, challenge that understanding in view of the testimony of other Kansans. The observations of the "Sage of Emporia" are rather curious when placed alongside those of the "Sage of Potato Hill", grim Ed Howe of the Atchison *Globe*. The latter's *Story of a Country Town* is already an American classic, and its courageous realism embodies a view of human nature that White never really knew. In Kansas, as elsewhere, there apparently have been all kinds of people, and all kinds of experiences, and hence all kinds of philosophies.

Mr. White must be taken for what he was, and his biographer does that in terms of praise for all the things in which his subject believed: Bull Moose liberalism, religious and racial tolerance, defending America by aiding the Allies, and so on.

If Mr. Hinshaw has undervalued White in any respect it is in regard to his poetic streak. The man from Kansas was not only a famous editor, raconteur historian, and writer of best-selling novels, but also something of a poet. Only passing mention is made of the volume of verse White wrote as a young man, with Albert Bigelow Paine; and the reader does not fully appreciate the extent to which flowers, trees, music, and a sensuous outlook on life appealed to White. Greater significance might also have been made of lovely Peter Pan Park in Emporia, given by the Whites in memory of their daughter; for Mr. White himself had many of the qualities of Pan, Puck, and all the other whimsical clowns of literature. It is fitting that a presentation of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* has become an annual event in the Park, accompanied by the kind of choral singing that moved Mr. White to editorial ecstasy.

One would like to know more, also, about the White family; Sallie Lindsay White seems to have been her husband's alter ego in charm and work (even on the *Gazette*); and the children are already famous in legend and literary achievement.

The unreserved praise of this biography sometimes tends to cloy; "All the world loved William Allen White" is the persistent theme. One would like to enter a demurrer: there must have been *some* Democrats in Kansas! But with the over-all view there can be no serious quarrel with anyone who knew William Allen White. He was in word and deed the kind of a man his friend Theodore Roosevelt would have described, at the top of his lungs, as "bully".

ROBERT A. EAST

BROOKLYN COLLEGE

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BOOK NOTES

The Farmer's Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897, by Fred A. Shannon (New York and Toronto, Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1945; xiv, 434 pp. $5.00), provides the most comprehensive account available of the economic developments relating to agriculture in the United States during the years covered. As his title suggests, the author has emphasized the completion of agricultural settlement and the effect of this process upon farming in both the new frontier and the older regions and upon the national economy as a whole. He has a deep sympathy for farmers, and their economic welfare is a major interest in his treatment of the problems that confronted them. As this period of American agricultural history is rampant with stress and change, the problems of organization and emphasis in studies concerning it are unusually difficult, but the author has resolved them moderately well. The volume begins with a chapter on "Nature and the Farmer" in which attention is given to the extent to which the farmers understood the land on which they worked. The chapter on "Agricultural Settlement in New Areas" adds substantially to the interpretation of the actualities behind the census maps of persons to the square mile. The chapter on "Disposing of the Public Domain" presents the subject in perspective with reference to the latest findings of the specialists on the subject. There are seven chapters on the practical problems of agriculture considered by regions and one on farm mechanization. The chapters on governmental activity in agriculture, the political revolts, and the farmers' attempts at self-help through coöperatives emphasize the inadequacies of the government's efforts on behalf of the farmers against economic monopolies. The chapter on "The Farmer and the Nation" provides succinct delineations of the place of agriculture in the nation's economy and of the city as a safety valve for rural discontent. The concluding chapter is a summary on "The Literature of the Subject" that the author found sufficiently useful to recommend. The volume is not perfect in all respects, but listing a bill of particulars would tend to overemphasize its shortcomings and detract from its merits. Apparently due to the lack of space, there are a number of regrettable omissions. There are also inaccurate and doubtful statements and some conclusions that are questionable; but, historians who are aware of the intricacies of the subject in the same period covered

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and the inadequacies of the pertinent monographic literature will acclaim the author's bravery, stamina and skill in essaying this pioneer venture.—EVERETT E. EDWARDS, United States Department of Agriculture.

The roots of Soviet strength during the war and after continue to receive puzzled attention in the Western world. *Why Is Russia So Strong?: The Foundations of Russia's Strength* (Bienne, Switzerland, Editions Chasseral, 1945; 264 pp. Francs 11.-), by George Kieser, differs from other studies in the field in its serious, well-informed approach, which is based on thoughtful comparison of the Soviet social system and philosophy with those of the capitalist nations. After a survey of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union since the Revolution, the author discusses in great detail the economic foundations of her strength, both in terms of resource development and of economic planning and incentives. Then he turns to the social factors of Soviet strength in a more general sense, such as the selection of managers from the ranks of the working population, the productive contribution of factory committees, and social insurance. The concluding section deals with such political foundations of Russia's strength as its nationality policies. Throughout the book a constant and interesting effort is made to compare social motivations under a planned collectivist economy with those which prevail under capitalist competition. The author's general attitude is that of unqualified admiration toward Soviet achievements, not from the angle of a party Communist, but rather from that of an independent Socialist who also happens to be a Russian patriot. Occasionally he appears to sense the necessity of discussing such issues as the political dictatorship, but he seldom follows up such suggestions. Although the book is thus exposed to criticism on grounds of lopsidedness, it contains a wealth of both factual information and penetrating social analysis. Its earlier Swiss editions in the French, German and Italian languages have had a responsive reception and it deserves the attention of social scientists in the Western world.—ALBERT LAUTERBACH, Sarah Lawrence College.

Rival Partners: America and Britain in the Postwar World, by Keith Hutchison (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1946; x, 262 pp. $2.00), is a layman's guide to Anglo-American problems in economic policy. It is a thoroughly well-meaning book, obviously written with thought and care by a man to whom the problems were of more than purely intellectual concern. Its aim is to popularize and proselytize rather than to break new paths in analysis. Its stand can be described

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as moderate liberal, with a dash of realism injected by a familiarity with English problems and interpretations. Its key contention that the British balance-of-payments problem is the crux of future Anglo-American economic relations is forcefully stated as the conclusion of the whole book, but its analysis does not go nearly deep enough. The Second World War not only did not bring the lasting peace and the liberal world of the Atlantic Charter, but seems to have produced more violent competition between liberal and totalitarian ideals than existed before. In this competition the liberal ideals can hope to win out only if the liberal nations are indissolubly united. Half-measures of economic coöperation may prove to have been the first steps in the right direction, or else they may turn out to have provided a means of evasion of the facts of life. Perhaps one should not scare one's readers by getting down to brass tacks; but the illusionism surrounding Bretton Woods, San Francisco, and projected global trade organizations has to be liquidated if Mr. Hutchison's ideals are to triumph, and Mr. Hutchison seems as yet in no mood to admit any such thing.—I. DEVEGH, New York City.

A recent study—*The Kentucky State Budget System* (Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1945; iv, 103 pp. $0.50) by James W. Martin and Vera Briscoe—covers more territory than its title or brevity might suggest. It not only traces the legal background and current practices of Kentucky budgeting; it also appraises the present system and offers recommendations based on the experience of other jurisdictions and the writings of budgetary " authorities ". The resulting framework for comment brings up to date some of the information on comparative state budget provisions and practices last assembled by Sundelson (*Budgetary Methods in National and State Governments*) in 1938. Moreover, its quotations and numerous citations offer a convenient bibliographical check list, especially with respect to recent speeches and articles on American budgetary practice. The Governor of Kentucky is vested by law with a major rôle in budget preparation; he is to submit an authoritative and coördinated plan to the legislature. He apparently has more power and discretion than many other governors to control the execution of the budget, by reason of (1) relatively broad items of appropriation, (2) a system of quarterly allotments enforced by pre-audit of commitments, and (3) authority to approve certain types of appropriation transfers, and to supplement individual appropriations from a generous contingency item made to him. In holding budget hearings, Kentucky governors invite attendance and participation by the Legislative Council, a bipartisan body

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drawn from both houses of the legislature. The authors credit to this practice the fact that the biennial appropriation bill reflecting the Governor's spending proposals has usually been passed with little dissent. Observers of experience in other states, as well as harried governors and budget officers, may well desire a more detailed story than is here presented of the specific working relations between Kentucky's governor, budget staff, legislative council, and the legislature as a whole. The Kentucky budget system has been less than fully adequate, according to this report, primarily because (1) a large share of the state's revenues are earmarked and are substantially excluded from the scope of the budget, and (2) there has been inadequate staffing for budgeting as well as a failure to recognize it as a task of continuous planning. Similar comments might apply to budgeting in many other states. However, earmarking of revenues need not of itself preclude (as much as Kentucky practice might suggest) comprehensiveness of budgetary planning and control.—ALLEN D. MANVEL, Bureau of the Budget.

The Zionists, in their desire to find a permanent home for the uprooted Jews of Europe by settling the largest possible number in Palestine, have concentrated considerable scientific talent on studying the economic potentialities of that country. The Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, responsible for many of these investigations, has been assembling and analyzing economic data with respect not only to Palestine but also to the other countries of the Near East (the American equivalent of the British term, "Middle East"). *The Economic Development of the Middle East: An Outline of Planned Reconstruction after the War* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1945; xii, 164 pp. $4.00) by Alfred Bonné is in large measure a product of years of research by the Institute of which the author is director. The volume appeared originally in Jerusalem in 1943 and was reprinted in this country under the auspices of the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction. The only difference between the two is the inclusion in the later edition of a brief appendix regarding the effect of the war on post-war finance in the Near East. The first third of the book is devoted to an analysis of population trends and their relation to national income, a description of the major economic and social problems and of agricultural and industrial productivity in the region. The general thesis of the study is that the most desirable kind of planned economy for the Near East lies somewhere between the Anglo-American capitalist-democratic system of private initiative and the Soviet statist-dictatorial system of "all-

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embracing collective planning". Any over-all program of managed economy for the area, in the author's view, would have to include the introduction of intensive agriculture and the extension of the land under cultivation, a steady increase in the price of agricultural products in relation to that of manufactures, the industrialization of the region, and the development of public services (health, education, transport, and the like) supported by greater taxation. Bonné feels that his proposals for economic reform could be financed through the use of the unprecedented amount of local capital accumulated in the war years, supplemented by international credits in the form of capital goods. The author betrays a rather optimistic view of the possibilities of implementing his program and merely alludes to, but never tackles, the complex political problems with which the economic issues are inextricably involved. Although the volume is less Palestino-centric than most others by Zionist writers, attention is disproportionately focused on that country. The omission of Iran and the countries and shaikhdoms of the Arabian Peninsula also decreases the value of the study. Despite these defects the volume is an important contribution to a largely undeveloped field.—J. C. HUREWITZ, Washington, D. C.

Once again there has appeared that handiest of political reference works, the *Political Handbook of the World, 1946* (Harper & Brothers, New York, for the Council on Foreign Relations; 202 pp. $3.00). Like its predecessors, this nineteenth volume in the series was edited by Walter H. Mallory. Like its predecessors, too, it contains unbiased and accurate factual information on the parliaments, political parties, party platforms, and newspapers of seventy-three countries. There is similar information with regard to the World Court, the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations Organization. The course of history is reflected in the changes over previous volumes. For Germany there is no listing of a "ruler" and under Japan the name of Hirohito appears a full page after that of Supreme Allied Commander MacArthur. After several years' absence, Austria and Albania are reincluded. There are new sections on Syria and Lebanon. There is a splendid six-page section on the structure of the United Nations Organization. Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia, Manchukuo and Monaco have lost their separate listings. And, strangely, as the Middle East and the Arab countries in general come to occupy more space in the daily press, such countries as Iran and Iraq are moved from their regular alphabetical place and relegated with Muscat, Nepal and Liechtenstein to the back of the book under the general heading "other countries". It is not at all clear to the reviewer why Newfoundland, Liberia and

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Luxembourg should be given a page or two each, while Iran, Iraq and Saudi-Arabia are made to share the last three pages with nine other states. The allocation of space, however, admittedly is a matter of opinion. But there can be no difference of opinion regarding the indispensability of the *Handbook* to an intelligent understanding of the confused and confusing political happenings of the day.—WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM, Wagner College.

For months now, those who were not present at San Francisco, or who were not fortunate enough to acquire a file of records from the conference, have been handicapped in their search for comprehensive analytical comment and orderly documentation. Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, who served at the conference in official capacities, have come to the rescue. Thus between the covers of one volume—*Charter of the United Nations; Commentary and Documents* (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1946; xiii, 400 pp. $2.50)—may be found: a brief but thorough historical sketch of the evolution of the Charter; a description of the organization and procedure of the conference; a summary of the nature and content of the Charter; an article-by-article commenting on the Charter; pertinent documents ranging from the Atlantic Charter to the Potsdam Declaration; and, finally, a first-rate selected bibliography. The commentary—some 250 pages of the text—comprises the important part of the authors' contribution. Analytical remarks span the relationship between a particular provision of the Charter and past experience in the field of international organization; the nature of the agreement reached in various articles and the reasons for it; and criticism of certain clauses. In general, discussion of the latter kind seems least successful. Highly specialized students may be a little disappointed in some sections, notably those devoted to voting procedure in the Security Council, action with respect to the maintenance of peace, and regional arrangements. But it is too easy to become picayune in reviewing a work of this kind. While there are places where the reader wishes for an extra paragraph or two, the magnitude of the authors' task is obscured by the competence with which it is accomplished. This is a technical book, really a reference book; it cannot be read easily at one or two sittings for general enlightenment. Laymen can, however, consult it with profit. In the torrent of material which will be upon us in due time, this effort will more than hold its own.—RICHARD CARLTON SNYDER, Columbia College.

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